Practice and Procedure | The Better Chancery Practice Blog

Before You Draft that PSA …

May 6, 2015 § 4 Comments

Suzie drops by, writes you a check for your retainer and court costs, and fills you in on the terms of the parties’ agreement to get an irreconcilable differences divorce. She hands you a folded sheet of notebook paper with bullet points that read like, ” … Joe will get his truck and pay for it, and I will get my car and pay for it,” and ” … Joe will pay me $5,000 from his retirement account,” and “Suzie will get 1/2 of Joe’s retirement with Ajax Lightning Rod Corp.”

So, what do you do next?

If your answer was to hand the paper to your secretary to start working on a draft, you are wrong. As in deeply, malpracticedly wrong.

The correct answer is that you need a LOT more information before you commence that draft. Consider:

What kind of retirement account is the $5,000 going to come from, and when it is it to be paid? If the account is a defined contribution plan, such as IRA or 401(k), a lump sum can be paid if done properly. If, on the other hand, it is a defined benefit plan, such as most pension plans, she could only get the money in the form of an income stream at the time of Joe’s eligibility for retirement.
If that retirement plan that is going to fund the lump-sum payment is PERS or military retirement, you can’t dip into it to withdraw cash. The only way to access PERS benefits is to retire and begin drawing a monthly benefit, or to leave employment and get a cash payout.
What are the actual names of the retirement accounts? You are asking for trouble if you don’t use the exact name of the accounts, such as “Ajax Lightning Rod Corp. Employee Benefit Program 51-014,” or “Joe Blow IRA Account no. 700-092108, Skinflint Bank & Trust, Lucedale, MS.” Why? Because people have a tendency years after the fact to lose their memory of exactly what it was they agreed to do, and that detail nails down exactly what that agreement was. Not only that, but later when you draft any necessary QDRO, you will need that exact information.
Do not lift a finger to draft that PSA until you hold in your hand the most recent statements from all of the retirement accounts. Just because someone tells you they can do something does not mean they can. Also, those statements will have most, if not all, of the information you will need to draft the retirement provisions of the PSA.
Make sure you specify the exact date of division. For example, “Suzie shall receive an amount equal to one-half of the account balance as of January 15, 2015 …” The date by which the division is to be accomplished is also critical.
Spell out who has the responsibility to do what. If Joe is to accomplish all of this, make sure the agreement says that. If someone is going to hire a financial advisor or lawyer to draft a QDRO, who will pay the expense? Some plans actually charge fees — as much as several hundred dollars — to process divisions. Who will pay?
Address who will bear the tax responsibility for his or her share of the division. Remember that IRA and 401(k) divisions are taxed as income, plus a 10% penalty. If that $5,000 payment is made, will Suzie’s share be reduced by 38%, or will Joe bear that burden? Remember that Suzie can avoid any taxes by rolling the money over into her own qualified account.

The most recent object lesson in how not to handle a retirement division is in the case of Miles v. Miles, about which I posted at the link. You don’t want that to happen to you. As I said before, you need to educate yourself about retirement accounts and put some thought into the most effective way to draft a provision that will protect your client and successfully accomplish what she wants to do.

Some of the information in this post is derived from a presentation by Michael D. James of Legacy Wealth Management Group, Hattiesburg, to the Conference of Chancery Judges in April.

The Expectation of Privacy

May 4, 2015 § 4 Comments

The MSSC last Thursday published a new MRCP 5.1 that imposes some important privacy protections to all filings in chancery court — both electronic and paper. Here is the new rule, which went into effect April 30, 2015:

RULE 5.1. PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR FILINGS MADE WITH THE COURT

(a) Redacted Filings. Unless the court orders otherwise, in an electronic or paper filing with the court that contains an individual’s social-security number, taxpayer-identification number, or birth date, the name of an individual known to be a minor, or a financial-account number, a party or nonparty making the filing may include only:

(1) the last four digits of the social-security number and taxpayer-identification number;

(2) the year of the individual’s birth;

(3) the minor’s initials; and

(4) the last four digits of the financial-account number.

