August 20, 2019 § Leave a comment
Nat Alford and his wife Linda consented to a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences, leaving it up to the chancellor to adjudicate several issues, including whether Linda should be awarded attorney’s and expert-witness fees. Linda testified that she had been “struggling” to make monthly payments against the more than $24,000 billed by her attorney.
The chancellor ordered Nat to pay $5,000 toward Linda’s attorney’s fees, and $6,000 toward expert witness fees. Nat appealed, and one issue he raised was that the award was erroneous.
The COA reversed and rendered in Alford v. Alford, decided July 23, 2019. Judge Jack Wilson wrote for the majority:
¶31. “An award of attorney’s fees is appropriate in a divorce case where the requesting party establishes an inability to pay.” Gray v. Gray, 745 So. 2d 234, 239 (¶26) (Miss. 1999). “The party seeking attorney’s fees is charged with the burden of proving inability to pay.” Riley v. Riley, 846 So. 2d 282, 287 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Jones v. Starr, 586 So. 2d 788, 792 (Miss. 1991)). “It is well settled in Mississippi that if a party is financially able to pay an attorney, an award of attorney’s fees is not appropriate. Furthermore, if the record is insufficient to demonstrate the wife’s inability to pay the attorney’s fees, then an award of the fees is an abuse of discretion.” Gray, 745 So. 2d at 239 (¶26) (citations omitted).
¶32. At trial, Linda offered a list of invoice amounts prepared by her attorney that showed that he had billed her a total of $24,572.94, which included the trial. Linda also requested expert witness fees (for Paris) in the amount of $6,000. Linda and her attorney both testified that she had been paying $1,000 per month in attorney’s fees, although neither of them could say how much she had paid in total. Linda also testified that she had been paying $500 per month to Paris’s firm, although she did not state how much she had paid or how much was left to pay. Linda testified that she had been able to make her monthly payments to her attorney and expert, although she said that she had “been struggling to” do so. Linda’s attorney testified regarding his time and fees and Linda’s ability to pay. On cross examination, he was asked whether the equitable distribution of the marital assets would provide Linda with sufficient “financial resources to pay [her fees].” In response, he stated, “I would certainly hope that the [c]ourt awards [Linda] what [she] requested, which is 50 percent of the marital assets. If that occurs, then she certainly would have the money to pay me at that time. I would agree with that.”
¶33. Following the trial, the chancellor found that Linda had the ability to pay some but not all of her attorney’s fees. The chancellor then ordered Nat to pay her $5,000 for attorney’s fees and $6,000 for expert witness fees.
¶34. We conclude that the award of attorney’s fees and expert witness fees was an abuse of discretion because “the record is insufficient to demonstrate [Linda’s] inability to pay.” Gray, 745 So. 2d at 239 (¶26). Linda testified that she had been able to pay her attorney’s fees and expert witness fees in monthly installments of $1,000 and $500, respectively, and she failed to show how much she had already paid or what she still owed. In addition, Linda was awarded bank accounts with a combined balance of approximately $17,000, a Merrill Lynch account with a balance of $134,115.06, and retirement accounts with a combined balance in excess of $375,000. Linda received nearly half of the marital assets, which her attorney agreed would be sufficient to allow her to pay her attorney’s fees. There is nothing in the record to show that Linda would have been required to liquidate any significant part of her savings to pay her attorney or her expert. Indeed, as stated, the record does not even show what Linda owed at the time of trial. On these facts, Linda failed to meet her burden of establishing an inability to pay her fees. See, e.g., Dauenhauer v. Dauenhauer, 271 So. 3d 589, 601 (¶51) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (holding that award of attorney’s fees was an abuse of discretion where the spouse had already paid part of his fees in installments and had sufficient assets to pay the balance). Accordingly, the award of attorney’s fees is reversed and rendered.
” … [S]he failed to show how much she had already paid or what she still owed.” So how could one expect the chancellor to make an accurate ruling? I will reiterate what I have said here many times: if you expect to get your client an award of attorney’s fees you have to put some time and thought into what it will take to prove entitlement to that award. Close will not get the cigar. Slapdash won’t even come close.
