Ethics | The Better Chancery Practice Blog

THE LATEST ON DISCOVERY GAMESMANSHIP

February 13, 2012 § Leave a comment

Discovery gamesmanship has been the subject of a prior post on this blog. It’s a troublesome phenomenon, not only for the lawyers who have to confront and deal with it, but also for chancellors who have to decide whether, when and how to impose sanctions.

The most recent pronouncement from our appellate courts came in the case of Williamson v. Williamson decided by the COA on January 10, 2012, at ¶¶ 29-31.

In Williamson, the appellant, Will, argued that the chancellor had improperly assessed him with attorney’s fees for failing to file complete and timely responses to the other side’s discovery requests. Judge Carlton’s opinion disposed of his claim:

¶29. Additionally, as to Will’s argument that the chancellor erred by awarding Mary attorney’s fees for her costs in filing the motion to compel, we, likewise, find no merit. We recognize the chancellor possesses sole discretion as to whether sanctions should be imposed for discovery violations, and we employ an abuse-of-discretion standard of review when considering a chancellor’s order of sanctions. Williams v. Williams, 43 So. 3d 517, 521-22 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Hayes v. Entergy Miss., Inc., 871 So. 2d 743, 747 (¶11) (Miss. 2004)). Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4) provides:

If the motion [to compel] is granted, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney’s fees, unless the court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

¶30. The record shows that Will failed to provide complete and timely responses to Mary’s requests for discovery prior to Mary filing her motion to compel. The record also reflects Will provided no adequate reason for his failure to comply. Thus, in accordance with Rule 37, we find no error in the chancellor’s order requiring Will to pay Mary’s attorney’s fees for her cost incurred in bringing the motion to compel. See Russell v. Russell, 733 So. 2d 858, 862-63 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).

¶31. Accordingly, we find no merit to Will’s arguments as to chancellor’s … award of attorney’s fees to Mary.

In this district, attorneys have a long-established custom of trying to work with each other through discovery problems, but sometimes the payback for that civility is abuse of the system. The judges generally view the initial motion to compel as a warning shot resulting in an order to comply, with a second trip to court triggering sanctions if warranted by the proof. I often will impose a $25 per day fine for each day after the court-imposed deadline that a party fails to comply, and I do not limit my sanctions to that. I also use scheduling orders in almost all cases, particularly divorces, and a party who pushes the deadlines and fails to compy risks running afoul of the court on that count.

As Williamson clearly indicates, you play games with discovery at your and your client’s peril. Thankfully, most attorneys in this part of the world have grown past the gamesmanship in chancery court, and for the most part discovery proceeds in an orderly fashion with both sides able to accumulate the evidence they need to present their respective cases to the court in a complete fashion. For those who persist in non-compliance, however, read Williamson and be warned.

WHO OWNS THE FILE?

December 8, 2011 § Leave a comment

In the past few months, on two separate occasions, I have heard a witness say that he or she did not have certain documents because “my previous lawyer has them, and won’t give them to me until I pay my bill.”

When I was in practice I heard the same thing from time to time in various forms.

Now, I have no way to know whether what those statements were true, or whether they were based on a misunderstanding.

But the fact is that it is a long-standing ethical rule in Mississippi that the client has a right of access to the file file in the attorney’s office, regardless whether the client has any unpaid balance of fees or expenses.

Ethics Opinion 144, issued March 11, 1988, includes the following language:

This committee concludes that M.R.P.C. 1.16 modified the prior ethical rules of the Mississippi Bar Association only to the extent that the prior opinions required the unconditional delivery of the file by the lawyer. The current Rule only requires that the lawyer surrender papers and property to which the client is entitled. The Rule recognizes the lawyer’s right to retain papers to the extent permitted by law. Thus, the issue is primarily a legal matter concerning the ownership of the items in the file and the legal enforceability of the attorney’s lien. However, the ethical issue which the lawyer must weigh in the balance with his legal rights is at what point will the enforcement of his legal right breach his ethical duty under 1.16(d) to “take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interest.” Each case will turn on its own facts, and it is not possible to anticipate each situation. Generally, if retaining the client’s file prevents the client from obtaining another lawyer or from proceeding with his case in a timely manner, then the lawyer may have breached the ethical duty owed to the client.

