CHECKLIST FOR DOING AN ACCOUNTING IN A PROBATE MATTER
April 11, 2011 § 16 Comments
_____ State the time period covered by the accounting, starting with the date of the last accounting, or if a first account with the date the estate, guardianship or conservatorsip was opened.
_____ List all assets of the estate as of the ending date of the last accounting. (MCA §91-7-277, §91-7-93, §93-1333, §93-13-67, and §93-113-259 and UCCR 6.03).
______ List the date, source, and amount of each item of income since the last accounting. (MCA §91-7-277, and §93-13-67).
______ Total the income and state a total.
______ List the date, payee, explanation or description, amount, and authority (the date of each authorizing court order) for each disbursement since the ending date of the last accounting. (MCA §91-7-277, 91-7-279, §93-13-67p, and §93-13-71 and UCCR 6.04 and 6.05).
______ Attach all documents supporting all income and disbursements. This is the “voucher” requirement that was previously posted about here. The required documentation includes ALL statements of any accounts or investments showing income or disbursements. This may also include canceled checks and receipts. (See statutes and rules cited above).
______ Total the disbursements and state the totals.
______ List and explain for all non-financial assets that appeared on the previous accounts, but are no longer in the control of the fiduciary.
______ A request for payment for the fiduciary including a bill or itemization to support request. (MCA §91-7-299 and §93-13-67 and UCCR 6.11).
______ A request for attorney fees, including a bill or itemization to support said request. (MCA §91-7-281 and §93-13-79 and UCCR 6.12).
______ Close with a summary calculation of the value of the estate coming into the hands of the fiduciary at the opening of the accounting period, a total of the income, a total of the disbursements, and a total balance in the fiduciary’s control that will be the beginning figure for the next account.
______ Have the fiduciary sign and swear to the accounting. (MCA §91-7-277 and §93-13-37 and UCCR 6.02).
Thanks to Jane Miller, Senior Staff Attorney for the 12th District.
WHEN THE JUDGE RESERVES RULING
March 31, 2011 § Leave a comment
So you just made the most brilliant objection of your legal career and the blankety-blank judge reserved ruling. How could this be? You begin to stew and fret, so much so that you let the witness conclude her testimony and be excused.
Guess what. Your brilliant objection went out the window as the witness left the courtroom. Why?
Uniform Chancery Court Rule 3.04 deals with objections to testimony. It specifically states, “If the Chancellor shall reserve his ruling, counsel interposing the objection shall make a note thereof and renew his objection at the conclusion of the testimony; otherwise he shall be deemed to have waived his objection.” You didn’t renew the objection, so it is waived.
It is fairly common for Chancellors to reserve ruling on an MRCP Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s or petitioner’s case. If the judge reserves ruling, you must renew your motion at the conclusion of your case, or it is deemed waived.
In similar fashion, if the judge reserves ruling on a question or line of questions, be sure to renew that objection in a timely fashion, or you may be “procedurally barred” from raising the point on appeal.
A MOTHER LODE OF PROOF
March 28, 2011 § Leave a comment
Suppose in an equitable distribution case that you have to prove the balance in a PERS account and its balance on a past date? Or in a contempt case that you have to prove it was a hail storm that did the damage on May 15, 2008? Or in a modification of child support case that the consumer price index has increased by x percent since 2006?
And suppose that in each of the scenarios above counsel opposite will not stipulate to the facts or allow you any easy way to go about proving what you need to prove?
Do you have to subpoena a witness from PERS to bring the records and do calculations in person? Do you have to subpoena a meteorologist to testify as an expert? Are you required to enlist a respected economist to testify about the CPI?
There’s an easier, more efficient way that opens up endless, inexpensive opportunities to prove even the most esoteric matters.
It’s MRE 803(8), which states that, even if the declarant is available to testify, the following are not excluded by the hearsay rule:
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duties imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report …
There’s more to the rule involving reports such as police reports and investigative reports, but that’s a subject for another post.
To utilize that part of Rule 803(8) stated above, all you have to do is produce a certified copy of a record or report of a public agency that sets forth either activities of the agency or matters observed pursuant to a duty imposed on the agency by law.