The chancellor clearly concluded that Linda should have help with some of her attorney’s and expert fees. What the chancellor was not given to support her conclusion, however, was: (1) the amounts Linda had paid; (2) the remaining balances; (3) more detail about the financial strain the fees had imposed on her; and (4) what financial impact it would have on her equitable distribution to have it reduced by attorney’s fees.
I also thought it was interesting that Linda’s attorney was allowed to testify, apparently without objection, to Linda’s ability to pay. That, to me, is a fact issue in the case, and attorneys are not allowed by ethics to be fact witnesses except as to what they are owed in attorney’s fees. I have stopped attorneys in situations like that and directed them to limit their testimony to how much is owed, what services were rendered, what has been paid, and the employment contract. Maybe that’s just me.
June 10, 2019 § Leave a comment
Sandra Oliver was a party in chancery court hearings involving probate of her grandmother’s estate and partition of her real property. The chancellor’s ruling on the merits were not to her liking, and she appealed pro se.
One of the issues she raised on appeal was that the chancellor should have recused herself because she was biased against her and her father. In Estate of Oliver: Oliver v. Oliver and Carney, decided April 16, 2019, the COA affirmed. The portion of Judge Carlton’s opinion addressing the issue is longer than I usually quote, but I think you will find it helpful:
¶103. Sandra asserts that her and her father’s due process rights were violated at hearings before Chancellor Daniels that took place in both the partition and estate matters due to the chancellor’s alleged bias against her. We find Sandra’s contentions without merit. ¶104. The supreme court has recognized that “[t]his Court presumes that a judge, sworn to administer impartial justice, is qualified and unbiased. For a party to overcome the presumption, the party must produce evidence of a reasonable doubt about the validity of the presumption.” Kinney v. S. Miss. Planning & Dev. Dist. Inc., 202 So. 3d 187, 194 (¶20) (Miss. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Continuing, the supreme court explained that “[r]easonable doubt may be found when there is a question of whether a reasonable person, knowing all of the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge’s impartiality. Said another way, the presumption is overcome only by showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the judge was biased or unqualified.” Id.; see Washington Mut. Fin. Grp. LLC v. Blackmon, 925 So. 2d 780, 785 (¶12) (Miss. 2004) (recognizing the “heavy burden” a movant bears in proving that a judge’s purported hostility requires recusal).
¶105. Sandra contends that the chancellor displayed “biased actions” in the partition action at the February 2, 2015 hearing on Sandra’s motion to controvert, the Carneys’ motion in limine to exclude testimony or evidence relating to any claim that Sandra may have due to the actions of J.C., and issues relevant to that motion raised in Sandra’s pro se motion to correct facts. Sandra was represented by counsel at that hearing. In her brief, Sandra refers to this hearing as a “non-hearing,” and contends that the chancellor showed bias because she did not allow presentation of evidence or testimony. We disagree.
¶106. At the beginning of the hearing, the chancellor observed that Sandra had “explain[ed] her whole case” in her pro se motion to correct facts. The chancellor then stated on the record that she had “read the entire [court] file and not just the motions that are noticed for hearing today . . . [and that she] under[stood] very thoroughly what the issues [were and] the issues that [Sandra tried] to raise . . . .” The chancellor then heard argument of counsel at length, and discussed numerous points of law with counsel. In our review of the hearing transcript, we find no indication that the chancellor displayed bias in any way at the February 2, 2015 hearing.
¶107. Regarding subsequent hearings before Chancellor Daniels, Sandra states in her brief that after the February 2, 2015 “non-hearing,” she “filed a formal complaint with the judicial committee against Judge Daniels based on all of the biased actions, reactions, denial of a hearing and presenting of any testimony as well as remarks made at the February 2nd, 2015 hearing.” Sandra’s judicial performance complaint against Chancellor Daniels was filed in June 2016, at least three months before the September 27, 2016 final partition hearing before Chancellor Daniels, and five months before the November 14, 2016 hearing in the estate action, also before Chancellor Daniels. On appeal, Sandra claims that her filing of the judicial performance complaint against Chancellor Daniels in June 2016 is a basis for requiring Chancellor Daniels’s recusal at these subsequent hearings.