(b) Exemptions from the Redaction Requirement. The redaction requirement does not apply to the following:

(1) a financial-account number that identifies the property allegedly subject to forfeiture in a forfeiture proceeding;

(2) the record of an administrative or agency proceeding; and

(3) the record of a court or tribunal, if that record was not subject to the redaction requirement when originally filed.

(c) Filings Made Under Seal. The court may order that a filing be made under seal without redaction. The court may later unseal the filing or order the person who made the filing to file a redacted version for the public record.

(d) Protective Orders. For good cause, the court may by order in a case:

(1) require redaction of additional information; or

(2) limit or prohibit a nonparty’s remote electronic access to a document filed with the court.

(e) Option for Additional Unredacted Filing Under Seal. A person making a redacted filing may also file an unredacted copy under seal. The court must retain the unredacted copy as part of the record.

(f) Option for Filing a Reference List. A filing that contains redacted information may be filed together with a reference list that identifies each item of redacted information and specifies an appropriate identifier that uniquely corresponds to each item listed. The list must be filed under seal and may be amended as of right. Any reference in the case to a listed identifier will be construed to refer to the corresponding item of information.

(g) Waiver of Protection of Identifiers. A person waives the protection of Rule 5.1(a) as to the person’s own information by filing it without redaction and not under seal.

These same restrictions, in slightly different form, are in Section 9 of the Electronic Courts Administrative Procedures. This amendment to the MRCP extends the existing electronic filing privacy protections to paper, or conventional, filings.

From a practice standpoint:

Tax returns need to be scrutinized carefully. It’s not enough to redact the taxpayers’ SSN’s at the top of the returns. The children’s names and SSN’s are also on the return. Schedule C may include a taxpayer ID number.
On 8.05’s, use the initials of the children and their ages rather than their full names and birth dates. As for the parties, again, use their ages and not birthdates. For financial accounts, use only the last four digits. Do not include taxpayer ID numbers anywhere.
If you slip up and include any of the proscribed information, you will be deemed to have waived the protection of the rule for your client. If that results in any damage due to identity theft or other misuse, you could be called to account.

The obvious purpose of this amendment is to prevent identity thieves from trolling for SSN’s and birthdates. Keeping the children’s names out protects them from predators.

This rule is in effect right now. School your staff in its requirements and begin observing them yourself. Discovery, particularly voluminous discovery, is typically chock full of this kind of private information. You need to be diligent to protect the interest of your clients.

A Publication Hiccup

February 3, 2015 § 2 Comments

Last week the Meridian Star newspaper failed to publish legal notices scheduled for Tuesday, apparently by oversight. The paper called the lawyers who had had items scheduled and offered to republish any way the lawyers directed.

This caused some heart palpitations that influenced two lawyers to seek out my position on the matter, since estates assigned to me were affected. Each were running second and third publications. They had directed the paper to publish on three consecutive Tuesdays, and were concerned about the variation in days.

Before getting to a response, let’s look at the two most commonly invoked provisions on point:

MCA 91-7-145(2) states that notice to creditors in an estate, conservatorship, or guardianship ” … shall be published for three consecutive weeks.” The requirement clearly is that the publication be made once in each of three consecutive weeks. The day is immaterial.
MRCP 4((a)(4)(b) for process by publication is even clearer. It specifically provides that ” … publication of said summons shall be made once in each week during three consecutive weeks …” Again, the specific day of the week is immaterial.

So the answer, simply, is that so long as the paper publishes your notice or process one time in each of three consecutive weeks, regardless of the days when the notices are published, you have met the requirement of the statute and the rule.

There are other notice statutes. When you must comply with one, follow the express language of the statute.

Sometimes we get caught up in old habits, like telling the clerk at the paper to “Run this the next three Wednesdays …” and that’s how we always do it because that’s how we’ve always done it. But it’s the specific language of the statute or rule that controls, not force of habit.

Beware Vague Language in College Education Support Provisions

January 7, 2015 § 2 Comments

In the recent COA case of Wilson v. Stewart, handed down December 9, 2014, Jay Wilson argued that the chancellor erred in construing the provision in the original agreed divorce decree to include post-emancipation college education support for his two daughters, Henley and Anabel. He also claimed that Anabel forfeited her right to support due to poor academic performance.

