WHAT IS YOUR DUTY TO THE COURT WHEN YOU HAVE CONTACT FROM THE OTHER SIDE?

February 14, 2011 § 1 Comment

You have filed a Complaint for Divorce for your client, and thirty days have elapsed with no answer being filed by defendant. Your client wants you to get this over with, and has been calling and asking when you plan to present his case to the court. Only problem is you received a letter from another attorney the day after the defendant was served with process. The letter says that she wants to settle, and if no settlement can be reached, she intends to defend. Since that letter, though, you haven’t heard anything further.

What do you do? Can you present the case as an uncontested divorce? Do you have a duty to tell the court about the letter?

The facts above are close to those in Holmes v. Holmes, 628 So.2d 1361, (Miss. 1993), in which the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed a chancellor’s refusal to set aside an uncontested judgment of divorce in those circumstances. The supreme court stated:

“In the case at bar, Mrs. Holmes promptly contacted an attorney. Her attorney wrote her husband’s attorney and informed him that Mrs. Holmes was represented by counsel and that she wished to settle the case if possible; however, he made clear Mrs. Holmes’ intent to defend the suit should no settlement be reached. With knowledge of this letter, Mr. Holmes’ attorney nevertheless proceeded to secure a divorce by default against Mrs. Holmes. In this regard, his conduct suggests gamesmanship. In the Comment to M.R.C.P. 1, it is stated that “properly utilized, the rules will tend to discourage battles over mere form and to sweep away needless procedural controversies that either delay a trial on the merits or deny a party his day in court because of technical deficiencies.” Conversely, improper utilization of the rules invariably results in the type of gamesmanship and ambush techniques, employed in the case at bar, that the rules were designed to abolish. We refuse to condone such behavior and therefore reverse the judgment of the chancellor and remand for proceedings consistent with the opinion rendered in this cause.”

So what is your duty to the court? At your first opportunity, tell the judge with all candor what contact you have had from another attorney. The judge will decide whether the contact is sufficient to constitute an appearance. You should offer the court any correspondence for the judge to examine. If your only contact was in the form of a conversation, relate accurately what the conversation was. Sometimes that contact was with the other party. Tell the court and let the judge decide whether it was enough to be treated as a contest. The judge may rule that the other side is entitled to a notice of hearing before you may proceed.

If you fail to disclose contact from another attorney or the other party, you run the risk that the other side may file a motion to set aside that judgment, and the judge may just file away a mental note about you that you are one of those lawyers who doesn’t tell the court all it needs to know to make a fair decision.

Read the entire Holmes decision and keep in mind the supreme court’s use of the distasteful terms “gamesmanship and ambush techniques.” Judges don’t appreciate those kinds of tactics that bring both the courts and the legal profession into disrepute.

WHAT’S BREWING IN THE CAPITOL THAT MAY AFFECT YOUR PRACTICE

February 3, 2011 § 2 Comments

Here’s a link to legislation pending in Jackson that may have some effect on your practice.

It’s early, and some things fall by the wayside while others get amended, but here are a few to take note of based on my own cursory, limited review:

  • HB 55 appears to take adult guardianships in the same direction that UCCJEA took child custody some years ago.  As our population ages, and younger people are taking responsibility for older adults, the tug-of-war between siblings for parents across state lines can create some head-scratching jurisdictional battles that this measure seeks to address.
  • HB 170 addresses an anomaly in the law created by the emancipation of a child.  The case law has held that the cause of action for past due child support becomes the enforceable obligation of the child after emancipation, even though the child support payments were due to the custodial parent.  This bill would allow the parent who was owed the support to collect it despite emancipation.
  • HB 689 is of high interest in chancery court since the supreme court handed down McDonald v. McDonald, 39 So.3d 868 (Miss. 2010), which held that hearsay in a guardian ad litem’s report is inadmissible.  This bill would correct that.  It spells out how hearsay in the report would be handled, and the procedure spelled out is similar to that proposed by Justice Pierce in his dissent to the majority opinion.