¶108. As to this argument, we observe that Sandra did not object or file a motion in either the partition or estate action asking Chancellor Daniels to recuse. Sandra’s argument about Chancellor Daniels’s alleged bias was not raised until her appeal, which procedurally bars her from arguing the issue in this case. Tubwell v. Grant, 760 So. 2d 687, 689 (¶8) (Miss. 2000). As the supreme court recognized in Tubwell:
Over the years, this Court has been quick to point out that it will not allow a party to take his chances with a judge about whom he knows of [alleged] grounds for recusal and then, after he loses, file his motion. Where the party knew of the grounds for the motion or with the exercise of reasonable diligence may have discovered those grounds, and where that party does not move timely prior to trial, the point will be deemed waived. Id.
As a result of her untimely objection, Sandra has waived this issue. See also Latham v. Latham, 261 So. 3d 1110, 1113 (¶¶9-11) (Miss. 2019) (holding that appellant waived recusal argument on appeal where he knew the ground for June 2016. In Adams, 249 So. 3d at 467-68 (¶¶15-21), Elle Adams made the same argument, asserting that the chancellor in that case should have recused herself because Elle had filed a state bar complaint and federal action against the chancellor. We rejected Elle’s argument,
finding that the chancellor’s awareness of the federal action against her, and the pending state bar complaint, did not require recusal where there was “no evidence that the chancellor’s impartiality might be reasonably questioned.” Id. at 468 (¶21). We find that the same analysis applies in this case.
¶111. Sandra quotes from the September 27, 2016 final partition hearing as an example of the chancellor’s “grudge” against her. But in this excerpt the chancellor, at most, is expressing frustration with the parties’ inability to reach an agreement on any detail, including what half of the property they wanted (“I was hoping y’all could at least agree on one thing, but obviously y’all cannot agree on whether the sun is shining outside or not.”). Our review of the transcript from the September 27, 2016 hearing shows no bias warranting recusal.
¶112. Similarly, Sandra quotes snippets of exchanges from the November 14, 2016 hearing in the estate case that she claims demonstrates the chancellor’s alleged animosity towards her. These include exchanges such as the chancellor telling Sandra that “[i]f you have a problem with my ruling, appeal it[;]” and the chancellor’s admonishment to Sandra to “be careful[,]” stated in the context of Sandra representing herself. These statements, particularly when read in context, are nowhere near the “combative, antagonistic, discourteous, and adversarial” conduct that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that Sandra did not receive a fair hearing. Cf. Schmidt v. Bermudez, 5 So. 3d 1064, 1074 (¶¶19-21) (Miss. 2009) (finding that a chancellor’s “abusive and inappropriate conduct,” including, but not limited to, repeatedly questioning a party’s honesty, badgering that party during cross-examination regarding evidence to be presented in her own case, and accusing the party of “diarrhea of
the mouth” violated party’s substantive right to a fair trial). Sandra also quotes an exchange in which the chancellor refused to let Sandra testify about ad valorem tax issues—but, as the chancellor explained in the next line of the transcript (not included in Sandra’s snippet), this was because Sandra was trying to raise issues already ruled upon at the final partition hearing. Nothing in that exchange suggests a lack of impartiality in any way.
¶113. In short, our review of the September 27, 2016 and November 14, 2016 hearing transcripts does not reveal any exchange between Sandra and the chancellor that suggests any hostility, lack of impartiality, or ill will on the chancellor’s part so as to result in a “manifest miscarriage of justice” in this case. We reject this assignment of error.
Some comments tomorrow.
May 29, 2019 § Leave a comment
There comes a time in every lawyer’s life when you have no choice but to file a motion for the judge to recuse.
Most recusal situations are pretty clear, but not all are. It’s awkward at best to suggest that the judge should not be hearing your case, particularly where you are insinuating that ethical challenges may be involved. So you want to do it right if you’re going to do it at all. Here is some information that might help you get it right.
