PUBLICATION PROCESS: THE NIGHTMARE CONTINUES

July 18, 2011 § 1 Comment

Thank goodness most, if not all, lawyers are paragons of mental health.  Otherwise they would regularly be reduced to quivering, sobbing hulks curled in a fetal position on the office hook rug, terrorized by the veritable panoply of unseen legal bugaboos that can bite them, sometimes fatally, in the butt.  These legal viruses are not mere phantasms; they infest your files, lurking there invisible like the dust mites that feast on your body while you sleep.  <Shiver>

MRCP 4(c)(4)

I have already warned you about the dangerous propensity of MRCP 4 publication process to devour entire cases whole. It’s a rule that can transform your case from a delightful, playful puppy dog into an undead, zombie-esque creature that will turn on you and try to drink your blood and eat your skin.

Just when you were growing comfortable with your new-found awareness of Rule 4’s parlous proclivities, here comes something else to worry about.

It’s Article 6, §169 of the Mississippi Constitution, which is entitled, “Style of Process.” It states in pertinent part: “The style of all process shall be ‘The State of Mississippi …’ ”

Given the fact that the MSSC and COA have strictly interpreted Rule 4 as it applies to publication, I think you would be wise to look at your process forms and make sure that every one includes THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI. Look at MRCP Forms 1C, 1D and 1DD. Notice that each includes the style of the case, which includes the court, county and state, and the language THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI. Redundant? Perhaps. An additional line you have to pay for? Absolutely. Necessary? You bet; it’s required by our state constitution!

Chancellor George Warner consistently found process inadequate that did not include the requisite language. Over the years, we have grown less vigilant, and now you can find process in the newspaper that lacks the proper style. I predict that someone will raise this point on appeal and that the appellate court will say, “Sorry, you goofed up and violated the Mississippi Constitution; your process is no good, the court had no jurisdiction, and this case is reversed.”

Now uncurl yourself from that fetal ball, brush yourself off, and start fixing your forms. THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI. Add the words in where they belong. Take pride in the fact that you have avoided being a victim of this peril. And rest easy for now … until the next legal plague that will try to drink your blood and eat your skin.

                                                

Thanks to attorney Leonard Cobb.

TURNER v. ROGERS DECONSTRUCTED

June 22, 2011 § 4 Comments

By Ben McMurtray

Yesterday the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in the case of Turner v. Rogers. The question before the court was whether a respondent in a civil contempt proceeding, namely someone who was being threatened with jail time for failure to pay child support, has a right to have counsel provided to him.  The Court held that “the Due Process Clause does not automatically require the provision of counsel at civil contempt proceedings to an indigent individual who is subject to a child support order, even if that individual faces incarceration (for up to a year).”  The Court went on to hold that “in particular, that Clause does not require the provision of counsel where the opposing parent or other custodian (to whom support funds are owed) is not represented by counsel and the State provides alternative procedural safeguards. . . .”

The practical effect of this ruling has actually very little to do with the right to counsel.  Instead, the focus of the courts and attorneys should be on the “alternative procedural safeguards” mentioned by the Court.  The Supreme Court identified four such safeguards in its opinion, which, if employed together, can “significantly reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty” and therefore negate the need to appoint counsel to an indigent civil defendant.  These safeguards are:

  1. Notice to the Defendant that his “ability to pay” (the child support) is a critical issue in the contempt proceeding;
  2. The use of a form (or the equivalent) to elicit relevant financial information;
  3. An opportunity at the hearing for the defendant to respond to statements and questions about his financial status (e.g., those triggered by his responses on the form);
  4. An express finding by the court that the defendant has the ability to pay (before finding him in contempt).

This list is not inclusive of all possible safeguards that a state could employ.  In fact, the Court stated that past cases “suggest . . . that sometimes assistance other than purely legal assistance (here, say, that of a neutral social worker) can prove constitutionally sufficient.”

Turner, though, is quite limited in its scope.  The Court does not address several potential situations in this ruling, so the issue of whether counsel should be provided to indigent civil defendants is far from dead.  The Court did not say whether counsel should be provided when the party seeking the child support is represented by an attorney.  Instead, it was quite careful to limit the opinion to cases where the person seeking the child support was also represented pro se.  Furthermore, the Court explicitly held that this opinion does “not address civil contempt proceedings where the underlying child support payment is owed to the State, for example, for reimbursement of welfare funds paid to the parent with custody.”   Also, the Court did not address what due process requires in an “unusually complex” case where a defendant “can fairly be represented only by a trained advocate.”  In each of these instances, the holding suggests that the Court would be far more likely to hold that an attorney must be provided to an indigent civil defendant if the other side is represented by counsel.

So how does Turner v. Rogers affect one’s practice?  When a defendant is served with process in a child support action, just include something telling him that his ability to pay is an issue at the hearing.  Go ahead and attach some kind of a financial disclosure form too so that the court has all the information it needs to determine if the defendant is able to pay.  Make sure the defendant has a chance to talk about his financial statement and any testimony deriving therefrom during his hearing.  Finally if the court finds him in contempt, ensure that the judge makes a finding that the defendant has the ability to pay.