The ownership of the specific items contained in a file is a matter of law. Informal Opinion ABA No. 790 (Oct. 26, 1964). The client’s file consists of the papers and property delivered by the client or which the client caused to be delivered to the lawyer. DR9-102(b) (4). In addition, the “end product”, or in other words, what the lawyer was hired to do, is usually also considered to belong to the client. Wisconsin Bar Bulletin, June 1970 Supplement (Memo Opinion 4-78). On the other hand, the notes and memorandums are usually considered to belong to the lawyer and be his work product. Missouri Bar Bulletin, May 1978, Informal Opinion (Jan. 6, 1978). Contrary opinions can be found which indicate the client has no absolute right to the files. Maryland Opinions Informal Opinion 76-50 (March 1, 1976). This committee concludes that the better-reasoned opinions generally recognize that to the extent the client has a right to his file, then his file consists of the papers and property delivered by him to the lawyer, the pleadings or other end product developed by the lawyer, the correspondence engaged in by the lawyer for the benefit of the client, and the investigative reports which have been paid for by the client. San Diego Bar Association, 25 Dicta, May 1978 (Opinion 1977-3). However, the lawyer’s work product is generally not considered the property of the client, and the lawyer has no ethical obligation to deliver his work product. [Emphasis added]

That language arises out of professional rules that preceded the current ones, and are no longer in effect. Nontheless, I think the rationale is sound, and the opinion is still on the state bar’s website among the many other ethics opinions.

The kicker in the language above is the phrase ” … which have been paid for by the client” at the end of the italicized language. The problem usually arises when the lawyer wants to keep all those items until they have been “paid for by the client.”

You should read the entire opinion and draw your own conclusions, but I think that a fair reading is that the client is entitled to all documents he or she delivered to you and all end products, and you are entitled to keep all of your own notes, research and paperwork you generated. The client’s entitlement to the file documents should not be based on payment or non-payment, but rather on the prejudice that might result to the former client in the aftermath. For many years before EO 144, the inflexibile rule in Mississippi was that the lawyer had no right to deprive the client of the file due to non-payment.

May you charge the client to copy the file before you let it go? Ethics Opinion 105, issued September 9, 1985, includes this language: “… in the absence of controlling language in any applicable employment agreement, a lawyer discharged by his client in a pending matter may ethically charge his client for the actual cost of duplicating the client’s file but that the lawyer may not ethically condition release of the duplicate file on the prior payment of the copying costs. Because there is no apparent potential for prejudice to the client where the subject of the representation is concluded, the Committee concludes that after the conclusion of a matter the lawyer may charge a client for the actual copying costs for duplicating a file and condition the release of the duplicate file on the prior payment of the copying costs.”

SCRUGGS-PETERS-DELAUGHTER CONNECT-THE-DOTS GAME

October 19, 2011 § 2 Comments

Of all the sad aspects of the Scruggs saga, the one that most troubles me is the chain of events that led to the downfall of Circuit Judge Bobby DeLaughter. Up to now, what we have known of his culpability could be gleaned from his own guilty plea and from reading between the lines of other disclosures. Ed Peters’ involvement, and how he interacted with DeLaughter, has been left mostly to conjecture and street gossip.

Thanks to motions filed by Scruggs in federal court, however, Peters’ grand jury testimony, or a portion of it, has been unsealed, and you can read for yourself the sordid details. Tom Freeland has summarized it, and has another post about it. You can read Peters’ testimony for yourself here and here. Freeland followed up with another couple of posts that you can find on his blog.

Philip Thomas has a post questioning why Peters has never been prosecuted in state court.