There are two categories of situations giving rise to consideration of recusal.
The first category consists of situations where the judge is per se disqualified and recusal is required unless waived by the parties. The bases for disqualification per se are set out in the Mississippi Constitution and the Mississippi Code.
The second category consists of situations in which grounds for disqualification per se are not present, but the judge’s impartiality might be questioned by a reasonable person knowing all of the pertinent facts. These are spelled out in Miss. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E.
Category One: Per Se Disqualification
Mississippi Constitution Article 6, § 165 states: “No judge of any court shall preside on the trial of any cause, where the parties or either of them, shall be connected with him by affinity or consanguinity, or where he may be interested in the same, except by the consent of the judge and of the parties.”
Mississippi Code Ann. § 9-1-11 sets forth the same bases for recusal as provided in the constitution and adds the ground that the judge was previously counsel in the same proceeding.
The key to category one is that the judge is actually disqualified from sitting in the case. Recusal is mandatory unless the parties and the judge agree otherwise, or, as some people put it, they agree to waive the disqualification.
Category Two: Discretionary Recusal
The second category of recusal matters is found in the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct in Canon 3. In contrast with the Constitution and statutory mandatory recusal, all of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct bases for recusal are hortatory; the Code recites that the judge “should” recuse in the listed circumstances if they apply.
Canon 3E(1) states the general principle: “Judges should disqualify themselves in proceedings in which their impartiality might be questioned by a reasonable person knowing all the circumstances or for other grounds provided in the Code of Judicial Conduct or otherwise as provided by law, including but not limited to instances where … ” The provision continues with several specific categories of situations that may require recusal. This is the general principle behind all recusal motions. Note the word should above. Again, in these situations recusal is discretionary and is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion.
The specific situations spelled out to complete the above provision are:
3E(1)(a). The judge has a personal bias toward a party or has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that, “In the absence of a judge expressing a bias or prejudice toward a party or proof in the record of such bias or prejudice, a judge should not recuse himself.” Bateman v. Gray, 963 So.2d 1284, 1291 (Miss. 2007). The burden, which is a heavy one, is on the movant to prove facts sufficient to establish disqualifying bias or prejudice.” Hodnett v. State, 787 So.2d 670 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
What about a bad outcome? Some clients thing the judge is prejudiced against them because of an adverse ruling. Our appellate courts have recognized that “[O]ne party’s irritation at the trial judge’s ruling against him is not grounds to force the judge to recuse himself.” Clay v. State, 829 So.2d 676, 687 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). “Prior rulings by a judge in the proceeding will almost never be sufficient to justify recusal.” Campbell and Jackson, Commentary on Judicial Ethics in Mississippi, § 6: 9 (2010). The United States Supreme Court addressed the principle in the case of Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994):
“ … opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings , or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. They may do so if they reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.”
In Rogers v. Morin, 791 So. 2d 815, 821 (¶13) (Miss. 2001), the court held that a chancellor was not required to recuse after he remarked in a hearing that he believed that the appellant had no credibility. Weighing credibility is, after all, what chancellors do. If we were required to recuse every time we made that determination, there would be chaos.
3E(1)(a). The judge or a lawyer with whom she previously practiced served as a lawyer or is a witness in the matter in controversy, or .
3E(1)(b). A lawyer as attorney or witness in the case is a former law partner or associate and served in the case while the judge was with the firm.
3E(1)(c). The judge or a member of his household has a pecuniary interest.
3E(1)(d). The judge or a member of his family is a party or is an officer, will be a witness.
You should read the Canons themselves for the exact language. A link to them is here.