To prove the balance in the PERS account and its balance on a past date, get a certified copy of a report from PERS itself showing that information.
The hail storm on May 15, 2008, can be proven through a certified report from the National Weather Service.
The U.S. Department of Commerce can give you a certified copy of a report showing the CPI information you need.
MRE 902(1) and (2) say that those documents are self-authenticating.
The late Lawrence Rabb, who was a respected lawyer in Meridian, often astonished me with the proof he was able to marshal using certified reports he obtained from state and federal agencies. Many times he was able to prove critical elements of a case with a simple, self-authenticating document. With a little imagination, I am sure that you can come up with dozens of ways you can put Rules 803(3) and 901(1) and (2) to use for you.
POST-TRIAL MOTIONS: ROUND THREE
March 23, 2011 § 3 Comments
I’ve posted here about the necessity to file post-trial motions to preserve error in chancery court, and how the COA’s January 25, 2011, decision in Robinson v. Brown may have changed our traditional practice. Then the COA stayed the mandate and we awaited a new decision.
The new Robinson v. Brown opinion was issued yesterday, March 22, 2011, and in my judgment we are back exactly where we started: You’d better file those post-trial motions if you expect to raise an issue on appeal.
Although the new opinion actually addresses and analyzes the sufficiency of the chancellor’s findings, the court states at ¶ 23 that, “In this case, we likewise find the challenge of the chancellor’s findings in the instant case procedurally barred.” The two cases cited in support of the point are distinguishable both on their facts and their procedural posture, but no matter. The COA is determined to interpret MRCP 52(b) in its own way.
I have other fish to fry, so I don’t really have the time or energy to devote to breaking this down further. Besides, I am out of the appeal business. It’s lawyers like you who have to deal with this.
If the supreme court will take this case on cert and look closely at it, perhaps our supreme chancellor, Justice Pierce, will be afforded the opportunity to elucidate this for us. If I were still practicing law in chancery court I would certainly want the point clarified for the sake of my clients and my malpractice insurance premiums.
In the meantime, I stand by my earlier suggestion to file those post-trial motions raising every conceivable point possible that you may wish to raise on appeal. If you don’t you may find yourself “procedurally barred” in the COA.
PROVING THE VALUES OF VEHICLES
March 15, 2011 § Leave a comment
You’re the judge. Which values do you think will have more credibility:
- Financial statement 1 has the family vehicles valued by the party at $800 (the car he wants) and $35,000 (the car that he wants the other party to have), unsupported by any authority; and
- Financial statement 2 that has Kelly Blue Book or NADA printouts from the internet showing values of $12,000 and $16,500?
Financial statement 2 will win the credibility battle every time.
When you are doing your responses to discovery, go to the Kelly Blue Book site or the N.A.D.A. site and enter the make, year model, mileage, condition and options for your client’s car. Use the “Used Car – Private Sale” figures, and print out the results. Include the printout with your discovery response as an attachment to the Rule 8.05 financial statement or in any other appropriate place. Then, when you are preparing for trial, make sure the printout is attached to the financial statement you are going to offer into evidence.
FIVE MORE TIPS FOR MORE EFFECTIVE RULE 8.05 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
March 14, 2011 § 9 Comments
I posted here ten tips for more effective financial statements.
Here are a handful more to use in your quest for financial statement perfection:
- Number the pages. It saves the fumbling around as the witness and the court are trying to orient themselves to your questioning. And use the page numbers in questioning the witness: “Ms. Smith, look with me at page 3, line 6.” That’s a lot clearer and easier for a witness to follow than asking “Now you say you spend $200 a month on clothes for yourself; how did you come up with that?”
- Add or delete categories to meet your needs. Your client spends $65 a month buying yarn and other materials to feed her knitting habit. Why not replace an unused catergory like “Transportation (other than automobile)” with “Hobby Expenses.” It would be a whole lot clearer than lumping it in with household expenses or something else, and will make it easier for your nervous client to understand while testifying.
