NEW FACTORS FOR UPWARD OR DOWNWARD DEVIATION IN CALCULATING CHILD SUPPORT
August 29, 2012 § Leave a comment
Significant amendments to the child support guidelines went into effect May 22, 2012, and I don’t think most attorneys are aware, because I don’t hear any proof addressing them in cases I try.
The amendments were to MCA 43-19-103, which sets out the bases that the court may use to deviate from the statutory child support calculation guidelines.
(i) Payment by the obligee of child care expenses in order that the obligee may seek or retain employment, or because of the disability of the obligee.
(j) Any other adjustment which is needed to achieve an equitable result which may include, but not be limited to, a reasonable and necessary existing expense or debt.
So if you represent a payee, you need to highlight those daycare expenses necessary for employment, have your client talk about its impact on her budget, and have her ask specifically for the court to take it into account in calculating child support. And disability of the payee is now a factor.
Also look at subsection j. It can be used by either payer or payee. Many families have significant debt incurred for the household, and the party who will have to pay it can look for some relief under this provision.
While you’re at it, check out all of the deviation factors. I hear a lot of cases where I never even hear any of them mentioned.
8.05 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS: “THE GOLD STANDARD” OF PROOF
August 22, 2012 § 6 Comments
This just in: Rule 8.05 financial statements are the “gold standard” of financial proof in chancery court. That’s what Judge Fair said in the COA case of Collins v. Collins, decided August 21, 2012, beginning at ¶34:
This case highlights the role of the income and asset disclosures required by Rule 8.05 of the Uniform Chancery Court Rules. Rule 8.05 mandates prescribed forms for such disclosure and also requires:
(B) Copies of the preceding year’s Federal and State Income Tax returns, in full form as filed, or copies of W-2s if the return has not yet been filed.
(C) A general statement of the providing party describing employment history and earnings from the inception of the marriage or from the date of divorce, whichever is applicable.
¶35. Compliance with the rule is mandatory, for obvious reasons. If both parties put down identical values for marital property and properly disclose their income and expenses, supported by the required federal and state tax returns and earnings history, a court can adjudicate property and money issues expeditiously and in accord with the law. Noting the importance of Rule 8.05 disclosures, in Trim v. Trim, 33 So. 3d 471 (Miss. 2010), the supreme court has ruled that filing a substantially false Rule 8.05 financial disclosure statement constitutes fraud on the court.
¶36. Though there may be contrary misinterpretation of some decisions, which properly [fn 1] apply only when conflicts between forms conflict,1 Rule 8.05 disclosures should not be evidence of last resort. Rather, they should be the gold standard, requiring other evidence only when there are legitimate disputes as to valuation. [Emphasis added]
[fn 1] “Chancellors may rely on these statements to value property when the parties fail to offer any other evidence as to value.” Kimbrough v. Kimbrough, 76 So. 3d 715, 721 (¶28) (Miss. App. 2011) (quoting Studdard v. Studdard, 894 So. 2d 615, 618-19 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004)). “To the extent that further evidence would have aided the chancellor in [his] decision, the fault lies with the parties and not the chancellor.” Messer v. Messer, 850 So. 2d 161, 170 (¶43) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Yes, 8.05’s are the gold standard of proof to a chancellor trying to root enough information out of the record to make a decision about equitable distribution and alimony. But some lawyers treat them like fool’s gold. Their 8.05’s do not include tax returns, figures are contradictory and incomplete, valuations are lacking, and there is no employment history.
In Collins, Mr. Collins included no tax returns, and he contradicted himself in his testimony, admitting that his 8.05 was incorrect and inaccurate. As a result, the chancellor relied on her own best judgment and calculated what she believed to be his income, resulting in an impressive $1,300 a month child support obligation.
The chancellor also accepted Ms. Collins’ valuations of real property in the absence of proof offered by Mr. Collins. Ouch.
Some parties offer tables of personal property with some pretty incredibe valuations. In one case I had the husband wanted the riding lawn mower, which he valued at $800. The wife — I am not kidding — valued it at $15,000. Husband testified that he had bought it several years before for $1,600 at Sears. I found his valuation more credible. What was the wife thinking when she tagged the item with that value? Did she think I’d bite on that? Where was her attorney when that table was prepared before trial.