There is a presumption that all judges sworn to administer impartial justice are qualified and unbiased. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Frierson, 818 So.2d 1135, 1141-42 (Miss. 2002); Miss. Code Judicial Conduct Canon 3E commentary. The burden is on the party seeking recusal to file a motion detailing the factual basis relied on, and to create a reasonable doubt about the presumption of impartiality. Taylor v. State, 789 So.2d 787 (Miss. 2001); Copeland v. Copeland, 904 So.2d 1066, 1071 (Miss. 2004). There must be a reasonable basis to form a conclusion that there was a question of impartiality. Faerber v. Faerber, 13 So.3d 853, 865-66 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). Mere speculation is not enough. Pearson v. Browning, 200 So.3d 1080, 1085 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016), citing Dillard’s, Inc. v. Scott, 908 So.2d 93, 98 (Miss. 2005) (quoting Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E)(1)).
July 3, 2018 § Leave a comment
Before limited-scope representation, I think it was pretty clear that a lawyer who prepared papers for a person to use in court had to show on the paperwork that he had prepared it.
Since limited-scope representation, the answer has been unclear. Until now.
The Mississippi Board of Bar Commissioners has addressed the question with an Ethics Opinion. The text of it is here:
ETHICS OPINION NO. 261
OF THE MISSISSIPPI BAR
RENDERED JUNE 21, 2018
The Ethics Committee has asked to respond to two questions:
Is it ethical for a lawyer to prepare documents for pro se litigants?
If the answer to question 1 is yes, is the preparing lawyer required to disclose either the name of the preparer or that the document was prepared by a lawyer?
Rules 1.2 and 8.4(c) of Professional Conduct are applicable to this opinion. The relevant portion of these Rules provide:
Rule 1.2 Scope of Representation
(c) A lawyer may limit the objectives or scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.
Services Limited in Objectives or Means. The objectives or scope of services provided by a lawyer may be limited by agreement with the client or by the terms under which the lawyer’s services are made available to the client. For example, a retainer may be for a specifically defined purpose. Representation provided through a legal aid agency may be subject to limitations on the types of cases the agency handles. When a lawyer has been retained by an insurer to represent an insured, the representation may be limited to matters related to the insurance coverage.
A limited representation may be appropriate because the client has limited objectives for the representation. In addition, the terms upon which representation is undertaken may exclude specific means that might otherwise be used to accomplish the client’s objectives. Such limitations may exclude actions that the client thinks are too costly or that the lawyer regards as repugnant or imprudent.
Limited scope representation is an important means of providing access to justice for all persons regardless of financial resources. Lawyers are encouraged to offer limited services when appropriate, particularly when a client’s financial resources are insufficient to secure full scope of services. For example, lawyers may provide counsel and advice and may draft letters or pleadings. Lawyers may assist clients in preparation for litigation with or without appearing as counsel of record. Within litigation, lawyers may limit representation to attend a hearing on a discrete matter, such as a deposition or hearing, or to a specific issue in litigation.
Although this Rule affords the lawyer and client substantial latitude to limit the representation, the limitation must be reasonable under the circumstances. If, for example, a client’s objective is limited to securing general information about the law the client needs in order to handle a common and typically uncomplicated legal problem, the lawyer and client may agree that the lawyer’s services will be limited to a brief telephone consultation. Such a limitation, however, would not be reasonable if the time allotted was not sufficient to yield advice upon which the client could rely. Although an agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent representation, the limitation is a factor to be considered when determining the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. See Rule 1.1
Rule 8.4 Misconduct
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
(1) Is it ethical for lawyers to limit the scope of their representation to discrete aspects of a matter?
Yes. The 2011 amendments to the comments to Rule 1.2, set out above, expressly provide that a lawyer may provide limited scope representation on behalf of a client. Such limits can involve merely drafting a document or advising a client on how to proceed in a matter without undertaking a full representation. This is commonly referred to as unbundled legal services. It is important for lawyers to remember two important aspects of this type of limited scope representation. First, is that the lawyer does represent the client to the extent of the limited scope representation, and the full panoply of ethical obligations (including the obligation of confidentiality under Rule 1.6) apply to the representation. Second, a lawyer’s ethical obligations under Rule 1.4 require that the lawyer ensure that the client fully understands what it means to limit the scope of representation to discrete aspects of the representation and the consequences of the limited representation. For example, if the lawyer only drafts a motion for summary judgment but does not appear at the hearing, the client will have to present the motion and respond to questions from the court that the client may be unable to answer.
