Evidence | The Better Chancery Practice Blog

BETTER CHANCERY PRACTICE FAQ

October 8, 2010 § 2 Comments

My 8.05 financial statements stink. How can I improve them?

Here are Ten Tips for More Effective Rule 8.05 Financial Statements.

Is my estate ready to close?

Check out this Checklist for Closing an Estate.

I think I need to file a habeas action. Any tips?

This Habeas Corpus Step by Step should help.

One more time: what are those child custody factors I need to prove at an upcoming trial?

The Albright factors are what you’re looking for.

Help! We need to sell some real property in an estate, and I don’t know where to start?

How to Sell Real Property in an Estate may be just what you need.

I’ve been asked to handle a minor’s settlement for a Jackson firm, and I’ve never done it before. What do I need to do?

This Outline for Handling a Minor’s Settlement will get you started.

My mail has an MRCP 41(d) notice in it this morning. I remember you said something about it, but I don’t have time to look for it. Can you remind me what I am supposed to do?

<Sigh> Here’s a post on what to do When Rule 41(d) Comes Knocking at Your Door.

I need to prove the tax effects of alimony, but my client can’t afford to hire a CPA to come testify. Any ideas on what I should do?

Try looking at Proving Tax Effects of Alimony.

My Chancery Judge is really nitpicky. How can I draft my adoption Complaint to satisfy him?

Are you talking about me? Whatever. Here is a post on pleading Jurisdiction for Adoption.

Every time I go to court in Jackson, the lawyers there snicker about my countryfied attire. Any suggestions? I cannot afford another $100 contempt citation for punching out a lawyer in the courtroom.

You probably need to be charging more so that you can afford either a better wardrobe or more contempt fines. Until you do, try reading “High Waters” and Burlap Suits. It won’t change anything, but it may help you to feel better.

VOUCHERS YOU CAN VOUCH FOR

September 23, 2010 § 6 Comments

by Jane Stroble Miller, Senior Staff Attorney for the Twelfth Chancery Court District

Shortly after graduating from law school I was confronted with a baffling legal question. An older and more experienced attorney was attempting to do something that Mississippi statutes and case law clearly stated he could not do. In my naiveté I assumed he knew of a statute or case about which I was ignorant that allowed him to act as he did. After several hours of exhaustive research I called a former professor and mentor, the Honorable William Champion. On hearing my dilemma, he chuckled and informed me that I had just encountered an attorney who had been practicing law for so long that he had lost touch with what the law was.

Recently I again encountered this phenomenon in my duty as staff attorney in monitoring probate matters. One of my tasks is to try to explain to attorneys why the chancellor feels that their accountings do not meet the requirements of both the statutes and the Uniform Chancery Court Rules (UCCR). In a meeting with an older attorney, I pointed out that he had failed to attach vouchers to his accounting. He insisted that he could not provide the necessary documentation “because the banks no longer returned the original canceled checks,” and remained firmly stuck to that position. I realized that I would have to do some research to arrive at a definitive answer.

Section 91-7-277, MCA, requires that the annual account show ” … disbursements, every item of which and the amount thereof to be distinctly stated and supported by legal voucher …” Sections 91-7-279 and 93-13-71, MCA, prescribe the form for vouchers and provide that the account shall be rejected by the clerk unless the vouchers are in the proper form. The only exception to the voucher requirement is when the guardian is an approved financial institution.

Over time, attorneys began using original canceled checks as “legal vouchers,” and the courts recognized them as such. Although neither the statutes nor case law identify canceled checks as “legal vouchers,” there is authority in UCCR. In fact, UCCR 6.04 does specifically refer to “a receipt or cancelled bank check …” as a voucher.

The problem with canceled checks as vouchers, however, is that if you stop at the check, you have omitted the most important, and meaningful, part of Rule 6.04. The sentence of the Rule dealing with vouchers, in its entirety is as follows: “Every such voucher shall consist of a receipt or cancelled bank check showing to whom and for what purpose the money was paid.” [Emphasis added]

In other words, if the canceled check fulfills the function of showing “to whom and for what purpose the money was paid,” then it is a proper voucher within the meaning of the Rule. If the canceled check does not do that job, it is not an acceptable legal voucher. Put even plainer: if the canceled check would not otherwise be acceptable as a receipt, it simply is not a legal voucher.