Many lawyers and their clients adopt the extremely unhelpful tactic of valuing everything at near zero that they expect to get, and assigning astronomical values to everything the other party expects to get. For example, wife has the green couch, and she wants to keep it, so she values it at $50; husband opines that it is worth $2,750, and he does not want it. Give me a break.
Most people can not afford to hire a personal property appraiser to value their near-worthless pile of stuff. So lawyers toss it into the chancellor’s lap to flip a coin and make a call as to what the values might be. That’s a cop-out. Lawyers should be more professional than that.
If you try many financial-issue cases in chancery, I encourage you to read Collins. It’s the latest illustration of how parties shoot themselves painfully in the foot when they do a less-than-adequate job in prepping their 8.05’s, and it just might give you some ideas how an on-the-ball attorney can help his or her client avoid that kind of disaster.
CHILD SUPPORT AS A MIRAGE
August 21, 2012 § 1 Comment
Any agreement that provides for child support must be found by the judge to be adequate and sufficient, and it must be definite and specific enough to be enforceable.
Most agreements meet those requirements. You won’t go far astray if the child support is within the statutory guidelines and the language awarding it is clear and unambiguous as to how it was calculated, the exact amount to be paid, the due dates, and its duration (e.g., “until further order of a court of competent jurisdiction,” or “until the minor child is emancipated by operation of law or order of this court,” etc.).
These requirements don’t stop lawyers from presenting some pretty fanciful child support arrangements that sometimes make chancellors scratch their heads. Here are some that have been proven not to be allowable under Mississippi law, that you should avoid:
- An unspecified amount. In Lowrey v. Lowrey, 919 So.2d 1111, 1112 (Miss.App. 2005), the court rejected a provision that the mother would pay child support in the form of buying clothes for her children “in an amount that she can afford.” The provision is so indefinite as to be unenforceable. It also violates the fundamental principle that a person can not be held in contempt for failure to comply with a court order that is too vague or ambiguous to be understood. The court in Lowrey said at ¶33, “As it stands, a finding of adequacy and sufficiency depends upon enforceability of the child support provisions contained in a property settlement agreement.”
- Percentage child support. A provision that “husband shall pay 14% of his adjusted gross income as child support” is unacceptable. In Hunt v. Asanov, 975 So.2d 899, 902 (Miss.App. 2008), the court stated, “Before a party may be held in contempt for failure to comply with a judgment, ‘the judgment must be complete within itself … leaving open no matter or description or designation out of which contention may arise as to meaning’” [Citations omitted]. In order to determine what the father’s obligation might be or might have been, the court must look beyond the four corners of the judgment to extraneous earnings data and other information that in all likelhood is in controversy. The argument may be made that the case of Rogers v. Rogers, 919 So.2d 184, 188-89 (Miss.App. 2005) is contra. In that case, the COA held as unambiguous a provision that the husband would pay “14% of his adjusted gross income or $600 a month.” The argument raised by appellant there was that the apparent dichotomy betweeen 14% and $600 created an unresolvable ambiguity. The court rejected that argument and found the language clear, as did the chancellor. Rogers, however, did not directly address the problem of enforceability created by the need of the trial court to consider extraneous evidence to make a complete judgment, and the court pointed out that the $600 amount specified was clear enough to give the appellant an idea of his obligation. I do not see Rogers as an endorsement of percentage child support.
- Amount tied to unspecified return. In Rudder v. Rudder, 675, 678 (Miss. 1985), the court found a provision that the husband would pay any income or divident received from “any investments in the name of the child” was too “indefinite in amount, type, whereabouts, and the name of the holder.” The court held that the award was worthless, as a practical matter, to the custodial parent for enforcement. This type of support order is a subspecie of percentage child support. It requires the court to look to material extraneous from the four corners of the judgment in order to enforce it.