Some had considered DeLaughter a sort of wunderkind of the bench. They expected special things of him after he stepped out of the role as prosecutor of Byron De la Beckwith into a circuit judgeship. But he was a long-time associate of Ed Peters, the Hinds County DA, and he allowed himself to be in a position to be influenced by Peters. Peters took advantage of the cozy relationship to demand hefty fees from clients who expected him to influence the circuit judge. Peters’ testimony reveals how they did it.

It still turns my stomach to read this stuff, but it’s important for us to know and understand how this unfolded so that we can take measures to ensure that it will never happen again.

NEW DISCIPLINARY AND LJA RULES FOR COMMENT

August 30, 2011 § Leave a comment

The MSB is asking for comments on some fairly sweeping proposed changes to the disciplinary rules. You can click on this link to comment.

Unfortunately, you will need to read paragraph by paragraph, comparing your current rules, because there is no redline/italicized version. For that reason, I haven’t had the time to go through the changes and digest them for us here.

The Bar is also asking for your comments on a proposed rule setting up a separate Lawyers and Judges Assistance (LJA) committee. You can click on this link to get to it. This change is part of an ongoing effort to differentiate and separate the LJA function from the disciplinary function. Historically, some lawyers have been reluctant to submit to LJA intervention because it was linked to the disciplinary process, and they were concerned that they were placing their license in jeopardy. The new arrangement focuses on help to resolve self-destructive behaviors.

As always, I encourage you to offer your constructive comments. It’s your profession.

THE LAWYER’S MISSION IN LIFE

July 13, 2011 § Leave a comment

The Mississippi Bar Association annual meeting commences today in faraway, sunny Florida. I thought this would be a propitious time to look back more than a hundred years at the proceedings of the association in its earliest days.

On May 5-7, 1908, the Mississipi State Bar Association held its third annual meeting in Meridian.

Various papers were presented, among them “Railroads and the People,” Suggestions of Error, Legal and Otherwise,” “Reminiscences of a Few Mississippi Lawyers,” and “The Power of the Courts.”

The convention even adopted a resolution that, because their presence would “lend grace and dignity to its annual meeting and wisdom of its deliberations,” members in future were “invited to attend sessions accompanied by their wives, daughters, sisters and sweethearts as the condition may then exist.” That language of that resolution sounds patronizing to us more than a century later, but we need to keep in mind that lawyers in those days were, if not exclusively male, almost exclusively male, and their language reflected not only that reality but also the more patriarchal usages of the day, which used the masculine gender to denote the general, as the text below shows.

Another of the papers delivered at that meeting was by Meridian’s own S. A. Witherspoon, who spoke on “The Lawyer’s Mission in Life.” The language is perhaps too flowery for todays tastes, but the message is no less relevant and thoughtful now than it was 102 years ago. It is too long to reproduce in its entirety, but here are some excerpts:

” … if the exigencies of [the lawyer’s] professional duties do not lead him into the investigation of the truth and require the exercises of his powers in maintaining the cause of justice, and demand the aid of his influence in establishing the great law of love between man and man, then the lawyer’s life work is at war with his better nature, and deterioration instead of development must be his certain doom.”
“… in the solution of all political, social and religious problems that affect the happiness of humanity [lawyers] have been found in the front ranks, and the cause of freedom, justice and morality has found in them its most devoted and ablest advocates.”
“The strife, contention and never ending warfare of the lawyer’s life may conceal from the casual observer its logical relation and productive tendency toward the peace, goodwill and love among men, but it should be remembered that the legal battle which he constantly wages merely takes the place of violence and bloodshed of the barbarian, and that the lawyer in civilized life simply confines the fighting, which seems to be a necessity of humanity, within the ranks of his own profession, and this relieves his fellow men of the evils of human warfare.”
“But the prominent feature of the lawyer’s work is the problem of truth, and his greatest difficulty is measured by its laborious discovery.”
“And the light of his truth, streaming through all the walks of human life, as distinctly marks the lawyer’s mission as does the warmth and light that gives life and beauty to the flowers and defines the mission of the sunbeam.”
“The mission of the lawyer is not confined to the court room and does not end when the decree or judgment of the court is placed on the minutes, but it extends into all the affairs of men, and finds its last boundary at that point where his service is not needed for the betterment of humanity.”
“The professional duties of the lawyer develop in him a capacity for the ascertainment of truth, a power to explain and expound it to others, and the art and ability to advocate the cause of justice, and to win the triumph of right; and the possession of any power involves the duty of exercising it for the good of others. He has no right to bury his talent, or to hide his candle under a bushel. Whatever advantage and superiority he may enjoy over his fellow men is the result of his relation to society and the special privileges which it has granted him. And, therefore, I say that in all the religious, moral, social, and industrial controversies that divide the people, the lawyer is obliged to take part, and to give them the benefit of whatever wisdom and virtue he may possess.”