There are other bills proposing to:  revise requirements for durable powers of attorney; change acknowledgment requirements for recordation of certain instruments; revise procedures for filling judicial vacancies; clarify procedures for renewal of a judgment; specify where and when enforcement of liens takes place; spell out how disability payments are credited against child support; allow distribution of wrongful death damages without opening an estate; and filing-fee-funded increase in judicial salaries.  There’s plenty more there that might interest you.

YOU’D BETTER FILE THOSE POST-TRIAL MOTIONS AFTER ALL

January 27, 2011 § 9 Comments

Back on November 16, 2010, I posted here that you don’t have to file a motion for a new trial in chancery non-jury trials to preserve error for an appeal.  As I pointed out, it has never been the law in chancery court that such a motion was necessary, and MRCP 52(b) would appear to dispose of the issue.  I do believe that was an accurate statement of the law in chancery court.

Until Tuesday, January 25, 2011.

On that date, the court of appeals handed down its decision in Robinson v. Brown, in which the appellant attempted to argue that it was error for the chancellor to assess her with child support because she claimed that he had failed to make the appropriate findings of fact.  Justice Carlton’s opinion, to which there was no dissent, holds at ¶ 18 that the appellant:

” … failed to assert this alleged error post trial to the chancellor, and such failure waived her right to now complain as to this issue on appeal.  Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 52 allows the court to amend its findings, or make additional findings, upon motion of a party filed not later than ten days after the entry of a judgment or entry of findings and conclusions of law.  Watts v. State, 492 So.2d 1281, 1291 (Miss. 1986) (appellant was procedurally barred from raising an issue on appeal where he failed to raise it in his post-trial motion).”

The only case cited to support the point is a criminal case from circuit court, presumably from a jury trial.        

The opinion does not mention MRCP 52(b), which specifically states:

When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised regardless of whether the party raising the question has made in court an objection to such findings or has filed a motion to amend them or a motion for judgment or a motion for a new trial.

Would that exact language not apply in this case since the appellant was complaining that the trial court’s ruling was not supported by sufficient evidence?  And, as with nearly all chancery court cases, this was a case “tried by the court without a jury.”

The lone justice with chancery experience on the court of appeals, Justice Myers, is listed as “not participating.” 

Practice Tip: For chancery practitioners, I believe that this decision means that from now on you had better file a post-trial motion in every case if you have any thought of an appeal, and you’d better list every error you think might be in the record. 

For chancellors, this will mean an abundance more work, on top of the lengthy opinions we are required to write to pass scrutiny of the appellate courts.

There’s a lot I could say about this, but I guess I’d better not.  If you want my views, drop by my office and we’ll talk.

COLLATERAL DAMAGE FROM THE FALL OF ZEUS

December 30, 2010 § 2 Comments

Hinds County Circuit Judge Swan Yerger yesterday dismissed with prejudice Eaton Corporation’s lawsuit against Jeffery Frisby, et al., based on a finding that counsel for Eaton knew that Ed Peters was clandestinely attempting to influence the then trial judge, Bobby DeLaughter, and sanctioned Peters’ actions for their client’s benefit.

Judge Yerger found that dismissal of the billion-dollar suit was necessary to protect the integrity of the judicial system.  Philip Thomas comments on it here, with links to much more information on the suit.  Tom Freeland adds his thoughts here.    

The demise of Eaton’s suit is collateral damage from the Scruggs judicial scandal, which shed the light of day on Ed Peters’ activities vis a vis Judge DeLaughter in Scruggs’  legal battle with the Wilson law firm and gave reason to scrutinize his actions in Eaton.  If Balducci’s efforts to corrupt Judge Lackey had succeeded or never been reported, what is the likelihood that the improprieties in Eaton would ever have been uncovered?  And if Peters had gone undetected, would the defendants have suffered a billion-dollar miscarriage of justice?  Thankfully, we will never know for sure.

SYMPATHY FOR THE DEVIL

December 12, 2010 § 8 Comments

Curtis Wilkie’s THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF ZEUS is the story of the rise and fall of powerful trial lawyer Dickie Scruggs.  It is entertainingly well written, as one would expect of an author with Wilkie’s gift for the word, and microscopically researched.  Wilkie’s book complements KINGS OF TORT, Alan Lange’s and Tom Dawson’s treatment of Scruggs’ downfall from the prosecution point of view.  Those of you who savor Wilkie’s keen writing and incisive journalism will not be disappointed by this book.  The subject matter is a must-know for all Mississippi lawyers and jurists, and citizens as well.  I recommend that you buy and read this book.