- Lump sum. In Pittman v. Pittman, 909 So.2d 148, 153 (Miss.App. 2005), the court reversed a chancellor’s award of $26,000 in residential equity as additional child support that he said was more ” … in the nature of child support than accumulated assets.” The COA held that the chancellor has no authority to make an award of lump sum child support. If the chancellor lacks such authority, then I am certain that a chancellor lacks authority to approve such an agreement between the parties. Note: Professor Bell says that the statute authorizing guardians to settle claims on behalf of wards has been held to allow lump sum settlements in paternity actions. Bell on Mississippi Family Law, 2d Ed., §11.06[2][b], p. 321.
The kinds of alternative child support provisions that lawyers come up with is only limited by the imagination. It is the court’s duty, however, to make sure that the provisions are adequate and sufficient for the support and maintenance of the child. The further you stray from statutory guideline child support the more likely it is that you will be sent back to the drawing board.
When you draft an agreement you want it to produce tangible benefits for your client. The last thing you should want is for a court to find that language you threw together heedlessly is no more than an illusory mirage or an insubstantial chimera.
WRONGFUL DEATH AND THE ERRANT FATHER
June 28, 2012 § 1 Comment
In 1988, Catherine LePori gave birth to a son, Brandon, without benefit of marriage. In 2001, DHS filed an action against Alton Welch to establish paternity of the child. For reasons unexplained in the record, no judgment was entered until 2007. Those are the barebones facts that underlie the COA decision in LePori v. Welch, decided June 26, 2012.
We can deduce from the record that Alton never paid any significant child support during the pendency of or after that DHS suit, and that he did not develop any significant relationship with the boy.
In March, 2008, Brandon was was working in a sewer line when it caved in and he was killed. He was nineteen at the time.
In March, 2009, Catherine filed suit to terminate Alton’s parental rights posthumously, expressly for the purpose of preventing Alton from having any interest in a wrongful-death suit she had filed. Alton had filed a motion to intervene in the wrongful-death action.
The chancellor dismissed Catherine’s petition for failure to state a claim, and she appealed.
In its decision, the COA noted that the statutes providing for termination of parental rights (MCA 93-15-103, et al.), are concerned with the best interest of the child, not the parents or survivors. Thus, if the child is deceased the statute logically no longer applies. The court held that the statute is not to be applied posthumously.
Catherine argued that dismissal of her termination case would unjustly enrich Alton, whom, she alleged, had caused substantial erosion of the parent-child relationship. Judge Maxwell’s opinion pointed out, however, that MCA 91-1-15(3)(d)(i) provides that the natural father must have “openly treated the child as his, and ha[ve] not refused or neglected to support the child” in order to inherit. That code section is incorporated into the Wrongful Death Act (MCA 11-17-13).
Based on the code sections, Judge Maxwell pointed out that Catherine could have filed an action to determine Brandon’s heirs at law in his estate, and pled 91-1-15 as a basis to adjudicate that he had no interest. Or, Judge Maxwell noted, she could have pled the statute to argue against Alton’s motion to intervene in the circuit court action.
This is an interesting case that has implications beyond its apparently narrow focus. When you’re confronted with issues such as this, don’t get tunnel vision and limit yourself to one way to go. Keep your eye on the big picture and consider how all the component parts fit together.
DOES ANYBODY ACTUALLY DO THIS?
May 10, 2012 § 7 Comments
The following is from the “Attorney Check List” section of the Civil Filing Form Instructions in the Uniform Data Collection Procedures (UDCP) mandated by the MSSC:
“In accordance with the Federal Social Security Act, Titla IV-D, §§ 454(2)(A) and 454A(e)(4), and Miss. Code Ann. § 43-19-31(l)(iii) (Supp. 2000), cases wherein child support is sought must provide the name, date of birth and Social Security number for all parties to the case to the State’s repository for this information (in Mississippi, the Department of Human Services). If child support is contemplated at the time of the initial pleading, filing party must complete Child Support Information Sheet. Initial pleadings wherein child support is contemplated must include this sheet prior to the clerk’s admitting the pleadings for suit; if, at any time after filing initial pleadings, child support becomes an issue and this sheet has not been submitted as part of the Court file, attorney for Plaintiff shall provide the completed form for the Court’s file. Any information not provided at the time of filing, but discovered at a later time up to disposition of the case, may be reflected in a more complete form being filed with the clerk’s office for the court file. The Child Support Information Sheet shall be submitted by the clerk to the AOC along with the disposition form … ” [Emphasis in original]
Do you know anybody who complies with this? The first MSSC order adopting UDCP and mandating reporting was in 1993, and the last amendment was ordered in 2001. Never during the time that I practiced law did I offer such a form to a clerk, either before or after initiating a suit, and I do not know of anyone else who did. I asked a clerk whether she had ever had a lawyer submit such a form, or whether she or the other clerks had ever refused to file pleadings for failure to submit the form, and the answer was negative on both counts. She also said that AOC has never raised the issue.