Excerpted from “The Mississippi Bar’s Centennial: A Legacy of Service,” 2006 by the Mississippi Bar.

WHAT IS YOUR DUTY TO THE COURT WHEN YOU HAVE CONTACT FROM THE OTHER SIDE?

February 14, 2011 § 1 Comment

You have filed a Complaint for Divorce for your client, and thirty days have elapsed with no answer being filed by defendant. Your client wants you to get this over with, and has been calling and asking when you plan to present his case to the court. Only problem is you received a letter from another attorney the day after the defendant was served with process. The letter says that she wants to settle, and if no settlement can be reached, she intends to defend. Since that letter, though, you haven’t heard anything further.

What do you do? Can you present the case as an uncontested divorce? Do you have a duty to tell the court about the letter?

The facts above are close to those in Holmes v. Holmes, 628 So.2d 1361, (Miss. 1993), in which the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed a chancellor’s refusal to set aside an uncontested judgment of divorce in those circumstances. The supreme court stated:

“In the case at bar, Mrs. Holmes promptly contacted an attorney. Her attorney wrote her husband’s attorney and informed him that Mrs. Holmes was represented by counsel and that she wished to settle the case if possible; however, he made clear Mrs. Holmes’ intent to defend the suit should no settlement be reached. With knowledge of this letter, Mr. Holmes’ attorney nevertheless proceeded to secure a divorce by default against Mrs. Holmes. In this regard, his conduct suggests gamesmanship. In the Comment to M.R.C.P. 1, it is stated that “properly utilized, the rules will tend to discourage battles over mere form and to sweep away needless procedural controversies that either delay a trial on the merits or deny a party his day in court because of technical deficiencies.” Conversely, improper utilization of the rules invariably results in the type of gamesmanship and ambush techniques, employed in the case at bar, that the rules were designed to abolish. We refuse to condone such behavior and therefore reverse the judgment of the chancellor and remand for proceedings consistent with the opinion rendered in this cause.”

So what is your duty to the court? At your first opportunity, tell the judge with all candor what contact you have had from another attorney. The judge will decide whether the contact is sufficient to constitute an appearance. You should offer the court any correspondence for the judge to examine. If your only contact was in the form of a conversation, relate accurately what the conversation was. Sometimes that contact was with the other party. Tell the court and let the judge decide whether it was enough to be treated as a contest. The judge may rule that the other side is entitled to a notice of hearing before you may proceed.

If you fail to disclose contact from another attorney or the other party, you run the risk that the other side may file a motion to set aside that judgment, and the judge may just file away a mental note about you that you are one of those lawyers who doesn’t tell the court all it needs to know to make a fair decision.

Read the entire Holmes decision and keep in mind the supreme court’s use of the distasteful terms “gamesmanship and ambush techniques.” Judges don’t appreciate those kinds of tactics that bring both the courts and the legal profession into disrepute.

