TWO PRAYERS FOR LAWYERS
September 16, 2011 § 4 Comments
My Lord God, I have no idea where I am going.
I do not see the road ahead of me.
I cannot know for certain where it will end.
Nor do I really know myself, and the fact that I think I am following your will does not mean that I am actually doing so.
But I believe that the desire to please you does in fact please you.
And I hope I have that desire in all that I am doing.
I hope that I will never do anything apart from that desire.
And I know that if I do this you will lead me by the right road, though I may know nothing about it.
Therefore I will trust you always though I may seem to be lost and in the shadow of death.
I will not fear, for you are ever with me, and you will never leave me to face my perils alone.
This next prayer comes from Alan Lomax’s The Land Where the Blues Began. He recorded it at a black Baptist state convention in Clarksdale in 1942. The sentiment, especially with its reference to a “war coat,” could not be more appropriate for the litigation gladiator.
You know I can’t help from loving You.
Because You loved me myself,
Long before I knew what love is.
And when my time have come
I’ve got the king’s crown in coming glory.
And when I come down to the river,
Help me to pull off my war coat and enter.
I’ll enter in the name of the Lord,
Make my enemies out a liar,
Make us able to bear our burdens.
Q & A WITH JUDGE FAIR
September 15, 2011 § Leave a comment
Chancellor Gene Fair is one of four chancery judges presiding in District 10 (Forrest, Lamar, Marion, Pearl River and Perry). Here is an interview he gave to 12 CCDM.
Q: Tell us some of your personal preferences that lawyers from outside your district need to know before they come before you.
I would appreciate their reviewing our local rules, particularly in setting cases.
We have Mondays established as ex-parte days to which Rule 81 returns may be made to the Court in which a chancellor is sitting without a “setting order” or “fiat”. They should be aware that Rule 81 provides for Rule 81 return days to be set by (1) local rules – our Monday rule (2) a “setting order” for the specific case and (3) a general order. We don’t have a general order.
Our Administrators will give a date to a lawyer or secretary to which a return may be made with the understanding, on occasion not verbalized to out of district lawyers, that the person getting the setting will have read and will follow the rules and send a “setting order” to be signed by the Chancellor if the day for a setting preferred not a regular ex-parte Monday.
We are happy to set cases for Tuesday through Friday on a fairly regular basis, but require a special order to insure that those who have trial settings are not delayed justice they have worked toward for weeks or months by a plethora of last minute seven day returns.
Our web page is “www.chancery10.com” and reflects where all four chancellors will be and their dockets for each day they will be in open court. The Local rules also appear.
Otherwise, I prefer to try to follow the Uniform Chancery Rules and the statutes as closely as possible, and believe that, except for those things set out in our local rules, my actions should and would be the same as any other chancellor in the state. I would appreciate applicability of those rules and statutes being noted by Counsel if I seem to be ignoring them.
Q: What are the three attributes that you would consider to set the good lawyers apart from the bad ones?
Good Chancery Court Lawyers:
- Have read and understand the local rules.
- Have read and understood the Uniform Chancery Court Rules.
- Have read and understand as much as is possible the statutes governing the matter they are presenting and the interpretations of the Appellate Courts applicable to their case, since the Civil Rules do not apply to the more than 90% of Chancery filings governed by Titles 91 and 93.
Bad ones have not.
Good lawyers who litigate also understand and follow the Rules of Evidence, particularly when they follow the rules about making objections and submitting relevancy at the time of objection.
Q: What is the main thing lawyers should know to avoid doing in your court room during a trial?
Being ignorant of and not following the Uniform rules governing chancery trials and the Rules of Evidence.
Q: What part of your job do you enjoy the most?
A good presentation by two good lawyers of an interesting question not easily answered under the case law and statutes, which they also present honestly and with clarity.
Q: What part of your job do you enjoy the least?
“Weevil cases” as defined by a retired judge of my acquaintance, referring to custody cases in which both parents, the only choices for custody, are less than impressive if not downright awful and the choice is therefore one of “two weevils”.
Q: What is your pet peeve as a judge?
Failure by lawyers to follow the Rules and Statutes and confusing quantity with quality in presenting evidence.