On another similar tack, we in the 12th District have required Wage Withholding Orders to be submitted in every child support case since they came to be in the 1980’s. Judge Warner insisted on it, and we did it, and continue to do it. Judges in other districts have told me that they not only do not require them, but that their predecessors did not.
All of this probably falls under the category of letting sleeping dogs lie, and I will. I just found these curious.
INCOME FOR CHILD SUPPORT
April 10, 2012 § 3 Comments
MCA § 43-19-101 should be familiar to you. It sets out the child support award guidelines. Since the guidelines are based on the payer’s income, it’s critical to understand just what and what is not included in income.
Subsection 3(a) tells us that we first have to “Determine gross income from all potential sources that may reasonably be available to the absent (i.e., noncustodial and paying) parent.” That’s an interesting phrase, “potential sources that may reasonably be available.” Notice that it does not refer to actual income. Potential sources that might come into play are to be considered.
Income under 3(a) includes, but is not limited to …
- Wages and salary income. There is no exception for overtime; it’s included.
- Income from self employment. Both reported and unreported income in this category is covered.
- Income from commissions. Variable and seasonal income is included, and there are different approaches that the court can use to address it. Bonuses are included.
- Income from investments. Dividends, interest and capital gains are income.
- Interest income.
- Interest earned from any trust account or property. It makes no difference whether it came from a “family trust” or similar creature; if it is income, it is included.
- Paying parent’s portion of joint income of both parents. As reflected on the joint tax return.
- Worker’s compensation.
- Disability. You can read the rules for calculating child support when the payer is a social security recipient here.
- Unemployment. No exemption from child support when the income source is unemployment benefits.
- Annuity and retirement benefits.
- IRA disbursements and withdrawals.
- Any other payments made by any person, private entity, federal or state government, or any unit of local government. Any 1099 income would be included. Any refund of taxes paid in would be included.
- Alimony.
- Income earned from an interest in inherited property.
- Any other form of earned income.
At the end of 3(a) is the statement: ” … gross income shall exclude any monetary benefits derived from a second household, such as income of the [paying party’s] current spouse.”
Section 3(b)(i) requires that overpayments of taxes are to be included in gross income. That means that income tax refunds must be added back in. For low-income taxpayers who claim benefits such as earned income credit and head of household status, this can mean an increase in gross income by as much as $3,000 to $5,000, based on what I’ve seen in court. The trick is to figure out how much of that refund was attributable to the paying parent, and not to his spouse, and then to calculate his tax rate, social security deduction, etc. Don’t expect the judge to do all that math for you on a hunch as to what the proper percentages might be.
As a rule of thumb, you would do well to include anything that might even remotely be considered income. The judge will. If it looks like income, sounds like income, smells like income and feels like income, it most likely is.
One would think that the statute and its intent are straightforward and unmistakeable, but not from what I see in court. Witnesses often testify that they did not include bonuses “because I don’t know whether I’ll get one this year,” or commissions because “I never know from month to month what my commissions will be,” or overtime because “I don’t know when I’ll get some more overtime.” That’s simply not the law. Irregularity and umpredictability are factors that the court can consider, but they don’t warrant completely excluding those items from income.
As a practice matter, are you asking questions in your interrogatories, depositions and requests for production that address all those types of income?