UCCR Rule 6.06 (Lost Vouchers) reinforces my conclusions. It states that if the original voucher is lost or destroyed, a duplicate or ” … receipt from the person or corporation to whom the money was paid or the property was delivered … ” may be accepted by the court. Again, the function of a voucher is to document actual payment, the recipient and the purpose.

I even looked at Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines voucher as ” … an account, receipt, or acquittance, that shows on its face the fact, authority, and purpose of the disbursement.”

Given no hard and fast definition of a “legal voucher,” I formulated the following requirements for a voucher to be sufficient to comply with our laws:

A voucher must first and foremost be legal evidence that the money was disbursed for the purpose for which it is authorised or allowed.
It must be in writing or printed and show the payee, amount and date, and services or goods for which the disbursement was made.
A check made out to “cash” , even an original canceled check is not a “legal voucher.”

Canceled checks, whether copies or original, really only prove that a payee was paid a certain amount of money. In some circumstances, canceled checks may not be adequate proof. For instance, when a court has authorized the purchase of a computer for a minor ward, a canceled check to Best Buy or Sam’s Club does not prove the money was disbursed for a computer. The check could have just as likely been used to purchase a big screen television or a new set of tires for the guardian’s car. The same holds true for many canceled checks for clothing or personal items. Since vouchers are supposed to be “evidence,” the better practice is for an attorney to have printed receipts that match the date and amount of a canceled check. The guardian should provide the attorney with register tapes, tags or price stickers from the items purchased to prove that the disbursements were actually made for the ward and not for another party or purpose.

The best yardstick that both a judge and attorney could employ in determining the adequacy of a voucher would be to ask whether or not the proof would be of such a nature and sufficiency to be admissible as evidence at a trial and contains all the information necessary to convince the average person that the disbursement was made for what the guardian claimed it was made.

It took me a little time, digging and thought to arrive at my conclusions, but I had Professor Champion’s wisdom as a starting point and a reminder that sometimes we can practice law so long that we lose touch with what the law is.

ANATOMY OF A WILL CONTEST II: PROVING UNDUE INFLUENCE

September 21, 2010 § 5 Comments

We already took a look at testamentary capacity here. This post deals with the other pole of the will contest: undue influence.

A presumption of undue influence arises where a confidential relationship is proven to exist. Estate of Holmes, 961 So.2d 674, 680 (Miss. 2007). A confidential relationship does not have to be a legal one, and the relationship may be moral, domestic, or personal, and ” … the confidential relationship arises when a dominant over-mastering influence controls over a dependent person or trust, justifiably reposed.” Murray v. Laird, 446 So.2d 575 (Miss. 1984).

A confidential relationship exists where one person is in a position to exercise dominant influence over the other because of the latter’s dependency on the former due to weakness of mind or body, or due to trust; the law considers such a relationship to be fiduciary in character. Madden v. Rhodes, 626 So.2d 608, 617 (Miss. 1993). The party seeking to prove existence of a confidential relationship must do so by clear and convincing evidence. Whitworth v. Kines, Id. at 230.

In making its determination whether a confidential relationship exists, the trial court must consider the seven factors set out by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Dabney v. Hataway, 740 So.2d 915, 919 (Miss. 1999). Those factors are:

Whether one person has to be taken care of by others.
Whether one person maintains a close relationship with another.
Whether one person is provided transportation and medical care by another.
Whether one person maintains joint accounts with another.
Whether one is physically or mentally weak.
Whether one is of advanced age or poor health.
Whether there exists a power of attorney between the one and the other.

After considering the seven factors, the court returns to the core question, which is whether the proof establishes that the dominant person in the relationship was in a position to exercise undue influence due to the other’s weakness of mind or body, or due to trust, and whether such has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The question at this point is not necessarily whether the dominant person did or did not exercise dominant influence; rather, the issue is whether he was in a position to do so. If the answer to the inquiry is that there is clear and convincing evidence that the dominant person was indeed in a position to exercise undue influence, the presumption arises, and the burden shifts.

Once the presumption arises, it must be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Estate of Pigg v. McClendon, 877 So.2d 406, 411 (Miss. App. 2003).