In divorce cases I would note particularly failure to follow Rule 8.05 of the Uniform Chancery Court Rules, (including a work history) and Miss. Code Ann. §93-27-209, the disclosure requirements of names, exact addresses and present whereabouts of those who have lived with a child or children whose custody and visitation are in issue. Those two documents contain, or should contain, the majority of basic evidence necessary to establish perspective and to decide the average divorce case – or to at least focus on matters of custody and visitation. I might also point out that the child support guidelines statute also requires presentation of evidence of health insurance and cost thereof by both parties in cases involving children.
In estate matters, I note Rule 6 of the Uniform Chancery Rules and the statutes in Title 91, (along with checklists on the Blog of Judge Primeaux referring to them).
Finally I am generally perturbed by introduction of documents by a party which either directly impeaches his or her own 8.05 disclosure or, on the other hand, supports an undisputed 8.05 disclosure . For instance – real estate, jointly owned, having been appraised and having an agreed balance owed on it and on which both parties agree in four lines of their 8.05 forms. Having established that, they then file 75 to 150 pages of numbered exhibits including a deed, a deed of trust, a note, a payment history, a payment schedule, the appraisal, photographs, and more than one copy of a bank verification of the balance due, and then never refer to any of those documents in trial. “Why all this stuff?” the Court wonders when writing an opinion. “And why all these tax returns?” A Rule 1006 summary of pertinent items on tax returns for the last 10 years is much more helpful than the ten copies of such returns, which should have been exchanged with opposing counsel and which can be used to impeach if necessary but which don’t need to clutter up the record and make the writing of an opinion by a judge take longer time and require more verbiage, and make him or her wonder what in those many pages might turn the decision one way or another.
The social security three or four page summary of lifetime earnings and entitlements is, likewise, a good document to accomplish the work of a number of others.
Less is more.
Q: Lawyer tells you, “That’s not how we do it back in ________ County.” Discuss.
Ask the lawyer how they do it and who the judge or judges are in ____ County who allow it to be done their way. Call the judge or judges for information and advice. Who knows, we may be doing things wrong in our counties. I definitely know judges who know more than I do and have much more experience, as well as some definitely worth listening to who are younger and have been on the bench for shorter periods of time.
On the other hand, Judge Dale told me about a respected lawyer in this district who made a similar statement in an estate matter before him. The lawyer emphasized how he “always did it and never had a problem” before another judge in our district. Judge Dale replied to the lawyer that the lawyer “was not going to keep on doing it wrong any more and was lucky to have got away with it as long as he did”.
Q: Who do you model yourself after as a judge?
My grandfather, who was not a judge, but was, in his own words, “a lawyer and a good one”, and my uncle, his son, who was a chancellor and a presiding justice of the Supreme Court when he retired. Both suggested that the proper role of a trial judge, and particularly a Chancellor, was to apply the law as written, as interpreted by the Appellate Courts, and in the interest of justice, with the emphasis on justice and on equity. My uncle, when on the Supreme Court, pointed out that in his opinion his role on the Supreme Court was to interpret the law in accord with statutes, rules and prior case law in a manner so that the attorneys and trial judges of the state would clearly understand how to take care of their business. He made it a point to actually read the entire trial record as a Supreme Court Judge, something I saw him doing on Sunday afternoons on more than one occasion, even during the period the appellant and appellee were required to provide a summary of the record to be relied on rather than the record itself. I try to read all exhibits and a rough printout of trial testimony before writing an opinion because of his example and his statement to me when I was a law student that “I presume that the lawyer who sent this to me meant for me to read it all myself and I don’t want to disappoint him or show him or his clients disrespect.”
Q: Who do you consider to be the best chancellor you ever appeared before, and what set that chancellor apart?
Naming one is impossible, though three immediately come to mind: Sebe Dale, John Clark Love and Bob Oswalt. My uncle Stokes would be number four, but I never appeared before him for obvious reasons. All three I have named radiated a love of the law and a concurrent respect for the litigants and the lawyers. All accepted the awesome responsibility of their duties to children and disabled adults with equanimity and confidence that they would and could do everything possible to protect them, which they did. All maintained a “students of the law” perspective, reading the Court file in full, and new cases and new statutes as they appeared. All attempted to change with the times and the decisions, even if they personally disagreed with them.