- Don’t list a deduction as “mandatory” when it is not. Deductions required by law, such as taxes and social security are excluded from adjusted gross income for calculation of child support. Voluntary contributions, such as 401(k) deductions, health insurance premiums, and the like are not excluded from income. When you list voluntary deductions as “mandatory,” you are at worst planting false information in the record, and at best confusing the record. Your client does not know the distinction. This is part of practicing law: advising your client how to properly fill out his or her 8.05.
- Attach a current pay stub. Pay stubs are a marvelous source of information. Quite often clients (and attorneys, I am sad to report) miscalculate income. A current pay stub, preferably with year-to-date (YTD) info is a great tool to check the income figures. Pay stubs also show the true amounts of overtime, bonuses, deductions for insurance and other items, andd retirement contributions.
- Tailor your 8.05 to the case you are trying. In a divorce case, you can have one column of figures showing your client’s current expenses, one showing the household expenses before the separation (to show standard of living), and a third column showing her anticipated expenses following the divorce. In a modification case, add a column on both the income and expense side showing what your client’s income and expenses were at the time of the judgment you are seeking to modify.
Of all the documents you admit into evidence at trial, the 8.05 is the one that the judge will study the closest and spend the most time poring over. Make it a workhorse for your case.
GETTING THAT SUMMARY INTO EVIDENCE
March 9, 2011 § Leave a comment
I’ve talked here before about the beauty of MRE 1006, which allows you to summarize voluminous records and admit the summary into evidence. The charm of the rule is that (1) it eliminates the need for tedious searching through documents to locate the nuggets you need and eliminates as well the tedious testimony it takes to do that, and (2) it makes the judge’s job easier, which makes the judge happier, and a happier judge is better for your case than a grumpy one.
So you’ve gone and condensed those ten years of credit card statements into a summary showing the expenditures for jewelry for the opposing party’s girlfriend, their trips to Gulf Shores, the vacation spending on the family, and the payments on the credit card showing that he never ran a balance until the separation, when the balance began to balloon. All great stuff, and it’s going to help your alimony claim big time.
You proudly offer the summary and your wily opponent objects. Sustained. Every attempt you make to get the summary in meets with an objection. Sustained. You close your eyes and silently curse the judge who gave you the idea to go to all the trouble to do the summary in the first place. Where did you go wrong?
Well, you have to lay a foundation first.
To get a Rule 1006 summary into evidence, you have to establish 5 things:
- That the original writings, recordings or photographs are, in fact, voluminous;
- That the originals can not be conveniently examined in court;
- That the originals, or duplicates, have been made available for examination or copying, or both, by the other party at a reasonable time and place;
- That the originals would be admissible in evidence; and
- That the chart, summary or calculation offered in lieu of the voluminous originals is fair and accurate.
Now, let’s rewind the above scenario and do it right (assuming you’ve already laid a foundation for entry of the credit card statements):
You: Mrs. Smith, did you have an opportunity to examine all 120 of the MasterCard statements?
Witness: Yes, I did.
You: How many pages of statements were there?
Witness: More than 600.
You: After you examined them, what did you do?
Witness: I extracted certain information, collated it into categories, and organized it into a summary. I also highlighted the various charges on the original duplicates in colors corresponding with the categories.
You: Does your summary fairly and accurately duplicate and summarize the information in the credit card statements?
Witness: Yes.
You: Your honor, I would ask that the record reflect that I did make the original credit card statements available to counsel opposite for examination and copying in discovery more than three months ago.
Counsel Opp: That is correct, Judge.
You: I offer the summary into evidence.
Counsel Opp: Objection. Best evidence rule, hearsay, self serving, redundant and cloud of witnesses.
Judge: Overruled. Let the document be marked as the next numbered exhibit and admitted into evidence.
That’s really all there is to it. When the judge is poring over his notes and the exhibits to adjudicate the case, he will be extremely grateful that he has that nice summary to use instead of having to dig through 600 pages of credit card statements with thousands of transactions. Not only that, he will be less likely to overlook something you considered critical. The extra money your client has to spend for you to prepare the summary will be worth every dollar.
Wells v. State, 604 So.2d 271, 274-5 (Miss. 1992) is a case that illustrates the use and authentication of a summary in a jury trial.