The proponent then has the burden of going forward with clear and convincing evidence in a three-prong test set out in Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So.2d 1183, 1193 (Miss. 1987). The three-prong Mullins test requires the proponent to prove:

good faith on his part;
the grantor’s full knowledge and deliberation of his actions and their consequences; and
that the grantor or testator exhibited independent consent and action.

A will or conveyance is said to be the product of undue influence when an adviser has been so persistent and pressing that the testator’s free will and agency is suppressed. See, Longtin v. Wilcher, 352 So.2d 808, 811 (Miss. 1977).

In order to determine whether the proponent acted in good faith as provided in the first prong of the Mullins test, the trial court must consider the five factors listed in Estate of Holmes, 961 So.2d 674, 680 (Miss. 2007). Those factors are:

The identity of the person seeking preparation of the instrument.
The place of execution of the instrument and in whose presence.
What consideration and fee were paid, if any.
By whom paid.
The secrecy or openness given the execution of the instrument.

The second prong of the Mullins test is the grantor’s full knowledge and deliberation of his actions and their consequences. In order to adjudicate this prong, the court must take into consideration the factors set out in Estate of Holmes, supra at 685-686. Those factors and the court’s findings are as follows:

His awareness of his total assets and their general value.
An understanding by him of those persons who would be the natural inheritors of his bounty under the laws of descent and distribution or under a prior will and how the proposed change would affect that prior will or natural distribution.
Whether non-relative beneficiaries would be excluded or included.
Knowledge of who controls his finances and business, and by what method, and if controlled by the other, how dependent is the grantor/testator on him and how susceptible to his influence.

The third and last prong of the Mullins test is whether the decedent exhibited independent consent and action. In Dean v. Kavanaugh, 920 So.2d 608, 622 (Miss. App. 1993), the Mississippi Court of Appeals stated that the best way to show independent consent and action is to establish that the testator/grantor had the benefit of advice of a competent person disconnected from the grantee and devoted solely to the testator/grantor’s interests.

ANATOMY OF A WILL CONTEST: PROVING LACK OF TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY

September 14, 2010 § 6 Comments

Before the contestants in a will contest may proceed, the proponents of the will must first establish their position that the will is valid.

In Estate of Holmes, 961 So.2d 674, 679 (Miss. 2007), the Mississippi Supreme Court stated:

The proponents of the will meet their burden of proof by the offering and receipt of the will into evidence and the record of probate. [Citation omitted] The proponents make a prima facie case solely on this proof. Id. The burden then shifts to the contestants to overcome the prima facie case, but the burden of proof remains with the proponents to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the testator had capacity. Id.

The proponents typically make a prima facie case by admitting into evidence the will, the witness affidavits, the order granting letters testamentary, and the letters testamentary.

In order to determine testamentary capacity, the trial court must consider three factors:

Whether the testator had the ability at the time of making his will to understand the nature and effect of his acts.
Whether the testator had the ability at the time of making his will to understand the natural objects or persons to receive his bounty and their relation to him; and
Whether the testator was capable of determining at the time of making the will what disposition he desired to make of his property. Estate of Holmes, Id.

“In considering all the evidence, some testimony will receive greater weight. The testimony of subscribing witnesses receives greater weight than the testimony of witnesses who were not present at the will’s execution … The date of execution is the most important date, given that we recognize that a testator may not possess capacity one day and within several days have the capacity to execute a valid will.” Rocco v. Sims, 918 So.2d 864, 871-872 (Miss. App. 2005).

The same capacity that is required to make a valid deed is required the for making a valid will. Whitworth v. Kines, 604 So.2d 225, 228 (Miss. 1992). Since the party seeking to set aside a deed must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the grantor lacked mental capacity at the time of execution, and not simply that the grantor suffered general weakness. In re Conservatorship of Cook, 937 So.2d 467, 470 (Miss. App. 2006), it would follow that the same standard of proof would apply to a case in which the party seeks to set aside a will on the same basis.

LAY OPINION TESTIMONY SOMETIMES LAYS AN EGG

September 7, 2010 § 3 Comments

Some lawyers argue that lay opinion testimony should be strictly proscribed as not helpful to the court and an invasion of the court’s fact-finding province. Others attorneys respond that those concerns are overblown and that the court can filter out any ill effects. Here is a rough transcript of an exchange that happened in my courtroom recently. Judge for yourself:

Q: Now, you said a moment ago that you plan to file for bankruptcy. Do you know what effect bankruptcy will have on your income?