WHICH EXPENSES GET DEDUCTED FOR CHILD SUPPORT
March 20, 2012 § Leave a comment
In Coggins v. Coggins, handed down from the COA February 14, 2012, the appellate court was faced with the appellant’s claim that the chancellor erred by refusing his request to deduct rental investment expenses from gross income in order to arrive at adjusted gross income for calculation of child support.
The COA stated:
“¶19. The inclusion of income and deductions for calculating adjusted gross income for child support is primarily mandated by statute. According to section 43-19-101, in calculating gross income, the chancellor must consider ‘gross income from all potential sources,’ including wages and salary income, income from self-employment, and income from investments. As the chancellor explained, section 43-19-101(3)(b) lists several deductions that may be subtracted from the gross income figure, such as federal, state, and local taxes, social-security contributions, and mandatory retirement and disability contributions, but it does not list business expenses. Additionally, the Mississippi Supreme Court has allowed the deduction of legitimate business expenses in the case of a selfemployed payor-spouse. See Nix v. Nix, 790 So. 2d 198, 199-200 (¶¶3, 5) (Miss. 2001) (The chancellor considered the payor-parent’s legitimate business expenditures for reasons of equity, in order to determine available income for child support; he was a self-employed plumber.). However, the chancellor found no caselaw, nor do we, that allows for a deduction of expenses related to investments or supplemental business enterprises, which would be taken from the gross income of the payor-spouse. Therefore, in arriving at the adjusted gross income figure, the chancellor must include income from many sources, but not all expenses. The allowable deductions for this figure are statutory, and they differ from the allowable deductions for income tax purposes, upon which Bill appears to base his calculations. “
The court went on to point out that, although the statute allows for deduction of the expenses of self-employment, the appellant in this case was not self employed. The expenses he claimed arose out of investments that were a secondary source of income. His secondary employment resulted in a loss, and the COA said: “If [the appellant] opts to continue this rental venture at a loss, it should not be done to the detriment of his child.” The COA upheld the chancellor’s decision.
This case highlights the need for you to be quite familiar with with the child support guideline statute when you present child support issues to the court, and when you draft child support provisions in property settlement agreements. I urge you to read the guidelines and discover exactly what it is that should and should not be included in the calculation of child support.
While I’m on the subject, let me urge you (once again) NOT to list expenses on your 8.05’s as “mandatory” when they are not. The word “mandatory” so loosely used by so many of you is applied to all manner of deductions that simply do not meet the requirement of the statute. The statute limitss deductions to “legally mandated deductions.” That’s the exact phrase. So if there is a law that requires it to be deducted, it is a “legally mandated deduction.” That would include federal and state income taxes, social security, Medicare, and PERS for state employees. Health insurance (for the time being) is not legally mandated, nor are dental or cancer insurance, United Way, IRA contributions, etc., etc., etc. When you gratuitously label a deduction as “mandatory,” you are making the judge have to explain in the opinion why the deduction is not allowed. More work for the judge, which violates the cardinal rule — if you want to win, make it easier for the judge to find in your favor.
MAKING CHILD SUPPORT RETROACTIVE
March 13, 2012 § Leave a comment
Until 1991, the only way to get child support for a period predating your judgment was under MCA § 93-9-11, which allows the court to assess past education and necessary support and maintenance for a child for “one (1) year next preceding the commencement of an action” of paternity.
That changed with the case of Lawrence v. Lawrence, 574 So.2d 1376, 1384 (Miss. 1991), which held that the chancellor may make an upward modification of child support effective as of the date of filing of the pleading seeking modification. Downward modification is effective as of the date of the judgment of modification.