Here’s how Judge Fair treated the point for the court:

¶17. Jay claims that the court should have terminated his obligation to pay Anabel’s and Henley’s college expenses at twenty-one, the age of emancipation. Jay also argues that the court should have terminated his obligation based on Henley’s poor academic performance. In support of his argument, Jay cites Nichols v. Tedder, 547 So. 2d 766, 770 (Miss. 1989), which states that a parent has no legal duty to support a child once that child is emancipated. However, that duty may be extended to post-emancipation care by agreement, whether it be a separate contract or included in the divorce decree. Crow, 622 So. 2d at 1230.

¶18. Here, the provision pertaining to the payment of college expenses is in the original agreed divorce decree: “Jay shall bear, and otherwise provide for the funding of, the full costs of all college education expenses of the minor children . . . .” In Boleware v. Boleware, 450 So. 2d 92, 92-93 (Miss. 1984), our supreme court dealt with a similar provision in a modified divorce decree. The father in that case contracted to “be responsible for the payment of all college education expenses of the minor children . . . .” Id. Similar to the instant case, the children were under twenty-one when the parties entered into the agreement. Id. at 93. The father argued that his obligation ceased when the children reached twenty-one. Id. The court disagreed, relying on the chancellor’s finding that, at the time of the agreement, the parties intended for the obligation to extend post-majority. Id. In Crow, the court likewise held that a father’s separate agreement to pay for all reasonable college expenses remained in effect post-majority. Crow, 622 So. 2d at 1229. And in Mottley v. Mottley, 729 So. 2d 1289, 1290 (¶¶4-7) (Miss. 1999), the court referred back to its decision in Crow when discerning a father’s agreement to pay half of his son’s educational expenses; the court ultimately found that the father was bound by contract to pay post-emancipation support.

¶19. The chancellor in the present case ruled as our supreme court did in Boleware, Crow, and Mottley, reasoning that vague college-support provisions have been routinely construed to include post-majority support. Further, Jay’s agreement to pay for the children’s college expenses was not dependent upon their academic performance. We find no error in the chancellor’s ruling. [Emphasis added]

A few crucial points:

“Vague college-support provisions have been routinely construed to include post-majority support.” That’s critical. I think some lawyers often blur language in agreements in hopes that everyone will read into it what they want to be there, so as to induce an agreement. But that tactic can produce a result radically different from what your client really wanted. If you make it vague, it will be construed to include post-majority support, no matter what your client intended.
Vague language is indefinite language. Don’t assume that the judge will find the language to be ambiguous, so as to open it to parol evidence for interpretation, especially in light of the cited cases.
A good rule of practice is to make your agreements say exactly what you intend, and to be as specific as possible. If that hangs the agreement up, work through it by give and take, but don’t compromise by making the language less definite. A good example of the importance of drafting to the ultimate outcome is the case of Zweber v. Zweber, the college flying lessons case about which I previously posted.

In case after case, the lesson is inescapable that if you opt for indefiniteness, the outcome could seriously damage your client. A few other examples: when the alimony provision is unclear, it will be interpreted to be periodic alimony; the IRS considers that the custodial parent has the tax exemption when the PSA or judgment does not provide otherwise; and use of the term “family support” has been construed by the US Tax Court to create an alimony, and not a child support, obligation.

A Double Nightmare for Counsel

December 16, 2014 § Leave a comment

Sometimes we assume something and it makes us say “Ouch.”

Gregory Dailey and his ex, Tracie McBeath, were entangled in child-support-contempt litigation. Hearing had been continued a time or two, and Gregory’s attorney had filed a motion to compel discovery, noticed for the most recent trial setting, and both counsel agreed that the case should be continued. That’s where things went haywire.

Here’s how Judge Barnes, in the COA case of Dailey v. McBeath, issued November 25, 2014, described the situation:

¶5. A hearing on the petition was held April 19, 2012. Tracie’s counsel asserted a motion to compel discovery, claiming that when she had finally received an answer from Gregory a week prior to the hearing, there was no proper documentation (tax returns, check stubs, etc.) included. She also claimed that Gregory had purposely eluded investigators, giving them false information, and that he was hiding assets. Gregory failed to appear at the hearing. His counsel, however, was present and acknowledged that Gregory had not filed tax returns for the last seven years. Gregory’s counsel complained that counsel opposite had not been communicating with him and that he had been unable to depose Tracie, even though he had been trying for months.