Opposing counsel: Objection. He can’t possibly know what effect bankruptcy would have on his income. He is not an expert.

Counsel: But, judge, he can state his understanding based on what he trying to accomplish by filing bankruptcy.

Court: I believe that any ordinary person with walking-around sense would know what effect bankruptcy would have on their income. I will overrule the objection. Repeat the question for the witness, please.

Q: Do you know what effect bankruptcy will have on your income?

A: No.

PROVING TAX EFFECTS OF ALIMONY

September 2, 2010 § 3 Comments

Armstrong vs. Armstrong, 618 So.2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993), sets out the factors that the trial court is supposed to consider when adjudicating whether to award alimony, and if so, the form, duration and amount.

All of the Armstrong factors are important, and failure to prove even one can doom your claim. One of those factors is “The tax consequences of the spousal support order.”

There are only two ways to establish the tax consequences: (1) Have an expert testify or offer into evidence a learned treatise; or (2) Agree with opposing counsel what they are and present the agreement to the court.

It doesn’t take a legal scholar to appreciate the advantages and disadvantages of these approaches. An expert can offer clarity, but she can be asked about so many extraneous matters on cross until the court is bewildered. A learned treatise can be precise and clear, but you still need to lay a foundation for it with an expert in most cases. In either case, experts are expensive.

By contrast, it doesn’t take much to convince opposing counsel that it is to both parties’ benefit to enter into a stipulation as to the tax consequences. That way, both parties have evdence in the record for the court to consider, and if the case is appealed, the Court of Appeals is not left scratching its collective head about why there is no proof of the tax consequences.

Back when I was practicing, several of us attorneys colluded and came up with a form for a stipulation. I believe it covers every base. It was done several years ago, and may not reflect intervening changes in the tax code, but it will at least provide a template for you to adapt to the current law.

Here is the form:

TYPES OF ALIMONY

MISSISSIPPI CASE LAW	FEDERAL INCOME TAX
“Lump-Sum Alimony”	“Lump-Sum Alimony”
Represents part of the equitable distribution of the marital estate. Is a fixed sum not subject to modification. Obligation to pay continues after the death of the payee or payer.	Represents a property settlement for income tax purposes and is not taxable by the payer or taxable to the payee. Is not alimony for income tax purposes because payments would continue, by operation of law after the payee’s death.
“Periodic Alimony”	“Periodic Alimony”
Is based on the payer’s duty to support the payee in the manner to which she or he had become accustomed, is modifiable and terminates on payee’s remarriage, death, or payer’s death.	Is tax deductible by the payer and taxable to the payee; i.e., qualifies as alimony for tax purposes. The reason periodic alimony qualifies as alimony for tax purposes is because under Mississippi law there is no liability to make any payment (in cash or property) after the death of the recipient spouse.
“Rehabilitative Alimony”	“Rehabilitative Alimony”
Is for a fixed term, but is modifiable.	If the liability to make the payments stops after the death of the recipient spouse, then rehabilitative alimony would qualify as alimony for income tax purposes.

FEDERAL INCOME TAX REQUIREMENTS FOR ALIMONY:

A payment to or for a spouse under a divorce or separation instrument is alimony for federal income tax purposes if the spouses do not file a joint income tax return with each other and all of the following requirements are met:

The payment is in cash.
The instrument does not designate the payment as not alimony.
The spouses are not members of the same household at the time the payments are made. This requirement applies only if the spouses are legally separated under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance.
There is no liability to make any payment (in cash or property) after the death of the recipient spouse.
The payment is not treated as child support.

*********

The obvious advantage of the stipulation is that it establishes the fact without expense and both parties have the information in the record. Unfortunately, this is an element of alimony proof that is almost never addressed by the attorneys in a trial, and it could cost your client dearly.

TRIAL BY CHECKLIST: PERIODIC AND REHABILITATIVE ALIMONY

August 27, 2010 § 19 Comments

A practice tip about trial factors is here.

