BREAKING NEWS: TURNER v. ROGERS
June 21, 2011 § 3 Comments
The US Supreme Court yesterday ruled in Turner v. Rogers that it is a violation of the Due Process Clause of the US Constitution for the state to incarcerate a defendant for non-payment of child support when he was afforded neither benefit of counsel nor some alternative procedures, and he was not given adequate notice. I had previously posted about the case here.
I have only now gotten a copy of the opinion, and will post on it when I have a chance to read it.
Thanks to attorney Frances Stephenson.
MODIFICATION AND CONTEMPT: WHICH VENUE?
February 10, 2011 § Leave a comment
Steve and Nancy are divorced in Clarke County, Mississippi. The divorce judgment awarded custody of the three minor children to Nancy and ordered Steve to pay her child support. Shortly after the divorce, Steve relocates to the coast. After a year or two, Nancy remarries and moves to Tupelo with her new husband.
It has been six years since the divorce, and now Nancy wants Steve to begin paying more child support. Steve wants to file a contempt/modification action against Nancy for her interference with his visitation, and to gain custody of their oldest son, who now wants to live with dad. Nancy has not lived in Clarke County in the past four years, and Steve has not lived there in the past five years.
Which chancery court will have jurisdiction? Lee County where Nancy and the children live? Harrison County where Steve lives? Or is it the county where the defendant (respondent) resides, based on who files first?
The answer is: None of the above.
Clarke County will continue to have jurisdiction to modify and enforce its own judgments, even though neither party any longer resides there.
In the case of Reynolds v. Riddell, 253 So.2d 834, 836-837 (Miss. 1971), the supreme court held that the court that had original jurisdiction and rendered the judgment is the court that retains jurisdiction to modify and enforce that judgment, regardless of the residence of the parties since the time.
The appellant in Reynolds had argued that the version of MCA § 93-11-65 at the time conferred jurisdiction to determine and modify child custody on any Mississippi court where the child resides or where the party having actual custody resides, or where the defendant resides. The phrase “party having actual custody” must pertain to a party who obtained custody in in original proceeding and hence applies to modifications, the appellant argued. Not so, replied the supreme court opinion. It stated that the legislative intent of MCA § 93-11-65 was:
” … to provide a means of judicially determining the legal custody of a child in those instances where its custody was in question and no previous adjudication had been made thereasto, or either there existed conflicting custodial adjudications. We are of the opinion that the legislature did not intend to divest a court of jurisdiction … which continues in that court for the purpose of modification upon the changed circumstances between the same parties. We hold, therefore, that the Chancery Court of Washinton County did not have jurisdiction too modify the decree of custody entered by the Chancery Court of Sunflower County since the latter had continuing jurisdiction over these minor children.”
The court cited older cases that reached a similar result.
Three exceptions have been carved out of the rule announced in Reynolds:
- Reynolds itself created a procedure to remove the case to another county. At page 837, the court stated: “To alleviate the unfortunate condition made apparent by this case, the court vested with exclusive and continuing jurisdiction may entertain a motion to transfer the cause to the county which is the residence of the parents and the children, and upon hearing this motion, if it appears to the court in the exercise of its sound discretion that time and expense would be saved and the best interest of the children served or promoted, then the motion might be properly sustained.” [Emphasis added] Note the highlighted language. It provides that the action may be transferred to the county where both parents and children reside, not to a county where one parent or one parent and the children reside. In other words, you may proceed in the county where the custody order was originally entered, or in another county if both parents and children reside in that county, but in no other.
- In Bubac v. Boston, 600 So.2d 951, 955 (Miss. 1992), the court held that a habeas corpus proceeding may temporarily modify an original custody adjudication in certain limited circumstances, and that the jurisdiction of the habeas court is statutorily in the county where the children are being illegally detained. The habeas modification is temporary only until a permanent modification proceeding can be held in the court having original jurisdiction. The temporary nature of habeas jurisdiction wa recently reaffirmed in Pruitt v. Payne, 14 So.3d 806 (Miss. App. 2009).
- In Brashers v. Green, 377 So.2d 597, 599-600 (Miss. 1979), the court again upheld the separate jurisdiction of the habeas court and applied what was then the law regarding child custody modifications in cases involving parties in different states, which has since been supplanted by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. And in a post UCCJA case, the same holding, Roach v. Lang, 396 So.2d 11, 13 (Miss. 1981).
Reynolds was a pre-MRCP case. We’ve talked here before about transfers and venue, and how the two concepts interact. I am not aware of any cases that tackle similar issues from the standpoint of rules-based transfer, but the Reynolds rationale is sound under the rules and application of venue concepts, in my opinion.
