TRIAL BY CHECKLIST: MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT

August 12, 2010 § 9 Comments

A practice tip about trial factors is here.

The trial court is required to consider the factors set out in Adams v. Adams, 467 So. 2d 211, 215 (Miss. 1985), in determining whether child support should be modified.

  1. Increased needs caused by advanced age and maturity of the children;
  2. Increase in expenses;
  3. Inflation factor;
  4. The relative financial condition and earning capacity of the parties;
  5. The physical and psychological health and special medical needs of the child;
  6. The health and special medical needs of the parents, both physical and psychological;
  7. The necessary living expenses of the paying party;
  8. The estimated amount of income taxes that the respective parties must pay on their incomes;
  9. The free use of residence, furnishings, and automobiles; and
  10. Any other factors and circumstances that bear on the support as shown by the evidence. (citing Brabham v. Brabham, 226 Miss. 165, 176, 84 So. 2d 147, 153 (1955).

Expenses of private school are a legitimate factor to consider in modification proceedings, although the expenses are inadequate standing alone. Southerland v. Southerland, 816 So. 2d 1004, 1007 (¶13) (Miss. 2002).

Educational expenses may be properly considered with the increased needs of older children and their increased extracurricular activities in order to justify an increase in child support. Havens v. Brooks, 728 So. 2d 580, 583 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 1998).

Remember that the keystone consideration for modification is a change in expenses of the child.  You must put on proof that establishes what the expenses were at the time of the judgment you are seeking to modify, as well as proof of the expenses at the time of trial.  Most importantly:  It is not adequate to prove only that the income of the paying parent has increased.

TRIAL BY CHECKLIST: EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION

August 5, 2010 § 23 Comments

A practice tip about trial factors is here.

The decision in Ferguson vs. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 928-9 (Miss. 1994), sets out the factors that the trial court must address in making a determination of equitable distribution.  Those factors are:

  1. Substantial contribution to the accumulation of the property, based on direct or indirect economic contribution to the acquisition of the property, contribution to the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationships as measured by the quality, quantity of time spent on family duties and the duration of the marriage, and contribution to the education, training or other accomplishment bearing on the earning power of the spouse accumulating the assets.
  2. The degree to which each spouse has expended, withdrawn or otherwise disposed of marital assets and any prior distribution of such assets by agreement, decree or otherwise.
  3. The market value and the emotional value of the assets subject to distribution.
  4. The value of assets not ordinarily, absent equitable factors to the contrary, subject to distribution, such as property brought to the marriage by the parties, and property acquired by inheritance or inter vivos gift by or to an individual spouse.
  5. Tax and other economic consequences, and contractual or legal consequences to third parties, of the proposed distribution.
  6. The extent to which property division may, with equity to both parties, be utilized to eliminate periodic alimony and other potential sources of future friction between the parties.
  7. The needs of the parties for financial security with due regard to the combination of assets, income and earning capacity.
  8. Any other factor that in equity should be considered.

Some principles of equitable distribution to bear in mind:

  • Equitable distribution applies to marital assets, which are assets acquired through the work efforts of one or both parties during the marriage.  Included in the definition of marital assets is added value, as where an asset was the pre-marriage property of one party, but its value was increased during the marriage by contribution.  An example is a 401(k) plan with a value of $10,000 at the time of the marriage that increases through contributions during the marriage to $100,000.  The increased value attributed to contributions is a marital asset. 
  • Equitable distribution does not mean equal distribution.  The division must be equitable, considering all of the Ferguson factors.  Each asset need not be divided; the overall division must be fair. 
  • Equitable division of the marital estate involves four steps:  (1) The trial court classifies each asset as marital or non-marital; (2) The court determines the value of each asset based on the proof, which may require appraisals; (3) The marital assets are divided equitably based on the Ferguson factors; and (4) move on to the Armstrong factors to determine whether, after equitable distribution, alimony is appropriate.
  •  The parties’ separate, or non-marital, assets are not subject to equitable division, although they are to be taken into consideration in the distribution as well as in ajudicating the need for alimony.  The values of non-marital assets must be in the record as well as that of the marital assets. 
  • Equitable distribution may be used to eliminate the need for an alimony award.  As the court stated in Ferguson at 639 So.2d 921, 929 (Miss. 1994), “Alimony and equitable distribution are distinct concepts, but together they command the entire filed of financial settlement of divorce.  Therefore, where one expands, the other must recede.”   
  • The contribution of a homemaker to the marital estate is presumed equal to that of a wage-earner, but the presumption can be overcome with proof that the homemaker’s contribution was actually minimal.
  • A spouse may be granted a greater share based on greater need.
  • In making its allocation of assets, the court considers the asset value net of debt, and may also factor in the amount of debt assigned to a party in determining how to award assets.
  • The valuation date is in the judge’s discretion, but the judge can be influenced by your proof and argument.  Give careful consideration to the date you wish for the assets to be valued.  For example, due to fluctuations in the stock market, it may be in your client’s interest for the valuation date to be closer to the date of the divorce than to the date of separation.  Make your position and its rationale clear to the court.  Caveat: The appellate courts have made it clear that entry of a temporary judgment stops accumulation of marital assets, so that any increased value or newly acquired assets after the temporary are the separate property of the party to whom they are attributable.