(2) If the answer to question 1 is yes, is the preparing lawyer required to disclose either the name of the preparer or that the document was prepared by a lawyer?
No. The issue is whether a lawyer who has prepared a document to be filed with the court, but who does not enter a general appearance, must indicate on the document either the lawyer’s name or that the document was prepared by a lawyer. Some federal courts and some ethics opinions have found the lawyer’s failure to disclose his/her involvement to be misleading or dishonest to the court in violation of Rule 8.4(c). The deception here is that the tribunal or opposing counsel could believe that the party has received no professional help at all, when in reality a lawyer has provided some assistance. As a result of this failure to disclose the client may receive more lenient treatment by a court who believes the party is proceeding pro se – unware of the limited representation provided.
While sensitive to these concerns, the Committee does not believe that a lawyer’s undisclosed limited representation is a deception as contemplated by Rule 8.4(c). A court presented with a lawyer-drafted document and a pro se litigant appearing to defend or argue that document, would be aware of the nature of a lawyer’s involvement. If not, the court can always inquire from the litigant whether a lawyer assisted in preparing the document. The unlikely event that a court will be misled into providing leniency to a pro se litigant under these circumstances does not outweigh the strong public policy set out in the Comment to Rule 1.2, encouraging lawyers to provide limited scope representation without having to enter an appearance. The Committee is concerned that lawyers will be dissuaded from providing limited representation if required to disclose their involvement.
There are two additional points to make about this opinion. The first is that a lawyer cannot utilize the limited scope representation to actively and substantially participate in a matter without disclosure. This opinion contemplates that the lawyer is performing discrete aspects of representation. On-going representation of a client without disclosure would be misleading and a violation of Rule 8.4(c). Second, this opinion is based solely on the Rules of Professional Conduct and a lawyer’s ethical obligation and does not address any questions of law.
January 16, 2018 § 2 Comments
In the spirit of the new year, which is always a good time to reassess and reevaluate, I offer you MCA § 73-3-37, with which I am sure you are familiar, but perhaps would like to read anew:
It is the duty of attorneys:
(1) To support the constitution and laws of this state and of the United States;
(2) To maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers;
(3) To employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to them, such means only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek to mislead by any artifice or false statement of the law;
(4) To maintain inviolate the confidence and, at every peril to themselves, to preserve the secrets of their clients;
(5) To abstain from all offensive personalities, and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which they are charged;
(6) To encourage neither the commencement nor continuance of an action or proceeding from any motives of passion or personal interest;
(7) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to themselves, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed.
July 24, 2017 § 2 Comments
In 2007, Annie and Frederick Griffin got into a dispute with the mortgage carrier, ABN, over modified terms, and stopped paying. They then sued in federal court alleging fraud and violation of other federal laws on debt collection. ABN filed a motion to compel arbitration, but the matter returned to federal court in 2010 after the arbitrator no longer handled consumer cases. The Griffins filed a motion to declare the arbitration agreement unenforceable, and in response ABN withdrew the arbitration request, no doubt to move the case along. The court granted ABN’s motion.
The Griffins then filed an objection to the ruling, even though they had a pending motion to rule the arbitration agreement unenforceable. They filed the motion pro se, because their attorney withdrew, citing the Griffins’ proclivity for not following his advice. Finally, in February, 2012, the district court entered a sua sponte order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute, concluding that “[i]t appears to this court that the plaintiffs view this lawsuit not as something to be actually litigated, but, rather, as something to be kept alive indefinitely, even at the cost of taking a position that is fundamentally inconsistent with the one they have taken for years in this case.”
In January, 2014, the Griffins filed another complaint in chancery court raising the same legal claims and issues as in the federal suit, and based on the same set of facts. There ensued a removal to and remand from federal court, a recusal, and finally a dismissal in chancery on the ground of res judicata. The Griffins appealed pro se.