In the case of Harry v. Harry, 856 So.2d 748, 751 (Miss. App. 2003), the court held that an action for contempt may only be brought in the same court that rendered the original judgment, and the contempt action is ancillary to the original proceeding. Venue is exclusive in the original court even though the petitioner has moved to a different county in the same state. “Only the court contemned has jurisdiction to punish the contemnor.” Harry at 751; citing Tollison v. Tollison, 841 So.2d 1062, 1064 (Miss. 2003).
Neither the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act nor the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act offer any help. Those laws govern actions between a non-resident and a Mississippi resident, or between residents of other states, and do not apply to actions between exclusively Mississippi residents.
I’ve heard lawyers say for years that there are other ways to transfer, but the only authority I have ever found one way or the other is above. If you have something else that points in a different direction, let me know .
In sum, bring that modification or contempt action before the court that issued the original judgment that you are seeking to modify or enforce. If all of the parties and all of the children have relocated to another county, and they are all residing in that single county, you can petition the court to transfer the case to the new county.
A MATTER OF INTEREST FOR CHILD SUPPORT CASES
February 7, 2011 § Leave a comment
MCA § 75-17-7 provides:
All judgments or decrees founded on any sale or contract shall bear interest at the same rate as the contract evidencing the debt on which the judgment or decree was rendered. All other judgments or decrees shall bear interest at a per annum rate set by the judge hearing the complaint from a date determined by the judge to be fair but in no event prior to the filing of the complaint.
It is error for the trial court to fail to award interest on the amount adjudicated to be owed for arrearage in child support. Ladner v. Logan, 857 So.2d 764 (Miss. 2003).
Although the statute expressly states that pre-judgment interest may not extend back prior to the filing of the complaint, the rule does not apply to due and unpaid child support. That is because each payment in arrears is vested when due and becomes an automatic judgment against the obligor. Pope v. Pope, 803 So.2d 499, 501 (Miss. App. 2002). Each unpaid monthly installment begins to accrue interest at the legal rate, not from the time it may subsequently be reduced to judgment by a court, and it is error for a chancellor to reduce or eliminate the interest. Dorr v. Dorr, 797 So.2d 1008, 1015 (Miss. App. 2001). Amounts paid by an obligor in arrears are applied first to the interest obligations, and then to extinguish the principal amount of the oldest outstanding child support payment, and then the next oldest, and so on. Brand v. Brand, 482 So.2d 236, 238 (Miss. 1986).
The appellate courts have allowed the trial judges deference in setting the rate of interest. Rates from three pecrent (Brawdy v. Howell, 841 So.2d 1175, 1180 (Miss. App. 2003)) to eight percent (e.g., Houck v. Ousterhout, 861 So.2d 1000, 1003 (Miss. 2003)) have been upheld.
There is no prohibition that I know of for a property settlement agreement to provide a contract rate for interest on unpaid child support or other obligations such as alimony, but I have never seen a property settlement agreement with such a provision. The rarity is due, I am sure, to the difficulty of getting an agreement. An advantage would be that the court would be bound to the contract rate. See, e.g., Tower Loans, Inc. of Mississippi v. Jones, 749 So.2d 189, 190 (Miss. App. 1999), where the court of appeals reversed a circuit judge’s imposition of eight percent interest where the contract called for a 34.71% rate, and the contract rate was not usurious. Another advantage would apply to alimony and other non-child-support obligations in that it would allow pre-judgment interest back to the filing of the complaint for enforecement; a nice perk if you can get it. Finally, setting an interest rate at least for non-child-support obligations might be prudent in view of the authority that, if the court does not impose interest on a judgment it renders for non-child-support obligations, it is presumed that the judgment does not earn interest. Aldridge, August 28, 1998, A.G. Opinion #98-0507.
FIVE SIMPLE STEPS TO PROVE ATTORNEY’S FEES
October 13, 2010 § 7 Comments
You would think that the award of an attorney’s fee would get special attention from both the client and the attorney. After all, the client is looking for some help with the financial burden, and the lawyer representing him is looking for some assurance that she will be paid. And one of the best ways to impress your client favorably is to hang your fees on the opposing party.
In many cases, though, I find that the lawyer takes a sort of slap-dash approach. Sometimes the lawyer confers with the other side and reaches a low-ball stipulation about a reasonable fee. Or the lawyer takes the witness stand (one of the very few occasions when an advocate is allowed to testify per Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct) and offers some general testimony in vague terms about a ballpark figure. Or the lawyer simply asks his client what she paid him and apparently thinks that will suffice.