Equitable distribution is a complex subject with many nuances that are far beyond the scope of this post.  I recommend that you obtain a copy of Professor Deborah Bell’s Family Law in Mississippi, which includes an exhaustive analysis of the subject at Chapter VI.

TRIAL BY CHECKLIST: GRANDPARENT VISITATION

July 28, 2010 § 16 Comments

A practice tip about trial factors is here.

Martin v. Coop, 693 So.2d 912, 913 (Miss. 1997), factors for grandparent visitation:

  1. Potential disruption in the child’s life;
  2. Suitability of the grandparents’ home;
  3. The child’s age;
  4. The age and physical and mental health of the grandparents;
  5. The emotional ties between grandparents and the child;
  6. The grandparents’ moral fitness;
  7. Physical distance from the parents’ home;
  8. Any undermining of the parents’ discipline;
  9. The grandparents’ employment responsibilities;
  10. The grandparents’ willingness not to interfere with the parents’ rearing of the child.

Except in unusual circumstances, grandparent visitation should not be the equivalent of parental visitation. Martin v. Coop at 913.

If the court awards grandparent visitation equivalent to parental visitation, the court must make specific findings to support the award.  Settle v. Galloway, 682 So.2d 1032, 1034-35 (Miss. 1996).

TRIAL BY CHECKLIST: CHILD CUSTODY FACTORS

July 19, 2010 § 32 Comments

A practice tip about trial factors is here.

The factors that the court must consider in awarding child custody are set out in Albright vs. Albright, 437 So.2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983)

The factors are:

  1. Age, health and gender of the child.
  2. Parent having continuity of care prior to the separation.
  3. Parent with best parenting skills and willingness and capacity to provide primary child care.
  4. Employment of the parent and responsibilities of that employment.
  5. Physical and mental health and age of the parent.
  6. Emotional ties of parent to child.
  7. Moral fitness of the parent.
  8. Home, school and coomunity record of the child.
  9. Preference of the child at age sufficient to express a preference.
  10. Stability of parent’s home environment and employment of each parent.
  11. Relative financial situation of the parents.
  12. Difference in religion of the parents.
  13. Differences in personal values of the parents.
  14. Differences in lifestyle of the parents.
  15. Other factors relevant to the parent-child relationship.

The Albright factors are not to be applied in the manner of a scoresheet or mathematical formula.  Lee v. Lee, 798 So.2d 1284, 1288 (Miss. 2001).  The Chancellor may give special weight to one, two or several factors to determine the outcome.  Divers v. Divers, 856 So.2d 370, 376 (Miss. App. 2003).  The Chancellor has the ultimate discretion to judge the weight and credibility of evidence.  Chamblee v. Chamblee, 637 So.2d 850, 860 (Miss. 1994); Johnson v. Gray, 859 So.2d 1006, 1013-1014 (Miss. 2003).      

In an original action for custody, the Albright factors govern the award. 

In a modification of custody case, the proponent must prove 3 things, in combination, in order to prevail: 

  1. That there has been a change in circumstances of the custodial parent material to the issue of custody since entry of the last judgment; and    
  2. That the change in circumstances has an adverse effect on the minor child; and, if 1 and 2 are proven
  3. That it is in the best interest of the minor child to change custody.  Determination of the child’s best interest is based on application of the Albright factors to the facts of the case.

The standard for modification is like a three-legged stool; if one leg is missing, the stool can not stand.  It is a three-prong or three-part test. 