[Ben McMurtray is an Ole Miss law student who served as an intern in the 12th District this summer. His internship has involved learning about the inner workings of the courts, how lawyers operate out here in the real world, and how different judges handle things. He has observed trials, docket calls, motion hearings, chamber conferences and probate matters in Lauderdale and Clarke Counties, and he has sat in with Judge Clark in Scott County and Judge Fenwick in Neshoba. He even sat at defense counsel’s table in a rape trial in Lauderdale Circuit in which the defendant was acquitted. He observed an adjudicatory hearing in Lauderdale Youth Court. He has helped inventory the probate docket in Clarke County. This is his last week, and we will miss him when he is gone, but we wish him the best in the rest of law school and his legal career.]

BREAKING NEWS: TURNER v. ROGERS

June 21, 2011 § 3 Comments

The US Supreme Court yesterday ruled in Turner v. Rogers that it is a violation of the Due Process Clause of the US Constitution for the state to incarcerate a defendant for non-payment of child support when he was afforded neither benefit of counsel nor some alternative procedures, and he was not given adequate notice. I had previously posted about the case here.

I have only now gotten a copy of the opinion, and will post on it when I have a chance to read it.

Thanks to attorney Frances Stephenson.

THE US CONSTITUTION AT LONG LAST ARRIVES FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN MISSISSIPPI

May 17, 2011 § 3 Comments

Every lawyer sworn in on and after July 1, 2011, will have to swear to support not only the Constitution of the State of Mississippi, but also the Constitution of the United States.  Which means that only 193 years and 7 months after Mississippi was admitted to statehood, the lawyers thereof will now be getting around to swearing (or affirming) to support the national constitution.

Here is the oath prescribed in MCA § 73-3-35 as it is pre-July 1:

“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will demean myself, as an attorney and counselor of this court, according to the best of my learning and ability, and with all good fidelity as well to the court as to the client; that I will use no falsehood nor delay any person’s cause for lucre or malice, and that I will support the Constitution of the State of Mississippi so long as I continue a citizen thereof.  So help me God.”

The code shows the first appearance of the oath among our statues in the 1848 Hutchinson’s Code.  It’s impossible to tell from the currnt code whether the US Constitution ever appeared in the oath, or whether it was deleted.  Legislative history is not included in the judges’ Westlaw subscription — at least mine — so I can’t follow that up.

I am not aware of any requirement that the pre-July 1 lawyers will have to take a new vow vis a vis the US Constitution.  So does this set up the likelihood of warring factions among attorneys with loyalties divided between competing sources of organic law?  Are we to conclude that all pre-July 1 lawyers are exempt from supporting the US Constitution?  No, that would be erroneous, my dear friends.  MCA § 73-7-37 lists among the seven statutory duties of attorneys the duty “To support the Constitution and laws of this state and of the United States,” thus allaying fears of a bar civil war.

In 1945, the president of the Mississippi State Bar, Bidwell Adam, said with respect to the US Constitution, “It is my firm belief and honest conviction that no progress can be made in the direction of undermining this great Constitution … so long as the lawyers of this state and Republic continue to contribute their time, talents, energy, training and experience as its defenders.  Without the lawyers of this state and country, our Constitution would be lost to humanity and decadence would follow.”  Even 66 years ago, the need for lawyers to support the US Constitution was apparent, at least to the bar association.

But why was that particular requirement omitted from the oath and yet enshrined in statute?

The judicial oath of office set out in Article 6, § 159 of the Mississippi Constitution does include both the state and the US Constitution:

“I, ____________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all duties incumbent upon me as ____________ according to the best of my ability and understanding, agreeably as to the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution and laws of the State of Mississippi.  So help me God.”

I am sure there is some history behind all of this.  If anybody knows why the US Constitution was left out of the attorney’s oath, I wish you would enlighten us.

APPOINTED ATTORNEYS FOR CHILD SUPPORT DEFAULTERS?

March 24, 2011 § 1 Comment

Is an indigent parent in default of child support payments entitled to appointment of counsel when he or she is faced with jail as a penalty?  That is the issue that was presented to the Supreme Court of the US (SCOTUS) on March 23, 2011.

The majority of states do appoint counsel in such a situation.  Mississippi does not.  Nor does South Carolina, where the SCOTUS case originated.  In this case, Turner v. Rodgers, et al., Michael Turner was jailed for a $6,000 arrearage in child support for 12 months or until he paid up, whichever occurred first.  He could not pay, and so served the 12 months in jail.  Turner had been jailed repeatedly for failure to pay child support.

Turner takes the position that his jailing was for being poor, and that the system amounts to a debtor’s prison.  He argues that since his liberty was at stake in the court proceeding, the court should have appointed counsel for him.

South Carolina and the mother counter that it is not necessary to have a lawyer because such proceedings usually are decided on the simple issue of payment or non-payment, and the history thereof.  They point out that Turner “had the key to the jail,” as the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled in the case.  And they add that introducing lawyers into the proceedings would disadvantage mothers who can’t afford a private attorney to help them seek child support payments.

The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the right to an attorney in a criminal case, and SCOTUS has long interpreted that guarantee to include state criminal courts, but not civil cases. The distinction here is the possibility of jail time.

The SCOTUS decision is expected by this summer.

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