LIMITED SCOPE REPRESENTATION NOW A FACT IN MISSISSIPPI

February 2, 2011 § 1 Comment

I’ve talked here before about “unbundling” of legal services, also called “limited scope representation,” as a way of opening legal services to people who otherwise can not afford a lawyer for matters that they consider routine or uncomplicated.

On January 27, 2011, the Mississippi Supreme Court adopted amendments to the professional rules that allow limited scope representation. You can read the press release, which includes a link to the amended rules, here.

On the whole, I think this is a positive development in that it will help open up access to lawyers and courts. I do have a couple of practical concerns:

What does the lawyer do when the client insists that you limit the scope of your representation, but you know it is definitely not in the client’s best interest, and may even be to the client’s detriment, not to address other matters?
How do you draft a limited scope representation agreement that protects the lawyer from action by the client claiming inadequate representation?

Other states have trod this path before us, so there are possibly bar opinions and case law that can provide some guidance to practitioners.

From the court’s perspective, I can tell you that there is a serious need for low-level involvement of attorneys in those so-called simple and uncomplicated matters. I could go on and on about experiences with pro se litigants going forth boldly where no lawyer has set foot before, using pleadings and guidance material from the internet or from so-called legal software, or from kits purchased at office supply stores. These cases are a judge’s nightmare because the judge should never be put in the position of assisting any party with correcting and putting pleadings and other papers right, and the judge certainly can not do so when there is an opposing party. It can be painful and demoralizing to watch a pro se party inflict serious legal damage on herself, usually without a clue as to the extent of the injury. Even minimal involvement of an attorney in those cases would be a major benefit.

Another aspect of pro se proceedings often overlooked is that the pro se litigant has no professional or ethical duty to the court or to the opposing party. The possibility for fraud and misrepresentation is significant. There is no attorney, with his or her license and professional responsibility on the line to reassure the court. Likewise, these companies that sell the kits, software and advice owe their customers no duty at all. The insurance that a client obtains by hiring a lawyer is non-existent.

Finally, lawyers need to be aware that the DIY legal industry stands to keep chipping away at the edges of the practice of law until there will be real competition for clients. Your license and substantial investment in legal education, as well as your dedication to legal ethics and duty to the courts are all going to be in competition with nameless and faceless paper mills and internet sites that have no professional standing, no investment in education, and no ethical responsibilities.

I hope limited scope representation helps reduce the trend toward more DIY litigation. I encourage lawyers to look into limited scope representation and discover how it can enhance their practice as well as aid laypersons who feel that they can not afford legal services.

CONTINGENT FEES IN DOMESTIC CASES

February 1, 2011 § Leave a comment

Rule 1.5 (d) (1) of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct provides that “A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge or collect any fee in a dmoestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof.”

In their treatise, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR MISSISSIPPI LAWYERS, MLI Press, 2010, at § 22:10, professors Jeffrey Jackson and Donald Campbell state:

Under Rule 1.5 (d) (1), a contingent fee is unethical in a “domestic relations matter” where payment is contingent upon securing a “divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support or property settlement.” The policy behind this traditional prohibition is to prevent lawyers from taking a fee position that might give the lawyer an incentive to oppose reconciliation of the parties. The language of the prohibition refers to “domestic relations matters” rather than only to divorce. As such, that language would prevent a contingent fee in cases involving separation of persons who cohabited but were unmarried. Too, the reference to “domestic matters” and to “property settlements” would prohibit a contingent fee in negotiating pre-nuptial and post-nuptial agreements between parties about to join as a couple, or considering the possibility of separation. The state bar’s opinion is that Rule 1.5 (d) (1) does not, however, prevent a lawyer from charging a contingent fee for the collection of past due support or alimony. [Citing Miss. Bar Ethics Opinion 88]

COLLATERAL DAMAGE FROM THE FALL OF ZEUS

December 30, 2010 § 2 Comments

Hinds County Circuit Judge Swan Yerger yesterday dismissed with prejudice Eaton Corporation’s lawsuit against Jeffery Frisby, et al., based on a finding that counsel for Eaton knew that Ed Peters was clandestinely attempting to influence the then trial judge, Bobby DeLaughter, and sanctioned Peters’ actions for their client’s benefit.