Proving a reasonable attorney’s fee is actually a fairly simple process, but you need to cover all the points to make your client’s claim airtight. Before we talk about what you need to prove at trial, though, be sure you’ve done what you need to do before trial to lay a foundation for your claim:
- Record your time as you move toward trial, and have your time record printed neatly. You will need it for your testimony in court.
- Be sure there is a prayer for a reasonable attorney’s fee in your pleading. You are asking the court to take your opponent’s money, and that requires due process.
Now that the preliminaries are in order, here are the five steps to prove attorney’s fees:
- Be sure to have your client testify about his or her ability to pay. In divorce cases, ability to pay is the most critical consideration, and if you do not establish your client’s inability to pay, she will not be eligible for an award of an attorney’s fee. Deen v. Deen, 856 So.2d 736, 739 (Miss. App. 2003); Bates v. Bates, 755 So.2d 478, 482 (Miss. App. 1998). Even in a contempt case, where inability to pay is not required, you are wise to offer testimony about the financial effect of the contempt and the resulting attorney’s fees on your client, since an award of an attorney’s fee is not mandatory in contempt. Suess v. Suess, 718 So.2d 1126, 1129 (Miss. App. 1998). Remember that the ethical rules do not allow you as an advocate to testify about the contested merits of the case. If you are going to prove your client’s inability to pay, you will need your client’s testimony.
- Testify yourself about the prevailing rate charged by attorneys in the district. The award must be reasonable, and one of the key touchstones for reasonability is the usual and customary rate charged by attorneys in the district. But the prevailing rate is not binding on the court. The judge may award a fee at a greater or lesser rate if the circumstances warrant it. If you charged a rate different from the prevailing rate in the district, what rate did you charge and why? And if your rate exceeded the prevailing rate, what is your justification for doing so? Make your record.
- Put into evidence an itemization of the time you devoted to the case. Here’s where that itemized statement comes in. Identify it and ask that it be admitted into evidence. Before you do, though ask yourself: Is it credible? Does it look like a genuine fee statement that one would tender to a client for payment, or does it look like something you scratched together 5 minutes before setting foot in the courtroom? Are the times reported credible? Does it reflect charges for “one competent lawyer,” or are there charges included for others? Before you ever get to trial, pore over your statement and subject it to your own cross examination.
- Be sure to capture all the time in the case. Ask the court to take judicial notice of the time spent to that point in the trial, and estimate for the record how much more time will be needed to complete the trial. Estimate also the total number of hours that will be needed for any post-trial matters, such as drafting a judgment or preparing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
- Address each and every one of the McKee factors. You can read more about the McKee factors here. The McKee factors govern the amount of the award, but as a practical matter, if you don’t prove them there is nothing in the record to determine what is reasonable, which means that a reward of zero is most likely. No matter how badly you and your client want that attorney’s fee award, if you don’t include proof of the McKee factors, you likely won’t get it.
TRIAL BY CHECKLIST: ATTORNEY’S FEES
July 9, 2010 § 20 Comments
A practice tip about trial factors is here.
If you are expecting an award of attorney’s fees in your case, you must put on proof of the quantity of work that was done to earn the fees, as well as the amount of the fees. In the case of McKee v. McKee, 418 So.2d 764, 767 (Miss. 1982), the Mississippi Supreme Court set out the following factors that must be considered by the court in determining the proper amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded:
- The parties’ relative financial ability;
- The skill and standing of the attorney;
- The novelty and difficulty of the issues;
- The degree of responsibility involved in management of the case;
- Time and labor;
- The usual and customary charge in the community;
- Preclusion of other employment as a result of accepting the case.
If McKee factor evidence is not submitted, the court may deny your prayer for attorney’s fee, and if the trial court does award it, it may be thrown out on appeal.
In a divorce case, an award of an attorney’s fee is properly made only to a party who proves inability to pay and there is proof of the McKee factors. In Turner v. Turner, 744 So.2d 332, 338 (Miss. App. 1999), the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees was reversed where no itemized account was introduced into evidence, and the only testimony of fees was that the fee charged was $1,500 and that the party seeking the award was unable to pay it.
In other cases, an award of attorney’s fees may be made regardless of ability to pay where the party is found in contempt, or is found guilty of dilatory behavior or behavior that causes the other party undue expense, or for frivolous litigation, or for unfounded allegations of domestic abuse. In such cases, the proof of attorney’s fees should be supported by proof of the McKee factors.