MORE PROOF THAT CUTTING CORNERS DOES NOT PAY
March 8, 2011 § 1 Comment
Tangela Berry and Ricky Banks were guardians of their son Ryheim Banks. In June, 2004, they filed suit in circuit court against several medical defendants alleging negligence.
They reached a settlement with one of the defendants, Laura Carpenter, for $25,000, to be apportioned 1/3 each to Berry, Banks and Ryheim, after deduction of a $10,000 attorney’s fee.
When the settlement was presented to the chancellor, the guardians’ attorney did not call any witnesses. Instead, he made an announcement to the court that Carpenter’s involvement was “negligible,” and that the settlement was “appropriate.” He did, apparently, question Berry and Banks about whether they understood they were releasing their claims against the defendant, which they did, and whether the were following the advice of their attorneys in settling Ryheim’s claim, which they also did. There was no testimony regarding the nature or extent of the injuries, or the substance of the claims, or the damages incurred. The chancellor signed a judgment approving the settlement on August 5, 2005, including the language that the settlement was a “fair and reasonable settlement of a doubtful claim and it is in the best interest of the minor and all others.”
In July 2008, the guardians again appeared in court with new counsel asking the chancellor to set aside the prior settlement because the former attorney had not prosecuted the claim and had done no discovery. They said that they had learned that Carpenter had a $1,000,000 insurance policy that would have afforded coverage that was not disclosed to them at the time of the settlement. Their motion was brought under MRCP 60(b).
The chancellor did set aside the 2005 judgment pursuant to MRCP 60(b), finding that there was insufficient evidence at the 2005 hearing to establish that the settlement was fair and reasonable and in the best interest of the minor.
Carpenter appealed, charging that the trial court erred: in not including specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in his order; and that it was an abuse of discretion to set aside a judgment under MRCP 60 after three years had elapsed from the date of the judgment.
In the case of Carpenter v. Berry, et al., decided February 10, 2011, the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the chancellor’s ruling.
As for the claim that the conclusions were unsupported, the appellate court found that the chancellor’s findings were sufficient, considering that the matter was not complex.
With respect to the abuse of discretion claim, the court noted that the chancellor did not specify that part of MRCP 60 under which he proceeded. The court found MRCP 60(b)(5) applicable since that rule allows a judgment to be set aside where “it is no longer equitable that the judgment have prospective application.”
The court also found MRCP 60(b)(6) applicable, since it provides that the chancellor may grant relief “for any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.” MRCP 60(b)(6) “is reserved for extraordinary circumstances,” and is “a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular case. Briney v. USF & G, 714 So.2d 962, 966 (Miss. 1998).
The Supreme Court noted that the trial judge must consider several factors in determining whether to grant 60(b)(6) relief:
- That final judgments should not lightly be disturbed;
- That a 60(b)(6) motion is not to be used as a substitute for an appeal;
- That the rule should be liberally construed so as to achieve substantial justice;
- Whether the motion was made within a reasonable time;
- Whether the movant had been afforded a fair opportunity to present claims or defenses, if the judgment was rendered after a trial on the merits;
- Whether there are any intervening equities that would make it inequitable to grant relief; and
- Any other factors relevant to the justice of the judgment under attack.
[Note: one factor relating solely to dafault judgments was omitted by the court, with a reference] M.A.S. v. Miss. Department of Human Services, 842 So.2d 527, 530 (Miss. 2003).
In this particular case, the Supreme Court found that this was no ordinary 60(b) case because it involved the rights of a minor under a guardianship. The court said:
“It is the inescapable duty of [chancery] court and or the chancellor to act with constant care and solicitude towards the preservation and protection of the rights of infants and persons non compos mentis. The court will take nothing as confessed against them; will make for them every valuable election; will rescue them from faithless guardians, designing strangers and even unnatrual parents, and in general will and must take all necessary steps to conserve and protect the best interest of these wards of the court. The court will not and can not permit the rights of an infant to be prejudiced by a waiver, or omission or neglect or design of a guardian, or of any other person, so far as within the to prevent or correct. Griffin, Chancery Practice, §§ 45, 360, 530, 533. All persons who deal with guardians or with courts in respect to the rights of infants are charged with the knowledge of the above principles, and to act contrary thereof at their peril.”