So, Gregory is a no-show, possibly because he and his attorney assumed that a simple order addressing the discovery issues with a resulting continuance would be the net result. But, that assumption proved to be painfully incorrect, as Judge Barnes went on to describe:

¶9. Gregory’s counsel made an appearance on his behalf at the April 19, 2012 hearing, evidently expecting that the chancery court was only going to address the motions for discovery and grant the parties’ motions for a continuance. However, the chancellor refused to continue the proceedings and denied both parties’ motions. Although counsel argued that Gregory was located three hours away in Madison, Mississippi, as were the attorney’s files for the case, the chancellor advised the parties to prepare for trial and to attempt to reach an agreement. He admonished:

I’m going to continue with the case and you have no authority to release your client. I have that trouble in other cases and it’s my policy to go forward. . . . And I’m not going to play games with discovery. . . . Y’all should have cooperated with each other. I’m going to try the case, so just get your stuff ready.

. . . .

Now, what I will do is give y’all a chance to visit to see if you can resolve the matter. And it may be that you can talk to your client by phone. I will not tolerate from either one of you all the failure to cooperate and discuss a case.

¶10. On appeal, Gregory argues that the chancellor’s denial of a continuance, which gave his counsel only seventeen minutes to prepare for trial, was “an inherent abuse of discretion” and that he was “ambushed” and “unable to defend himself.” A chancellor’s decision to deny a motion for a continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Sizemore v. Pickett, 76 So. 3d 788, 794 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Robinson v. Brown, 58 So. 3d 38, 42 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011)). Absent a finding of prejudice, we will not reverse the denial of a continuance. Robinson, 58 So. 3d at 42 (¶10). [Footnote omitted]

¶11. While the chancellor’s decision to proceed with the hearing without Gregory present may appear harsh, we find that it was not an abuse of discretion. Gregory and his counsel should have been prepared for the possibility that the motions for a continuance would be denied. Gregory was obviously aware of the hearing, as his counsel was in attendance to represent him. Gregory does not contend that he was unable to attend the hearing, and he knew that he owed the prior judgment to Tracie and that the hearing had been scheduled for several months. Furthermore, the record shows that the chancery court had previously granted a continuance on August 17, 2011, and the chancellor noted at the hearing that the case had been set since February 21, 2011.

¶12. Consequently, we find any prejudice suffered by Gregory due to the chancellor’s decision to proceed with the hearing was of Gregory’s own making, and the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in denying the motions for a continuance.

A few nuggets sifted from the ashes:

Never wait until the day of trial to bring unresolved discovery disputes to the court’s attention.
Never assume that you will be granted a continuance, even when both sides ask for it.
Never, ever, excuse your client from being present for a matter set for hearing by court order.
Never argue with a straight face that you are being “ambushed” when the case has been set for 14 months.

Remember two important principles:

The older a case becomes, the less likely the chancellor will be to grant motions that would have the effect of prolonging it, and
If you insist on assuming something, be prepared to deal with the consequences when your assumption proves to be incorrect.

A Remand Without a New Trial

December 15, 2014 § Leave a comment

I posted here a few months ago that on remand the parties are restored to the position that they occupied before entry of the reversed judgment. A new trial is the norm, and even amended pleadings that change the scope of the proceedings from the original action are allowed.

That post also pointed out that, by agreement of the parties, the court may render a judgment on remand using the original record. The latest example of that is the case of Wilson v. Davis, a COA decision, handed down November 18, 2014.

In this case, the mother of a minor child had died, and the maternal grandmother refused to surrender the child to the father. The father brought an action for custody, which the chancellor treated as a modification, and not as an original action. The chancellor found for the grandmother, and the father appealed. The COA reversed and remanded, concluding that it was error for the trial court to try the case by the standards of a modification rather than as an original action.