Armstrong vs. Armstrong, 618 So.2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993), sets out the factors that the trial court must consider and address in making a determination about whether to award periodic and/or rehabilitative alimony. They are:

The income and expenses of the parties.
The health and earning capacities of the parties.
The needs of each party.
The obligations and assets of each party.
The length of the marriage.
The presence or absence of minor children in the home, which may require that one or both parties either pay, or personally provide, child care.
The age of the parties.
The standard of living of the parties, both during the marriage and at the time of the support determination.
The tax consequences of the spousal support order.
Fault or misconduct.
Wasteful dissipation of assets by either party.
Any other factor deemed by the Court to be “just and equitable” in connection with the setting of spousal support.

Before the court can reach the issue of alimony, the court must first adjudicate equitable distribution and determine whether any need for alimony can be alleviated by a greater share of equitable distribution. This means that the factors for equitable distribution (Ferguson factors) must be presented in alimony cases. If, after equitable distribution, the court finds that the needs of both parties are met and there is no disparity, the court does not consider alimony.

Professor Deborah Bell in her MISSISSIPPI FAMILY LAW treatise and her annual seminars has done some important research into how length of marriage and relative income affect awards of periodic, rehabilitative and lump-sum alimony. You should become very familiar with her work if you are going to take on an alimony case.

Caveat: This is an area of the law in flux, and the cases are significantly fact-driven. You should do some research for authority supporting your position pro or con before going to trial. There is plenty of case law on both sides of the issue.

TEN TIPS FOR MORE EFFECTIVE RULE 8.05 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

August 16, 2010 § 16 Comments

If your case involves economic issues or property division, Rule 8.05 of the Uniform Chancery Court Rules requires that you provide a financial statement complying with the form published in the rules.

An effective financial statement can make or break your case. It is the template for your client’s testimony, and a poorly-prepared statement will make your client cannon fodder for cross examination, while a well-prepared one will inoculate him or her from serious damage. Most importantly, the financial statement is what the judge will spend the most time mulling over when fashioning an opinion. The more effective your statement, the better off your case will be.

Here are ten ways you can make your Rule 8.05 statements more effective:

Never present a financial statement that you have not gone over in detail with your client. As part of your trial preparation, question the client’s figures, test his or her mastery of the information on it. If your experience tells you that a figure is unreasonably high or low, question it and make the client defend it. If the client can not defend the number, suggest that the client reconsider it. And while you’re at it, make sure that your client knows what he or she included in every category. Are there duplications? For instance, if your client charges clothing for the children on her MasterCard, did she duplicate the amount paid on the card in the line for clothing? Don’t just take your client’s figures at face value; inquire about them. I once asked a woman on the witness stand how she came up with $480 a month for entertainment, and she explained that was the amount she had spent the month before for flowers for her aunt’s funeral, and that her sisters were going to reimburse her. When I asked what she usually spent on entertainment, she said $50. In one fell swoop, I lopped $430 a month off of her expenses, diminishing her alimony claim against my client. Her attorney had simply taken her word for the $480 expenditure without questioning behind it.
Always have the statement typed so that it clearly presents your client’s position. A handwritten statement with scratched-out figures and marks, notations and arithmetic that doesn’t add up will just add confusion and make the judge’s job disagreeably more difficult. Take the time to type the figures in their proper places and make sure they add up properly. Remember the old adage: “The easier you make the judge’s job, the more likely it is you will prevail.” Okay, that’s probably not really an old adage, but it should be.
Make sure the tax returns are attached. Copies of the preceding year’s state and federal income tax returns “in full form as filed” are required. This means that all schedules and w-2’s must be attached. If a document was sent with the original return to the IRS, a copy of it must be included.
Have an adequate number of copies. “When offered in a trial or a conference, the party offering the disclosure statement shall provide a copy of the disclosure statement to the Court, the witness and opposing counsel.” This means that, in addition to the original in evidence, you should have three additional copies, plus one for yourself. It does your client absolutely no good for the court not to have a copy to look at while your client is being examined about it. It would even be a good idea to provide an extra copy for the judge to mark up with his or her own notes during testimony.
Include a complete employment history. Some lawyers have deleted this from the form in their computers, for some reason, but it is specifically required in the rule: “A general statement of the providing party describing employment history and earnings from the inception of the marriage or from the date of the divorce, whichever is applicable.” This information is vitally important in connection with property division, alimony, child support and even child custody, and yet it is often omitted by lawyers.
Be sure to explain any discrepancies. If your client has a perfectly logical explanation why the cell phone bill is $375 a month, be sure to cover it. If expenses exceed income, how is the client managing to pay the difference? If your client’s year-to-date income includes a one-time bonus that will never be repeated, notate that and have your client testify about it; if you don’t explain it, you can expect that the judge will include the bonus in your client’s income.
Use an up-to-date statement. A financial statement prepared six months ago in discovery and not updated since is simply not a statement of “actual income and expenses and assets and liabilities,” as required in the rule. It defeats the purpose of the rule for a witness to spend a couple of hours explaining how the statement should be updated when that should have been done in trial preparation. If you come to court without an updated statement, the court may continue your trial to require you to prepare one.
Have your client sign and date the statement. The Court of Appeals has been critical of unsigned financial statements.
Make sure the entries really are what they say. A voluntary 401(k) contribution is not “mandatory retirement,” and should not be listed on that line. Nor is a private health insurance premium “mandatory insurance.” The term “mandatory” as used on the form refers to items required by law, such as PERS retirement.
Remember that a month has more than four weeks. A month is 52 weeks divided by 12, or 4.3. A client who says “I get paid $400 every Friday, so I make $1,600 a month” is wrong; the correct amount would be $1,720.