The court also noted that the procedures prescribed for settling a minor’s claims as set out in MCA § 93-13-59 and UCCR 6.10 had not been followed in the original proceeding before the court.
The timeliness claim was disposed of by finding that timeliness under 60(b)(6) depends on the facts of the case, and that the chancellor did not abuse his diecretion in this one.
Finally the Supreme Court at ¶ 22 held that “The chancellor properly exercised the discretion afforded by Rule 60(b)(6) by finding that the need to fairly protect the ward’s interests outweighed the need for finality.”
Moral of the story: Don’t take shortcuts; faithfully follow the rules and the statutes. It only takes a little more effort and time to do it right. If a proper record had been made originally, that order might have been a lot more difficult to attack. You can find an outline for how to handle a minor’s settlement here.
LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR A BUSINESS RECORD
March 3, 2011 § 1 Comment
Business records play a role in many chancery court matters. Getting them into evidence can sometimes be crucial to your case.
MRE 803(6) allows introduction of business records, and states that they are “not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness.” Before you can get the records into evidence, however, you must lay a foundation that the records come within the rule. The four elements of foundation are:
- The record was made and kept in the course of regularly conducted business activity;
- The record is one that is routinely made and kept in the course of business, in the business’s usual practice;
- The record was made at or near the time of the event that it records; and
- The record was made by a person with knowledge, or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge, and who reported such knowledge in the regular course of business.
The witness who establishes the four elements will be either the record custodian or “other qualified witness,” who may be any person who can testify that the records satisfy the four elements. The witness need not have personal knowledge of the contents, nor is it required that the witness was custodian at the time the record was made. All that is required is that the witness have knowledge of the procedures under which the records were made and maintained. In H & E Equipment v. Floyd, 959 So.2d 578, 581 (Miss. App. 2007), the trial court properly excluded the invoices upon which the plaintiff sought to sue on open account because the custodian failed to explain how the invoices, many of which were reprints, were created, or that the invoices relied on were created at the time the charges were incurred.
Under the rule, the focus is on when the documents were created, their trustworthiness, and whether they were created in the course of regularly conducted business. Ferguson v. Snell, 905 So.2d 516, 519-520 (Miss. 2004). In Bower v. Bower, 758 So.2d 405, 414-415 (Miss. 2000), husband offered the monthly internet bills to prove wife’s internet usage, and the husband’s testimony was the only authenticating testimony offered. The supreme court held that the trial court properly excluded them as not being proven to be business records; if you click through the criteria above, you can see that husband’s testimony did not meet them.
The fact that the records are maintained on a computer or in a data file does not require any additional foundation requirements.
The person who generated the information in the record must have had personal knowledge, but the person who entered or recorded the information need not have personal knowledge. For example, an employee of the business observes a chemical process and records the temperatures, reactions and times involved in hand-written notes, which she then tenders to a stenographer who turns the notes into a typed record that is maintained by a custodian. The employee who observed must have had first-hand knowledge when the notes were made and if called as a witness, but neither the stenographer nor the custodian are under the same requirement simply to authenticate the documents as business records. In Dillon v. Greenbriar Digging Service, 919 So.2d 172, 174 (Miss. App. 2005), it was held that the trial court properly let in an inspection report, even though the inspector/custodian who testified was not the inspector who performed the documented inspection, because he adequately authenticated it as a business record.
If the record includes a statement by a person who is not a part of the business and is under no duty to make the report, and the statement is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, it will be treated as hearsay that is inadmissible, unless it can be shown to come within an exception to the hearsay rule. An example: The business’s employee reports the contents of a conversation he had with a customer. If the statement is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted by the customer, it is hearsay and will not be allowed in unless it comes within an exception, such as the customer’s own statement offered against him. In Bingham v. State, 723 So.2d 1189, 1190 (Miss. App. 1998), the court of appeals held that a police officer’s report may be admitted only to prove matters observed by the officer, but not to prove inadmissible matter such as the hearsay statements of persons interviewed by the officer. Copeland v. City of Jackson, 548 So.2d 970, 975 (Miss. 1989). But see, Watson v. State, 521 So.2d 1290, 1294 (Miss. 1990), where the supreme court upheld admission of letters of complaint from customers maintained by a bank on the basis that the documents were made a part of the ban business records.