Q: Share your innermost thoughts and feelings about MRCP 81.
Sometimes I like it. Sometimes I don’t. Sometimes the Appellate Courts say it must be followed strictly. Other times they don’t. I just try to follow it, whatever it says and whatever they say it says. In the context of Title 91 and Title 93 matters, which constitute over 90% of chancery filings being excepted from the Rules of Civil Procedure in favor of statutes, we have to consider only the Rule 81 process paragraphs, which are detailed and specific as to “no answer”, setting in specific ways, and the minimum number of days between service and return day (30 days or 7 days). Judge Ishee, in a recent dissent opined that the Supreme Court should move that process portion of the Rule into Rule 4 of the Civil Rules, a suggestion in which I concur.
Q: What do you do to try and get control of your probate docket?
Judge Gambrell and I share a clerk a clerk and have assigned, in addition to research and writing duties, the duty to learn the ins and outs of a probate proceeding and to draft letters to lawyers and fiduciaries pointing out deficiencies, and suggestions for resolving them. Most result in “oops” type replies and corrective action.
It is occasionally necessary to point out the requirements that fiduciaries (including conservators and guardians, who occupy the same status as executors and administrators according to Miss. Code Ann. §93-13-38) and also their lawyers of record cannot just quit and/or ignore such matters. They have duties mandated by statute and controlled by contempt determinations, which a Court must occasionally enforce that way. I have issued only a very few “show cause why” a contempt adjudication should not be made, and mercifully have had only a smaller number when no cause at all was shown.
In addition, we are blessed with County Probate Administrators who can, and do, step in when fiduciaries die, disappear or refuse to act.
Q: There are 19 appellate judges. What would be the ideal number of former chancellors serving on the two appellate courts?
The perfect courts would have equal numbers of former Circuit Judges and Chancery Judges along with equal numbers of former practitioners in each type of court, along with, on the Supreme Court, one or more judges, in an odd number of those who have (or has) participated in both courts, either as judge or practitioner (Judge Jim Roberts comes to mind as having served as both Chancellor and Circuit Judge (and as a Supreme Court Justice as well) . Even though there are more Circuit Court appeals to the Appellate Courts, there are way less long opinions mandated in Circuit Court cases, so the time for research and thinking required overall in the chancery matters would appear to be equal to that of the circuit matters.
Q: Tell us your favorite quote.
“Wherever you go, there you are.” Yogi Berra.
Q: Tell us your favorite court room movie.
To Kill a Mockingbird.
AN OBJECTIONABLE OBJECTION
September 14, 2011 § 4 Comments
One of the most baffling objections is “Object to the form of the question.” It’s baffling because it doesn’t tell the judge what the real problem is.
It’s actually a lazy objection because it is several objections in one. Problems with the form of the question arise from nine distinct sources, each of which is a separate objection in its own right.
These are the real objections to the form of the question:
- Leading. MRE 611(c) says that “Leading questions should not be used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be used to develop his testimony.” Which means that the judge may grant some leeway in order to ensure that testimony is developed. Leading is, of course, permitted on cross examination, for hostile or adverse witnesses, and for preliminary matters.
- Compound question. You can ask only one question at a time. Often the witness answers only one of multiple questions, not always making it clear which one she is answering.
- Argumentative and Harrassing. This is really two different things. A question is argumentative when it is merely a comment on the evidence, or a legal argument, or an attempt to get the witness to adjudge his own credibility. A question is harassing when the probative weight of the information sought is outweighed by the embarassment to the witness or its outrageous nature. UCCR 1.01 states that “The counsel, parties, and witnesses must be respectful to the court and to each other,” and “Bickering or wrangling between counsel or between counsel and witness will not be tolerated.”
- Asked and answered. You enjoyed the answer so much the first time that you just can’t resist doing it again.
- Assumes facts not in evidence. You have broad scope within the bounds of relevance to develop new facts, but not by framing your questions in such a way that they take as true facts that have not been established. In chancery, with no jury, this is a touch-and-feel objection that the judge may overrule and then disregard the answer.