Although I commend Wilkies’s book to you, I do find it troubling that it is unabashedly sympathetic to Scruggs.  Wilkie finally acknowledges their friendship at page 371, the third-to-last page of the book. 

As a member of the legal profession for nearly four decades and a member of the judicial branch, I can find no sympathy whatsoever for Scruggs at this stage of his life.  His flirtations with unethical conduct and illegality are legion.  Even his acolyte (Stewart Parrish’s excellent descriptive), Tim Balducci, said in a candid moment that his approach to corruptly influence judge Lackey was not his “first rodeo” with Scruggs, and that he knew “where all the bodies are buried.”  Big talk? Perhaps.  But to me it eloquently bespeaks Scruggs’ history:  His involvement at the shadowy edges of Paul Minor’s illegal dealings with Judges Wes Teel and John Whitfield; his use of stolen documents in the tobacco litigation; his use of questionably acquired documents in the State Farm litigation; and the hiring of Ed Peters to influence Judge Bobby Delaughter.  Are there more? 

Wilkie suggests that Scruggs’ increasing dependence on pain-killer medication led him to fall carelessly into a trap laid for him and Balducci by a scheming Judge Lackey, who had it in for Scruggs because of Scruggs’ political attacks on Lackey’s friend George Dale.  He posits that Lackey created the crime, and that Scruggs had set out initially “only” to improperly influence Lackey. 

The pain killers may be a contributing reason, but even a first-year law student knows that is not an excuse.

What about the idea of a trap?  I leave it to lawyers far better versed in criminal law and procedure to address that.  To me, the issue is finally resolved in this sentence on page 337:  “But Scruggs had acknowledged, ‘I joined the conspiracy later in the game.'”  Case closed as far as I am concerned.  Moreover, Scruggs was not an unsophisticated convenience store owner charged with food stamp fraud.  He was a sophisticated, powerful lawyer skilled in manipulating the levers of legal machinery.  He was not a gullible rube who did not grasp the significance of his actions or their consequences.  He was a lawyer and as such was held to the highest standard of propriety vis a vis the judiciary, a standard he trod into the mud.

As for Judge Lackey, the author skillfully excerpts quotes from the judge’s testimony to support his charge that Lackey had an animus against Wilkie’s friend, in particular the judge’s use of the term “scum” to describe Scruggs.  From my perspective, I can understand how someone in Lackey’s position would view the arrogant and powerful lawyer as scum when he saw how Scruggs had seduced the star-struck young Balducci, whom Lackey liked, into impropriety and, indeed, illegality.  Some of Dickie’s and Curtis’ influential and powerful friends in Oxford may buy Wilkie’s and Scruggs’ attempt to tar Judge Lackey, but I do not.  Judge Lackey chose to stay on the side of right and Scruggs chose the other side.  The point goes to the judge. 

Scruggs’ plaint that he only intended to commit an unethical act, not a crime — in other words that the consequences were unintended — is a familiar theme in history.  Henry II of England griped to his knights that he was irked by that troublesome bishop, Thomas Becket.  The knights, knowing from experience how far they could go before incurring the wrath of their king, promptly rode to Canterbury and rid their sovereign of that meddlesome priest, killing him at the altar.  Likewise, Scruggs’ knights, Balducci, Patterson, Langston, Backstrom and the others, knew the ballpark Scruggs was accustomed to playing in, and they set out with his money and influence to promote his (and their) interests in the accustomed manner of doing business.    

Henry II did penance for the rest of his life for what he saw as the unintended consequences of his actions.  Will Scruggs try to redeem himself for the damage he did to the legal profession and the legal system?  Time will tell.  When he is released from prison, he could find ways to devote some of his hundreds of millions of dollars to improving the courts and the legal profession and restoring integrity to the profession that made him rich.  In the final decades of his lfe, he could become known as a philanthropist who advanced the law and the legal profession, with his past a footnote.  I hope that is what he does. 