The second time around, the chancellor used the record from the original trial to render a decision applying the proper standard for adjudication of custody. That’s what Judge Roberts tells us in his dissent:

¶30. Upon remand, the chancery court did not hold a new hearing or take new evidence in the matter. It modified its original opinion and found that the natural-parent presumption had been overcome because [the father] had abandoned [the child] and he had engaged in immoral conduct; it then applied an Albright analysis; and it found that [the maternal grandmother] should retain custody of [the child] because it was in [the child’s] best interest.

Nobody raised the issue whether this procedure was proper in arriving at the trial court’s adjudication. Neither the majority nor the dissent raised the question on its own. It does not appear from the opinion that either party asserted the issue in a R59 motion for a new trial, which would have been the most efficacious way to assert it, in my opinion.

How to proceed on remand is something to which you should devote some thought before you have to deal with it. The outcome for the father in this case might have been dramatically different if he had used his knowledge of what the chancellor viewed as the weak points in his case, and reshaped his witness list and evidence to present a case that overcame them. Instead, he allowed the chancellor to adjudicate the case on the record that she had already used to find against him.

Divorce Defendant in Default

December 4, 2014 § Leave a comment

Larry Bolivar filed for divorce from his wife, Teresa, on February 19, 2013. She was served with process on March 21, 2013. The R4 process was in the usual form that included the admonishment to file an answer within 30 days, or the relief requested could be granted.

On May 8, 2013, Teresa had filed no response to the divorce complaint, and Larry appeared in court and presented his case. The chancellor granted him a divorce from her.

In June, 2013, Teresa filed a motion to set aside the divorce, an answer denying the allegations of the complaint, and a counterclaim for divorce. In her motion to set aside the divorce, she complained that she had not been properly served with a summons or notice of hearing for the May 8, 2013, proceeding.

At the hearing on her motion to set aside the divorce judgment, Teresa acknowledged that she had been served with process on the complaint, and the judge found on that point that she had been served with process. As to her argument that she should have been given notice of the May hearing, the chancellor denied the motion on the basis that her failure to file an answer precluded her from asserting that claim. Teresa appealed.

On appeal, Teresa raised for the first time the issue whether Larry should have had her declared to be in default per MRCP 55 before proceeding against her.

In the case of Bolivar v. Bolivar, decided November 25, 2014, the COA affirmed the chancellor’s rulings. Judge Ishee wrote the opinion for the court.

On the issue of whether Teresa was entitled to notice, pursuant to MRCP 5, of the May hearing, the court said this:

¶11. Rule 5(a), in pertinent part, provides that “every written notice . . . shall be served upon each of the parties.” Nonetheless, Rule 5(a) also states that “[n]o service need be made on parties in default for failure to appear[.]” At the hearing regarding Teresa’s motion to set aside the divorce judgment, Teresa testified that she was served properly with process. Although she contends that she had obtained an attorney whom she believed was handling her case, the record does not reflect that any action was taken on her behalf in the thirty days following her receipt of the summons. As such, she was in default for failing to answer or appear. Nonetheless, Teresa argues that she was not properly declared in default pursuant to Rule 55.

As to whether she was properly declared in default per MRCP 55:

¶12. Rule 55 governs default judgments, and provides that when a party “has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter his default.” M.R.C.P. 55(a). However, “[i]f the party against whom judgment by default is sought has appeared in the action, he [or his representative] shall be served with written notice of the application for judgment at least three days prior to the hearing of such application[.]” M.R.C.P. 55(b). Teresa contends that Larry should have applied for an entry of default with the chancery clerk or applied for a default judgment in the chancery court. She maintains that his failure to declare her in default meant that she was not in default and his duty to serve her notice remained intact. As such, she argues that the judgment in his favor is void. We disagree.

¶13. This rule is “not directly applicable” to divorce proceedings. Stinson v. Stinson, 738 So. 2d 1259, 1262 (¶12) (Miss. 1999). Specifically, the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that a judgment entered in an action for divorce following a defendant’s failure to answer is “a special kind of default judgment.” Id. at 1263 (¶13) (quoting Mayoza v. Mayoza, 526 So. 2d 547, 548 (Miss. 1988)). A defendant’s failure to answer does not drag a divorce case to a halt. Instead, the plaintiff must, at a hearing, prove the allegations that support the receipt of a divorce. If that is done, then the chancellor has authority to grant the divorce despite the absence of the defendant. Id. at (¶15). This reasoning is supported by Rule 55(e), which provides that “unless the claimant establishes his claim or rights to relief by evidence,” a default judgment will not be entered in a suit for divorce. “Furthermore, a divorce will not be granted on the uncorroborated testimony of the claimant.” Lindsey v. Lindsey, 818 So. 2d 1191, 1194 (¶13) (Miss. 2002).