In the case of Strong v. Strong, 981 So.2d 1052, 1054-55 (Miss.App. 2008), the parties entered into a consent for divorce on the sole ground of irreconcilable differences and submitted the following matters for adjudication by the court:
“The parties submit all other issues relating to the extent of the Husband’s visitation with the children, child support, the existence of temporary child support arrearage, health insurance coverage for the children, payment of medical expenses not covered by insurance, life insurance with the children as beneficiaries, claiming the children as dependants for tax purposes, payments of college expenses; and all other related child visitation and support issues to the Court for adjudication.” [Emphasis added]
The court of appeals held that language adequate to uphold the chancellor’s decision to award temporary child support for the twelve months preceding the temporary order in the case, where the payor did not object to presentation of proof on the point. The court said:
“¶ 13. In order to obtain child support, it must be requested in the pleadings or be tried by the consent of the parties. Lee v. Stewart, 724 So.2d 1093, 1095-96 (¶¶ 3-4) (Miss.Ct.App.1998). Lee is instructive to this particular case. There, the chancellor awarded one year of past-due support even though the issue was never raised in the original or amended complaints. Id. at 1095(¶ 3). This Court held that since Lee failed to make a contemporaneous objection when the evidence was introduced on the issue at trial, the issue was tried with Lee’s implied consent. Id. at 1096(¶ 4) (citing Atkinson v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce of Miss., 530 So.2d 163, 166 n. 2 (Miss.1988)).”
It is interesting that both Strong and Lee turn on either a pleading for relief or trial of the issue without objection. The clear implication is that if you include a prayer in your pleading for past child support, it will open the door to that relief by the court.
Whether to grant retroactivity is discretionary with the court. Weeks v. Weeks, 29 So.3d 80, 89 (Miss. App. 2009). I take the position that you must include a specific request for retroactivity in your pleading, or I will not grant it. My rationale is that you are trying to take money (i.e., property) from the other party, and that requires due process under the Fifth Amendment, which in turn requires adequate notice and opportunity to be heard.
DID COLLEGE SUPPORT JUST GET BIGGER?
February 21, 2012 § 2 Comments
Teresa and Charles Zweber got an irreconcilable differences divorce by consent in 2006. A special master heard their case, and the chancellor entered a judgment of divorce. Charles got custody of the parties’ daughter, Lindsey, and Teresa was awarded custody of the son, Daniel. Paragraph 9 of the judgment addressed the parties’ college support obligation. It reads in part:
“The Husband and Wife shall each be required to pay for the cost of the minor children, with Husband paying two-thirds (2/3) of the expense and Wife paying one-third (1/3) of the expense, based on the cost of the child attending college at a four[-]year state[-]supported institution in such state as the child is a resident of. All costs are to be based on the average costs of meals, tuition, books and room, published in a state[-]supported catalog and not to exceed the cost of a four[-]year state[-]supported institution. This obligation shall continue even if the child is over twenty-one (21) years of age prior to the completion of college.”
When Lindsey reached college age, she opted to attend Delta State University (DSU) and enrolled in that school’s commercial aviation program. The degree curriculum requires that the student take flight-training courses, most of which are at the student’s own expense. The expense is considerable: the university’s own published figures state that students can expect to spend around $55,000 for all of the required flight-training courses. Of course, as with all college students, Lindsey spent money in addition for books, tuition, pencils, paper, gasoline for her car, pizzas, makeup, hamburgers, hairdos, laptops and related paraphernalia, etc., etc., etc.
Charles sent Teresa a bill for her share of Lindsey’s college expenses. Included were the usual dorm and meal plan expenses, along with the charges for the flying instructions. Teresa deducted the flight instruction costs and began remitting a monthly payment to Charles for her share.
At trial the chancellor found that the flight-training expenses were necessary for Lindsey’s college degree, and ordered Teresa to pay up. Teresa appealed, claiming that the chancellor was in error due to the specific language of the college expense provision of the divorce judgment, which Teresa read to limit each party’s liability.
In a decision rendered February 14, 2012, in Zweber v. Zweber, Judge Griffis, writing for the majority of the COA, pointed out that the requirement of flying lessons and their cost were spelled out in the DSU catalog, and that they were required to complete the degree. In a masterful understatement, Judge Griffis observed at ¶ 17 that “Indeed, it does make sense that a student would have to learn to fly before he or she could graduate from a commercial aviation program.”