Read this book and judge it yourself.  You may see it differently than I.  The story, though, and its lessons, are important for Mississippians to know and understand.

THE WHOLE TRUTH AND NOTHING BUT

December 2, 2010 § Leave a comment

A Meridian lawyer passed this on from his LAWYERS desk calendar …

During a 1989 case in municipal court in Middletown, Ohio, a lawyer asked the judge to be excused from representing his client.

The judge scanned the courtroom, looking for a suitable replacement.  But before he could find one, the defendant stood up and said, “That’s all right, Judge.  I won’t be needing another lawyer.  I’ve decided to tell the truth.”

TRIBUTE TO JUDGE LACKEY

November 21, 2010 § Leave a comment

It was Judge Henry Lackey of Calhoun City whose refusal to be corrupted and courageous cooperation with law enforcement brought to justice some of the most powerful trial lawyers in this country. 

This tribute from the Calhoun County Journal:

Judge Lackey is truly one-of-a-kind

“There are two things you need to be a judge,” Judge Henry Lackey said. “A lot of gray hair to look distinguished and hemorrhoids to look concerned.”
Judge Lackey was speaking to a large gathering at the Oxford Convention Center that turned out to honor him upon his upcoming retirement after 17 years as circuit court judge and even longer as public servant.
Judge Lackey is less than two months away from entering retirement, but one look at this week’s Journal and you would see he’s busier than ever.
He was “roasted and toasted” at the Oxford Convention Center last week shortly after being honored by the Mississippi Supreme Court for his years of service on the bench.
Another reception is planned for Dec. 10 at First Baptist Church in Calhoun City.
This Thursday, Judge Lackey will once again be auctioning off Christmas items at the City Sidewalks Celebration at the Methodist Corner on the Calhoun City Square. Saturday night he is the featured entertainment at the Vardaman Sweet Potato Festival Banquet.
In between all of this he is still managing his day job as Circuit Court Judge for District Three. He’s spent all of this week holding court in Holly Springs.
The honors for 75-year-old Judge Lackey continue to pour in due in part to his role in one of the biggest legal crackdowns in recent history – the downfall of famed trial lawyer Dickie Scruggs and several of his colleagues.
“I’ve received praise and accolades that I don’t deserve,” Judge Lackey told me a few months back. “It’s like praising the sheriff for not stealing. It’s your job.”
Judge Lackey’s “integrity and intrepidness” in the case are well documented in Curtis Wilkie’s new book “The Fall of the House of Zeus” – a must-read according to my wife Lisa.
But as all the attention still pours in, and rightfully so, Judge Lackey still thinks of himself as the simple, “country lawyer” who still lives “within 300 yards of where he discovered America,” and that’s why he is so treasured here in Calhoun County.
A visit with him and you hear no mention of Dickie Scruggs. He talks of his “wonderful upbringing” in Calhoun City, working at his family’s business – the Ben Franklin 5 and 10 Cent store on the Calhoun City Square – and the endless list of fascinating people he grew up with such as Clarence “Dummy” Martin, Ray “Funnyman” Tolley, John Pittman, Mr. Mac, Monk and Big Dog.
I’ll never forget sitting in his office and him telling me of his experience when Robert Wardlaw, the world’s tallest man at 8’9″, visited Calhoun City.
One of the best story tellers I’ve every known, Judge Lackey is always worth the price of admission at any event he’s attending. I certainly wouldn’t let an opportunity to enjoy his tales or company pass me by.

The homespun Judge Lackey deserves our accolades.  As it is with Judge Lackey, I hope it will be said of all of us at the end of our careers that we adhered to the highest ethical principles and upheld the honor and dignity of the law.

Thanks to Tom Freeland for the link to this tribute.

 

DO I NEED TO FILE A MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL TO PROTECT MY RIGHT TO AN APPEAL?