It sometimes happens that records generated by third parties become part of a business’s records. An expert’s report and recommendations, for instance, may be included in the records of a project. The expert’s testimony would not be required for introduction of the report if: (1) the custodian can establish that the expert’s report was incorporated into records kept in the normal course of business; (2) that the business keeping the record relies on its accuracy in the conduct of its business; and (3) “other circumstances” indicate the trustworthiness of the document. Documents that are prepared for litigation or “litigation inspired” are generally found to lack trustworthiness. Jones v. Hatchett, 504 So.2d 198, 201 (Miss. 1987); See, e.g., Gilbert v. Ireland, 758 So.2d 1050, 1053-1054 (Miss. App. 2000)
When the source of the information is an outsider who is not a member of the business organization, the statement may be admissible if there is proof that there is a regular practice of verification by an employee so that the outsider’s statements are adopted by the business and become its own statements. An example of an admissible outsider record would be an invoice submitted by an outside company that is verified by an employee, matched to a purchase order of the business, and attached to records in the business’s files. An example of an inadmissible outsider statement would be a letter from someone not connected with the business that is merely placed in the files of the business.
Objections that the records include ambiguous or inaccurate statements or that they are incomplete go to the probative weight and not to admissibility.
Proof of matters based on absence of entries in business records and admissibility of public records are subjects of other posts.
MRE 902 addresses self-authentication, which may apply to some business records.
RESCUING THE FORGETFUL WITNESS
February 24, 2011 § 3 Comments
It’s a familiar scene. The witness is asked a crucial question and suffers that dreaded lapse of memory. “I don’t remember,” she says, and the lawyer knows the answer is right there on counsel’s table. How do you recover?
Unfortunately many lawyers follow the “I don’t remember” response with a leading question in an attempt to suggest the answer. That provokes a series of objections to leading questions and even, “The witness has already said she doesn’t remember, so she can’t answer any questions about this!” Often the examining lawyer gives up and moves on to something else.
The solution is in MRE 612, which allows a witness to use just about anything, admissible or not, to refresh his or her recollection.
Instead of asking that suggestive question, simply ask the forgetful witness whether there is anything she could refer to that would refresh her recollection. When she says she needs to look at her calendar, or her checkbook, or her diary, or her driver’s license, hand it to her and ask her to take a moment and look it over, and then ask the question again. Any objection should be overruled because she said she needed to refresh her recollection, and she should be allowed to do so. Note that any object can be used. It may be a photograph of a loved one, or a pencil, or a cell phone. The rule does not require that it be admissible in evidence.
Whatever object is used is subject to examination and inspection by the other side. And, of course, that is the practice as to any document or object used by a witness on the witness stand. The other party has the right under Rule 612 to offer into evidence those portions relating to the witness’s testimony, and there is a procedure for objecting to portions of the document that are not relevant, and preserving for appellate review any matter not made a part of the record.
It is quite common in court for a witness to say, “I need to look at some papers on the table to answer that.” The court will routinely allow the witness to look at what he or she needs to answer.
Rule 612 is the only procedure available to refresh a witness’s recollection. It is limited to a writing or a tangible object, and does not apply to an out-of-court oral statement, which would simply be an attempt to circumvent the hearsay rule. Eastover Bank v. Hall, 587 So.2d 266, 269 (Miss. 1991).
Some lawyers apparently confuse attempts to refresh the recollection of the witness with MRE 803(5), which pertains to the admissibility of a recorded recollection in a memorandum or record in lieu of the witness’s testimony when the witness has no recollection of the facts in the record. The two rules address different problems: Rule 612 is a method to refresh the recollection of the witness; Rule 803(5) is a way to get the facts in the record via documentary proof when the witness has no recollection.
Another source of confusion for older lawyers is that Rule 612 is a departure from pre-MRCP practice. In the era before MRCP it was much more cumbersome to refresh a witness’s faulty memory. But that was then (now 28 years ago) and this is now. If you’re still playing tapes of pre-rules practice in your head after all these years, you need to get out a rule book and get up to date.