In the case of Griffin v. ABN, et al., handed down May 16, 2017, the COA affirmed. Judge Greenlee wrote for the court:
¶7. “The appropriateness of application of the doctrine of res judicata is a question of law” and will therefore be reviewed de novo. Swaney v. Swaney, 962 So. 2d 105, 108 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
¶8. We agree with the chancellor that Griffin II [the chancery matter filed after the federal court dismissal] is properly barred under the doctrine of res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata has four identities: (1) identity of the subject matter of the action; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the parties to the cause of action; and (4) identity of the quality or character of a person against whom the claim is made. Harrison v. Chandler-Sampson Ins., 891 So. 2d 224, 232 (¶24) (Miss. 2005).
¶9. All four identities are met in the case at hand. The factual allegations in the complaint of Griffin II were copied almost verbatim from the complaint of Griffin I, and with the exception of dropping a couple of claims (the FDCPA and TILA claims), the complaint reasserts the same claims of fraud. All parties present in Griffin I were also present in Griffin II.
¶10. In addition to those four identities, to qualify as res judicata the prior judgment must have been a final judgment on the merits. Anderson v. LaVere, 895 So. 2d 828, 833 (¶10) (Miss. 2004). Under both Mississippi and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), dismissal for failure to prosecute operates as a final judgment and dismissal is with prejudice. An exception is found in Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(d), which provides that where dismissal is made by the clerk following twelve months of docket inactivity, that dismissal is without prejudice. See Strickland v. Estate of Broome, 179 So. 3d 1088, 1094 (¶18) (Miss. 2015). But the case at hand does not fall under Rule 41(d), but rather falls under Rule 41(b). Prior to dismissal, the Griffins were put on notice by the district judge that the case would be dismissed for failure to prosecute if the litigation did not move forward in a meaningful way. The Griffins responded by shifting their legal position in order to avoid trying the merits of the case. The district court’s dismissal of the action was not only appropriate for failure to prosecute, but was also consistent with the Griffins’ new argument that the case should not be tried in court at all but rather arbitrated.
The court went on to address and reject some other issues raised by the Griffins.
- Res judicata is all about identity of issues, facts, and parties. It matters not that the original, dismissed proceeding was in another state or federal court.
- Res judicata requires a final judgment on the merits in the dismissed action, and the COA found here that the federal court’s dismissal order was a final judgment on the merits per R41(b), and not a dismissal per R41(d).
- Shifting your legal position is a pretty effective way to frustrate your judge. My term for it is game-playing. Courts are for serious business, not for toying with others, delaying, pettifogging, and caviling. That’s the kind of conduct that will get your case thrown out of court. The Griffins’ lawyer was wise to withdraw before he became identified with their tactics and his own credibility with the court took a hit.
December 9, 2016 § 5 Comments
I know things can get tense out there, friends, but I hope it doesn’t come to this here in Mississippi:
A San Diego lawyer disbarred in a default judgment after walking out of his disciplinary trial says he plans to sue state officials involved in the proceedings.
The former lawyer, Douglas James Crawford, was accused of bringing pepper spray and a stun gun to a deposition, threatening to use them on opposing counsel if things got out of hand, and discharging the stun gun while pointing it toward opposing counsel, according to a summary of his case in the California Bar Journal. He was disbarred in September.
Crawford tells the San Diego Union-Tribune that he plans to sue for civil rights violations. He says he walked out of the disciplinary trial because he believed lawyers for the State Bar of California misrepresented facts and improperly kept him from presenting witnesses and evidence.
“As far as the disbarment, I could care less,” Crawford told the Union-Tribune. “It’s not really a group of people I want to associate myself with.”
A state bar court had found Crawford culpable in four of eight misconduct charges against him, according to the California Bar Journal summary and a July 2015 decision by the bar court hearing department. The bar court found he engaged in moral turpitude in the pepper spray and stun gun incident.
Crawford told the Union-Tribune that he brought the stun gun and pepper spray to the deposition because someone had brought a gun to another deposition and he felt unsafe. He said he displayed the stun gun and pepper spray to disclose that he was armed, but he never threatened anyone with them.
People bringing guns to depositions? People feeling unsafe at depositions? My Lord. And the disbarred lawyer is planning to sue for “civil rights violations.” Really.