Judge Yerger found that dismissal of the billion-dollar suit was necessary to protect the integrity of the judicial system. Philip Thomas comments on it here, with links to much more information on the suit. Tom Freeland adds his thoughts here.

The demise of Eaton’s suit is collateral damage from the Scruggs judicial scandal, which shed the light of day on Ed Peters’ activities vis a vis Judge DeLaughter in Scruggs’ legal battle with the Wilson law firm and gave reason to scrutinize his actions in Eaton. If Balducci’s efforts to corrupt Judge Lackey had succeeded or never been reported, what is the likelihood that the improprieties in Eaton would ever have been uncovered? And if Peters had gone undetected, would the defendants have suffered a billion-dollar miscarriage of justice? Thankfully, we will never know for sure.

REMINDER: THE LAWYERS CREED AND ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS

December 21, 2010 § 2 Comments

A LAWYER’S CREED

To my clients, I offer faithfulness, competence, diligence, and good judgment. I will strive to represent you as I would want to be represented and to be worthy of your trust.

To the opposing parties and their counsel, I offer fairness, integrity, and civility. I will seek to fairly resolve differences and, if we fail to reconcile disagreements, I will strive to make our dispute a dignified one.

To the courts, and other tribunals, and to those who assist them, I offer respect, candor, and courtesy. I will strive to do honor to the search for justice.

To my colleagues in the practice of law, I offer concern for your reputation and well being. I will extend to you the same courtesy, respect, candor and dignity that I expect to be extended to me. I will strive to make our association a professional friendship.

To the profession, I will strive to keep our business a profession and our profession a calling in the spirit of public service.

To the public and our systems of justice, I offer service. I will strive to improve the law and our legal system, to make the law and our legal system available to all, and to seek the common good through effective and ethical representation of my clients.

ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS

As a lawyer, I will aspire:

(a) To put fidelity to clients and, through clients, to the common good, before my personal interests.

(b) To model for others, and particularly for my clients, the respect due to those we call upon to resolve our disputes and the regard due to all participants in our dispute resolution processes.

(d) To preserve and improve the law, the legal system, and other dispute resolution processes as instruments for the common good.

(e) To make the law, the legal system, and other dispute resolution processes available to all.

(f) To practice with a personal commitment to the rules governing our profession and to encourage others to do the same.

(g) To preserve the dignity and the integrity of our profession by my conduct. The dignity and the integrity of our profession is an inheritance that must be maintained by each successive generation of lawyers.

(h) To achieve excellence in my work.

(i) To practice law not only as a business, but as a calling in the spirit of public service.

As to clients, I will aspire:

(a) To expeditious and economical achievement of client objectives.

(b) To fully informed client decision-making. As a professional, I will:

(1) Counsel clients about various forms of dispute resolution;

(2) Counsel clients about the value of cooperation as a means towards
the productive resolution of disputes;

(3) Maintain the sympathetic detachment that permits objective and independent
advice to clients;

(4) Communicate promptly and clearly with clients; and

(5) Reach clear agreements with clients concerning the nature of the
representation.

(1) Consider and discuss with clients alternative fee arrangements as may be
appropriate in the circumstances;

(2) Reach fee agreements with clients as early in the relationship as possible;
and

(3) Determine the amount of fees by consideration of many factors and not just
time spent by the attorney.

(d) To comply with the obligations of confidentiality and the avoidance of conflicting loyalties in a manner designed to achieve the fidelity to clients.

(e) To achieve and maintain a high level of competence in my fields of practice.