¶14. Since Teresa failed to answer or appear, we find that she was in default and not owed notice of the divorce hearing. Further, after a review of the record, we find that Larry established his claim to a judgment of divorce despite Teresa’s absence. Larry’s testimony, in addition to the corroborating testimony of Parker, clearly established a divorce on the grounds of desertion. As such, we find this issue is without merit.

Note that if the defendant does enter a timely appearance, and then stops participating, you must give the defendant notice of further proceedings per R5.

Directed Verdict vs. Involuntary Dismissal

December 3, 2014 § 4 Comments

Juries render verdicts. Judges in bench trials render judgments.

Thus, the proper motion after the plaintiff has rested in a jury trial is a motion for a directed verdict, per MRCP 50(a).

In a bench trial, which includes 99.9% of chancery matters, the proper motion is one for an involuntary dismissal, per MRCP 41(b), which states:

… After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court may then render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence …

In the case of SKL Investments v. Hardin and Torrence, handed down November 18, 2014, the COA said this:

¶12. “[T]he appropriate motion in a case tried without a jury is not a motion for [a] directed verdict, but involuntary dismissal, pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.” Gulfport-Biloxi Reg’l Airport Auth. v. Montclair Travel Agency Inc., 937 So. 2d 1000, 1004 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). “When reviewing a dismissal under . . . Rule . . . 41(b), we will not overturn the decision of [the chancery court] if [its] findings are supported by substantial evidence unless [the chancery court] abused [its] discretion, was manifestly wrong, or applied an erroneous legal standard.” Jones v. Jones, 101 So. 3d 731, 732 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted).

We discussed the different standards to be applied by the court in each of the two rules in a previous post. The distinction is substantial.

Legal nerd that I am, it irks me when I read a decision of the appellate court referring to a R41(b) motion in chancery court as one for a directed verdict. There are no verdicts in chancery court except in the relatively rare event of a jury trial — which now occurs only when one is requested in a will contest, and when the chancellor impanels an advisory jury (assuming that can still be done under the MRCP).

Likewise, you could conceivably lead an unsuspecting chancellor in a bench trial into error by casting your motion as one for a directed verdict. When the chancellor applies the proper legal standard to that motion, she is automatically in error, since it does not apply in bench trials.

Terminology can make a difference.

A Rule More Observed in the Breach

November 17, 2014 § 6 Comments

Just a friendly reminder that MRAP 25(b) states in part:

“In all cases a copy of any brief on the merits shall be served on the judge who presided at the trial …”

What it Means When You Sign a Pleading

November 13, 2014 § Leave a comment

We talked Monday about what can happen when one knowingly files a false pleading.

Aside from the fact that it’s patently unethical to do so, there is a specific requirement in the MRCP about a lawyer’s representations to the court via her pleadings. It’s in R11(a), which states in part:

Every pleading or motion of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record … The signature of an attorney shall constitute a certificate that the attorney has read the pleading or motion; that to the best of the attorney’s knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay …

That’s pretty straightforward. You have to have read the pleading, and if you fail to do that, you are still responsible for its contents since you certified to the court that you are aware of what is in it. You have to do more than take your client’s word for it that there is good ground to support the claims, because you are certifying to the court that you have made sufficient inquiry to determine that it is, indeed, a meritorious claim. And you can never file an unmeritorious pleading just to hold things up while your client makes good his escape or otherwise arranges his affairs to his advantage.

If the court finds that you have not signed pleadings or signed them with intent to defeat the purpose of the rule, you are subject to the sanctions in R11(b), including discipline, reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees. The sanctions extend both to the client and to the lawyer.

Carelessness is no excuse. The rule requires that you put some thought and attention into the pleadings that you file.

Where Am I?