I didn’t make this up. You can read the article at this link.
November 22, 2016 § 1 Comment
Suppose your client gave you her income tax return in confidence. You then make 20 unredacted copies and drive down the street throwing them at passers-by. Have you violated your client’s confidentiality?
Or suppose that your client gave you those same tax returns with the understanding that they would be disclosed in discovery in the course of her divorce. You send them unredacted to opposing counsel in answer to a request for production. Counsel opposite makes a copy for his client, who throws it in the back of his pickup. Later, it blows out as he zooms down the interstate, scattering your client’s name and SSN to the four winds. Have you violated your client’s confidentiality?
Or you simply file those tax returns unredacted on MEC. Have you violated your client’s confidentiality?
I think the undebatable answer in each scenerio is a resounding YES. It is you who chose to send the documents out into the cold, cruel, identity-stealing world unredacted, contrary to MEC Section 9. Remember, MEC says that if you file unredacted documents you have waived confidentiality; did your client authorize you to do that? Did your client even know you were going to do that?
I know, MEC applies only to electronic filings. True. But the principle should be the same in everything you do with your client’s sensitive documents and things, whether in paper discovery, exhibits in court, correspondence, and on and on. Your clients want and expect you to protect their confidentiality.
We get all manner of things attached to motions in this court. Our standard practice is to turn the paperwork over to the staff attorney who then uses the unprinted-on backsides to print internal memos, cases, etc. A few days ago, I finished a memo and noticed that it was printed on the back of a copy of a federal tax return. The names and SSN’s of the taxpayers were unredacted. Those were immediately shredded. Had I not caught that those folks’ names and SSN’s would simply have gone into the trash, and thence to a landfill, perhaps to be picked up by a breeze and deposited into the clutches of a n’er-do-well. Whoever filed that return unredacted is responsible for its consequences.
September 30, 2016 § 1 Comment
Ethical rules are clear in an academic context. Anyone who has practiced law, however, will tell you that applying them in the day-to-day scrum can be devilishly difficult.
For instance: You have discovered that, in a will you had prepared some time before your client’s death, you omitted one of his children whom he intended to be a beneficiary, and neither you nor he caught the omission. Now you are being called upon to probate the will, and you realize your oversight. What do you do?
A reader sent me this:
Attorney Parker Clifton was retained by Frank Henry to prepare estate planning documents. Clifton inadvertently omitted one of Henry’s daughters as a child on the first page of a pour-over will. The omission did not have any effect on the dispositive provisions of the document. At Henry’s death, Clifton was retained to probate the will. Before filing the document with the probate court, Clifton altered the first page to correct the error. After questioning by the daughter about the alteration, Clifton withdrew as counsel and self-reported his conduct.
The Ohio Board of Professional Conduct concluded that Clifton had violated Ohio R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(1) (knowingly making a false statement of law or fact to a tribunal) and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). Based on these violations, and considering mitigating factors such as a lack of prior discipline and Clifton’s self-reporting, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted the Board’s recommendation and issued a public reprimand.
Warren Cty. Bar Assn. v. Clifton, 2016 WL 4553838 (Ohio Sept. 1, 2016).
I invite your comments on how you would have addressed this situation.
Did Mr. Clifton really have to do anything, in light of the fact that, ” … The omission did not have any effect on the dispositive provisions of the document” ? The omission was “on the first page” of the will; we don’t know whether the missing name appeared elsewhere in the document.
If she were completely omitted and the testator had intended for her to be included, that would be a major problem. Otherwise, mere failure to name her in one paragraph would probably be inconsequential if she were identified elsewhere in the document.
Here, Mr. Clifton’s sin was in the alteration of the document and the initial dishonesty. Had he acknowledged the error and then had withdrawn and offered himself as a witness to the true facts, we would not be reading about him here.
This is the kind of thing that haunts lawyers sitting alone in their offices, confronted with a simple mistake that could have far-reaching implications that could reach into the lawyer’s wallet.
Thanks to Attorney Hale Freeland