As to opposing parties and their counsel, I will aspire:

(a) To cooperate with opposing counsel in a manner consistent with the competent representation of my client. As a professional, I will:

(1) Notify opposing counsel in a timely fashion of any canceled appearance;

(2) Grant reasonable requests for extensions or scheduling changes; and

(3) Consult with opposing counsel in the scheduling of appearances, meetings,
and depositions.

(b) To treat opposing counsel in a manner consistent with his or her professional obligations and consistent with the dignity of the search for justice. As a professional, I will:

(1) Not serve motions or pleadings in such a manner or at such a time as to
preclude opportunity for a competent response;

(2) Be courteous and civil in all communications;

(3) Respond promptly to all requests by opposing counsel;

(4) Avoid rudeness and other acts of disrespect in all meetings including
depositions and negotiations;

(5) Prepare documents that accurately reflect the agreement of all parties; and

(6) Clearly identify all changes made in documents submitted by opposing
counsel for review.

As to the courts, other tribunals, and to those who assist them, I will aspire:

(a) To represent my clients in a manner consistent with the proper functioning of a fair, efficient, and humane system of justice. As a professional, I will:

(1) Avoid non-essential litigation and non-essential pleading in litigation;

(2) Explore with clients and opposing parties the possibilities of settlement of
litigated matters;

(3) Seek non-coerced agreement between the parties on procedural and
discovery matters;

(4) Avoid all delays not dictated by a competent presentation of a client’s claims;

(5) Prevent misuses of court time by verifying the availability of key participants for
scheduled appearances before the court and by being punctual; and

(6) Advise clients about the obligations of civility, courtesy, fairness, cooperation,
and other proper behavior expected of those who use our systems of justice.

(b) To model for others the respect due to our courts. As a professional, I will:

(1) Act with complete honesty;

(2) Know court rules and procedures;

(3) Give appropriate deference to court rulings;

(4) Avoid undue familiarity and any appearance or claim of any undue influence
with members of the judiciary;

(5) Avoid unfounded, unsubstantiated, or unjustified public criticism of members of
the judiciary;

(6) Show respect with my attire and demeanor;

(7) Assist the judiciary in determining the applicable law; and

(8) Seek to understand the judiciary’s obligations of informed and impartial
decision-making.

As to my colleagues in the practice of law, I will aspire:

(a) To recognize and to develop our interdependence;

(b) To assist my colleagues to become better people in the practice of law and to accept their assistance offered to me.

(d) To offer my colleagues appropriate assistance with your personal and professional needs.

As to our profession, I will aspire:

(a) To improve the practice of law. As a professional, I will:

(1) Support high-quality continuing legal education;

(2) Participate in organized activities of the bar and other legal organizations;

(3) Assist when requested in the education of future lawyers; and

(4) Promote understanding of professionalism and ethical standards among
members of the profession.

(b) To protect the public from incompetent or other wrongful lawyering. As a professional, I will:

(1) Support high standards in bar admissions; and

(2) Assist in the enforcement of the legal and ethical standards imposed upon all
lawyers.

(c) To support diversity in the profession, especially the practice of law by members of historically underrepresented groups.

(d) To promote the understanding of and an appreciation for our profession by the public. I will:

       (1) Use appropriate opportunities, publicly and privately, to comment upon the
             roles of lawyers in society and government, as well as in our system of justice;
             and

(2) Conduct myself always with an awareness that my actions and demeanor
reflect upon our profession.

(e) To devote my time and skills to activities that promote the common good.

As to the public and our systems of justice, I will aspire:

(a) To counsel clients about the moral and social consequences of their conduct.

(b) To consider the effect of my conduct on the image of our systems of justice including the social effect of advertising methods.

(d) To support organizations that provide pro bono representation to indigent clients.

(e) To improve our laws and legal system by, for example:

(1) Serving as a public official;

(2) Assisting in the education of the public concerning our laws and legal system;

(3) Commenting publicly upon our laws; and

(4) Using other appropriate methods of effecting positive change in our laws and legal system.

The Creed and Aspirational Ideals are published by the Mississippi Bar.

Where Am I?