November 16, 2010 § Leave a comment

Unlike the practice in Circuit Court, where a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial is a prerequisite to the right to appeal, it has never been the rule in Chancery Court that a motion for reconsideration or for a new trial or for relief from judgment operate in the same fashion.  In two opinions issued last year (I have not taken the time to dig them up, but they are out there), our appellate courts commented that no motion for a new trial had been filed by the appellant before taking appeal from Chancery.  It raised a question in my mind whether we were poised to go in a new direction. 

MRCP Rule 52(b) would seem to dispose of the matter, although I do not recall it being mentioned in the appellate decisions mentioned above.  It states:

When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised regardless of whether the party raising the question has made in court an objection to such findings or has filed a motion to amend them or a motion for judgment or a motion for a new trial.

Of course, the question of sufficiency of fact to support the findings is only one possible basis of appeal.  One may also appeal on the ground that the decision of the Chancellor is contrary to the law, or that there is a defect in personal jurisdiction (subject matter jurisdiction may be questioned for the first time at any point).  Is a motion necessary to preserve those points?

Without doing substantial research, I can only say that in my years of practice I never saw a case where an appeal from Chancery Court was rejected for failure to file a motion for a new trial.  Your mileage may vary.

CHANCERY COURT CONTESTED ELECTION RESULTS

November 4, 2010 § 1 Comment

In District 7 (Tunica, Quitman, Coahoma, Tallahatchie and Leflore Counties), Place 1, Catherine Farris-Carter of Shaw opposed Tom T. Ross, Jr., of Clarksdale. 

Farris-Carter  52%  Elected

Ross  48%

Also in District 7, Place 3, W. M. Sanders of Greenwood and Jimmy Miller of Marks faced off for a newly-created seat.

Sanders  63%  Elected

Miller  37%

District 8 (Hancock, Harrison and Stone Counties) to take the place of retiring Chancellor Margaret Alfonso.  Candidates were:  Jennifer Schloegel and Dara Skinner, of Gulfport; and Robert G. Harenski, William E. Tisdale and Fran Yeatts, all of Biloxi. 

Schloegel  51%  Elected

Skinner  13%

Harenski  11%

Tisdale  21%

Yeatts  3% 

In District 10 (Forrest, Lamar, Pearl River and Perry Counties), for Place 2, to replace Judge Sebe Dale.  The candidates were Dawn H. Beam of Sumrall, Scott Phillips of Columbia, and Aaron L. Russell of Carriere.

Beam  47%  Runoff

Phillips  36%  Runoff

Russell  17%   

In District 10 (Forrest, Lamar, Pearl River and Perry Counties), to replace deceased Judge James H. Thomas, write-in.

I learned from an unofficial but well-placed source that Judge Thomas actually received 54% of the vote, and, as a result, Governor Barbour will appoint a replacement. 

In District 13 (Covington, Jefferson Davis, Lawrence, Simpson, and Smith Counties), incumbent Judge Larry Buffington of Collins faced opponents Douglas MacArthur Magee of Mendenhall and David Shoemake of Collins.

Buffington  44%  Runoff

Magee  11%

Shoemake  45%  Runoff

In District 18 (Benton, Calhoun, Lafayette, Marshall and Tippah Counties), incumbent Judge Edwin H. Roberts, Jr. was opposed by Helen Kennedy Robinson of Oxford.

Roberts  69%  Elected

Robinson  31%

A comprehensive recap of all the election results is here.

ADAR UPDATE

October 18, 2010 § Leave a comment

The Adar decision issued by a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit was the subject of a post I made October 1, 2010.  You can read my post here.  The ruling, issued in February and amended in March, was that a same-gender adoption judgment in New York was entitled to full faith and credit in Louisiana. 

On the very day I made my post, the Fifth Circuit en banc vacated the three-judge panel ruling on a petition for re-hearing:

 On October 1, 2010, the Court announced that a majority of the Circuit Judges in regular active service voted in favor of granting En Banc rehearing. By operation of Fifth Circuit Rule 41.3, that decision automatically vacated the Panel decision of February 18, 2010.

That leaves us for now where the case started, which is with a pending appeal to the Fifth Circuit, which now will take the matter up in the full panel.

Stay tuned.

Thanks to attorney Bill Jacob for bringing this to my attention.

Where Am I?

You are currently browsing the Courts category at The Better Chancery Practice Blog.