JUDGING IN THE BLIND

August 2, 2010 § 5 Comments

Is this you? Your client, Otis, is on the witness stand. Otis is testifying about his finances from Exhibit 2 in evidence, which is his Rule 8.05 financial statement — $350 a month for groceries, $100 for entertainment, $360.48 car note, and so on — and the only ones in the court room who are looking a copy of at his Rule 8.05 financial statement while he testifies are Otis, you and the lawyer on the other side. You glance at the judge, who is sitting there staring off into some faraway void, eyes glazed, his mind drifting off into starry space where Otis’ crucial testimony will never penetrate. The judge is missing the most important evidence in your case!

Where did you go wrong?

If you answered that the Chancellor doesn’t have a copy of the exhibit about which Otis is testifying and so is deprived of the most potent tool you have for the judge to follow and later recall Otis’s testimony, you are absolutely correct. Give yourself a gold star and a pat on the back for a correct answer to this quiz. Give yourself a big, fat F for your trial technique.

Uniform Chancery Court Rule 3.05 states that, “Unless excused by the Court, it shall be the duty of an attorney to distribute copies of any exhibits to the Court and opposing counsel when offered.” That includes the Rule 8.05 financial statements.

Some attorneys not only offer the exhibit; they also offer the court a separate, extra copy for the judge to mark up. That’s a pretty shrewd practice.

If you aren’t making sure that the court has the original exhibit or a copy when you ask a witness about it, you are asking the court to judge your case in the blind. Put yourself in the judge’s shoes: Without the exhibit, you are asking the judge to listen to, comprehend, copy down and digest literally dozens of figures, often delivered in rapid-fire, machine-gun fashion, when the figures are right there on the exhibit, and the judge could be following along, thoughtfully assimilating the testimony and jotting down a few helpful notes.

The principle is not limited to financial statements. I once had an attorney take a stack of photos in evidence from the bench, present them to the witness one by one, and ask the witness to describe and make observations about each. To this day, I have no idea what the witness was talking about. Had I had a separate copy, I could have looked at each photo simultaneously with the description, and perhaps that would have influenced the outcome of the case.

A week does not go by that I am put in the position of judging in the blind, and it is always to the detriment of the client. How do you expect the judge to get the benefit of your client’s testimony about her financial statement or other exhibit if you take the document away from the judge before she testifies about it?

A variation on this theme occurs when the lawyer actually begins questioning the client about the financial statement and the witness, for crying out loud, does not even have a copy to look at. That’s like sending the poor client into a knife fight without a knife.

I have actually begun stopping trials and ordering attorneys to comply with Rule 3.05. The lawyer who complies with Rule 3.05 not only appears to be prepared, professional and effective; she is prepared, professional and effective. Surely you don’t want to be embarassed by appearing unprepared and clueless.

Practice Tip: Always have the original and FOUR copies of all exhibits. That’s the original for introduction into evidence, copy one for yourself, copy two for your client, copy three for opposing counsel, and copy four either for the opposing party or for the court to mark up. Copies are cheap, compared to cost to your client of not having them.

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