There is one exception to the three-part test for modification.  In the case of Riley v. Doerner, 677 So.2d 740, 744 (Miss. 1996), the Mississippi Supreme Court held that it is not necessary to prove adverse effect where the child is in an inherently dangerous or unsuitable situation, as where the custodial parent is using drugs.  Evidence of the Albright factors should still be offered in such cases.  Some argue that Albright proof would not be necessary in a case where the proof shows a clearly dangerous circumstance, but it is this judge’s position that proof of the Albright factors in such a case would make the case airtight.  

There have been cases following Riley that have explained and even expanded on the concept, so that now there is arguably a “totality of the circumstances” test to justify modification.  Some attorneys have taken the position that the “totality” is an alternative avenue to the three-pronged test.  This court is not convinced, and takes the position that Riley and its progeny apply in extreme circumstances where the proof shows that the child is showing no adverse effects despite being in an inherently dangerous situation.  In my opinion, the Riley line of cases is not intended to create a new remedy where there is no inherently dangerous situation and the proof is not strong enough to satisfy the three-prong test.

The Albright factors apply only to physical custody, and the Chancellor is not required to address them in considering whether to grant joint legal custody only.  Palculict v. Palculict, 22 So.3d 293 (Miss. App. 2009).

TRIAL BY CHECKLIST: ADVERSE POSSESSION

July 12, 2010 § 11 Comments

A practice tip about trial factors is here.

Section 15-1-13, MCA, sets out a six-part test that must be applied to determine whether adverse possession has occurred. 

In order for possession to be adverse, it must be:

  1. Under claim of ownership.  The possessing party must have acted with respect to the land as if he or she owned it. Jordan v. Peters, 986 So.2d 1018, 1022 (Miss. App. 2008); 
  2. Actual or hostile.  Actual possession is effective control over a definite area of land, evidenced by things visible to the eye or perceptible to the senses. Blankenship v. Payton, 605 So.2d 817, 819-820 (Miss. 1992); 
  3. Open, notorious and visible.  In order for possession to be open, notorious and visible, “An adverse possessor must unfurl his flag on the land and keep it flying so that the owner may see … that an enemy has invaded his domains, and planted the standard of conquest.” Sturdivant v. Todd, 956 So.2d 977, 982 (Miss. App. 2007);
  4. Continuous and uninterrupted for a period of ten years.   Possession may be tacked on to the possession of predecessors in title. Jordan, at 1023;
  5. Exclusive.  The law requires that the person possessing the property in question must intend to possess the land over all others and to the exclusion of all others. Sturdivant, at 992; and
  6. Peaceful.  The adverse possession must be peaceful and unchallenged by the title owner. See, Sturdivant, at 987.

The claim of adverse possession must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Thornhill v. Caroline Hunt Trust Estate, 594 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Miss. 1992).

The adverse possession statute was enacted by the legislature to address the serious problems caused by landowners who ignore claims or encroachments over long periods of time. Clanton v. Hathorn, 600 So.2d 963, 966 (Miss. 1992).

There are various cases interpreting the adverse possession factors.  The cases cited here are only a basic introduction.

 

TRIAL BY CHECKLIST: ATTORNEY’S FEES

July 9, 2010 § 20 Comments

A practice tip about trial factors is here.

If you are expecting an award of attorney’s fees in your case, you must put on proof of the quantity of work that was done to earn the fees, as well as the amount of the fees.  In the case of McKee v. McKee, 418 So.2d 764, 767 (Miss. 1982), the Mississippi Supreme Court set out the following factors that must be considered by the court in determining the proper amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded:

  1. The parties’ relative financial ability;
  2. The skill and standing of the attorney;
  3. The novelty and difficulty of the issues;
  4. The degree of responsibility involved in management of the case;
  5. Time and labor;
  6. The usual and customary charge in the community;
  7. Preclusion of other employment as a result of accepting the case.

If McKee factor evidence is not submitted, the court may deny your prayer for attorney’s fee, and if the trial court does award it, it may be thrown out on appeal. 

In a divorce case, an award of an attorney’s fee is properly made only to a party who proves inability to pay and there is proof of the McKee factors.  In Turner v. Turner, 744 So.2d 332, 338 (Miss. App. 1999), the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees was reversed where no itemized account was introduced into evidence, and the only testimony of fees was that the fee charged was $1,500 and that the party seeking the award was unable to pay it.

In other cases, an award of attorney’s fees may be made regardless of ability to pay where the party is found in contempt, or is found guilty of dilatory behavior or behavior that causes the other party undue expense, or for frivolous litigation, or for unfounded allegations of domestic abuse.  In such cases, the proof of attorney’s fees should be supported by proof of the McKee factors.

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