The opinion goes on to state:
In Lawrence v. Lawrence, 574 So. 2d 1376, 1382 (Miss. 1991), the supreme court held: “Though college expenses are not technically ‘child support,’ a parent may be ordered by the court to pay them. A parent may also be ordered to pay some portion of the resulting expenses of college, in addition just to tuition.” (Citing Wray v. Langston, 380 So. 2d 1262, 1264 (Miss. 1980)). Today, the cost of a college education is not simply limited to meals, tuition, books, and room. Instead, all related fees and expenses of the child’s college education must be considered. This includes the direct expenses charged by the college or university (i.e., tuition, on-campus housing, fees, books, or other related expenses), as well as indirect expenses that are necessary for the child to live as a college student (i.e., offcampus housing, meals, transportation, insurance, computers, clothing, and personal expenses). Indeed, all of these costs are required for the child to complete successfully his or her college education. We recognize that not every parent can afford to pay these costs. The law provides that the chancellor, not this Court, is in the best position to make this determination. Based on our de novo review, we determine that the chancellor’s decision on this issue was correct. We therefore affirm the chancellor’s judgment.
I may be wrong, but I don’t recall the appellate courts setting out a more expansive definition of college education expenses before now.
There are implications here for your PSA’s. In essence, what the COA is telling you is that, unless you specifically carve categories of expenses out of the definition of college support, your client may face some additional expenses that never occurred to you in drafting it. That could be unpleasant to have to explain to the client after the expenses were incurred.
What about where the non-custodial parent is paying college education support and child support? It would be prudent, for example, to spell out that the child support will go toward your client’s share of “Junior’s transportation, off-campus housing and all other living expenses while at college,” or some such language that covers your situation.
In any case, you should specifically carve out and allocate those living expenses, such as “Husband will be responsible to pay the cost of Junior’s automobile, including maintenance not to exceed $1,000 per year, and gasoline and oil not to sxceed $200 a month, and wife shall be responsible to pay the off-campus apartment rent and utilities,” or something like that. If you don’t, the sky’s the limit.
There are a couple of other aspects of this case that deserve your attention. I recommend that you read it. After you read it, I urge you to consider the language in your PSA’s addressing that college support obligation and whether you are adequately protecting the interests of your client.
MAKING AN END RUN AROUND PIERCE
February 7, 2012 § Leave a comment
In Pierce v. Pierce, 42 So.3d 658 (Miss. App. 2010), the chancellor in a divorce had ordered the husband to pay the wife’s mortgage note until her child by a previous relationship graduated from high school. The COA remanded the case on other grounds, but instructed the chancellor not to tie the payment of the mortgage to any life event of the daughter, since she was not the payor’s offspring. In essence, the order amounted to an improper award of child support.
But what about where the child is the child of the payor? And what about where the payment is not any form of child support?
In Brooks v. Brooks, decided by the COA on December 13, 2011, the payor, Brandon, argued à la Pierce that the trial court had improperly converted payment of the mortgage note into additional child support when the judge tied Brandon’s obligation for mortgage payments to his youngest child’s attainment of the age of 18. He contended that the trial court’s actions were in violation of Pierce.
The COA rejected the argument that Pierce was applicable on the basis that there was no dispute that the child in question was his.
The court went beyond that point to add some significant language:
¶11. We cannot find that the mortgage payment was a form of additional child support. The award in the chancellor’s order was given under the heading, “Equitable Distribution,” and it was ordered after a discussion of the Ferguson factors. The chancellor ordered that when the house is sold, Brandon should receive 60% of the equity, and Dawn should receive 6 40%. The chancellor reasoned that “Brandon’s larger percentage will reflect his payment of debt, taxes[,] and hazard insurance over the next sixteen or so years . . . .” The upkeep and maintenance of the property are Dawn’s responsibility, except for repairs in excess of $1,000, which are the equal responsibility of both parties. Since the mortgage payment was part of the equitable distribution of the assets and Brandon will receive a portion of the equity back when the house is sold, the house payment is not the equivalent of child support. This issue is without merit.
The significance of this language is that it points a direction around Pierce via equitable distribution. If you can persuade your judge to consider mortgage payment as part of the equitable distribution, you can tie the payment to any life event of anyone. This can be helpful in a step-child situation as in Pierce itself, or where there are other child-related obligations not related to children of the parties. And just how do you pitch it? Offer the court through your client’s testimony a balance sheet showing your proposed equitable distribution. The judge might buy it.