- Ambiguous and confusing. A question is ambiguous when it is susceptible to more than one interpretation. A question is confusing when it is phrased in such a way that it can be misunderstood.
- Misleading. Misstatement of the witness’s or another witness’s prior testimony.
- Narrative. The question calls for a recitation of the whole story, which may or may not include objectionable material.
- Repetitious. You already made that point. Move on to something else.
Unless you’re objecting just to hear yourself talk, you want your objections to accomplish something for the benefit of your client. General objections like “Object to the form of the question” are an objectionable waste of time. Your chances of getting your objection sustained go up when you make a specific objection.
RECUSAL IS FOREVER
September 13, 2011 § Leave a comment
Here’s an important principle to bear in mind:
Once a chancellor has recused himself in a case, he is without further authority to act in that case, even in the most trivial procedural matters.
The case of Covington v. Montgomery, 43 So.3d 1193 (Miss. App. 2010) illustrates how and why that principle can be so important. Here’s what happened:
Covington, an attorney in Harrison County, filed a petition in chancery court seeking modification of custody from his ex-wife to himself. All four chancellors, including Judge Carter Bise, recused themselves because one of the parties was a practicing attorney in the district. Judge Frank McKenzie of Jones County was appointed to serve as special chancellor. He heard the case and denied the modification. Covington decided to appeal.
On the last day of the appeal deadline, Covington filed a motion to extend the appeal time, and got the signature of Judge Bise on the order. He subsequently filed his notice of appeal within the enlarged time.
The COA, on its own motion, raised the issue of its jurisdiction and held that Judge Bise’s order “had no effect” because Judge Bise had recused himself and had no further authority to act in the case. The opinion, written by Judge Roberts, pointed out that the duration of the special chancellor’s appointment is determined by the supreme court’s order appointing him, and there was nothing in it to indicate that his authority ended before the trial court’s jurisdiction terminated with the filing of the notice of appeal.
I have been approached by parties in cases where I have recused myself seeking procedural orders. Often the parties are there by agreement. In one case, I was asked to sign off on an agreed final judgment because the special chancellor was on vacation. I told them to wait. Once I got out I had no more authority. It’s a point to bear in mind.
IF YOU EXPECT TO REAP, YOU HAVE TO SOW (AND SOMETIMES YOU REAP WHAT YOU DIDN’T KNOW YOU SOWED)
September 12, 2011 § 2 Comments
Riff Raff: I ask for nothing, Master!
Frank: And you shall receive it, IN ABUNDANCE!
— From The Rocky Horror Picture Show
In chancery court, be careful what you ask for — or don’t ask for. What and how you plead can make a big difference in your outcome.
Take the case of Caudill v. Caudill, 811 So.2d 407, 408-9 (Miss. App. 2001), in which Douglas, acting pro se, filed a response to a contempt petition raising his inability to pay as a defense. When Douglas tried to argue at trial that his pleading was sufficient to support a reduction in separate maintenance, the chancellor rejected his claim on the basis that “there is no petition to relieve you of paying …” and that he “needed to have filed a counterclaim asking for affirmative relief.” Douglas appealed, pointing out that pro se litigants are held to a less stringent standard of pleading than are lawyers. McFadden v. State, 580 So.2d 1210, 1214 (Miss. 1991). Citing West v. Combs, 642 So.2d 917 (Miss. 1994), Douglas argued that the trial judge should have looked to the substance of his pleading rather than its form.
The COA rejected Douglas’s argument and upheld the chancellor:
“While it is true that a pro se litigant may not be held to the same standard in drafting his pleadings as an attorney, the chancellor is not held to the task of a mind reader. If the chancellor is not able to determine a request for relief from the pleadings, he may not grant such relief. Douglas did not make a specific request for a reduction in separate maintenance and did not amend his pleadings to include such a request. The chancellor did not abuse his discretion or commit manifest error in refusing to consider Douglas’s pro se answer as a counterclaim for a reduction in his obligation.”
MORALS:
-
If you don’t include a request for specific relief in your pleadings, don’t expect to get it.
-
Chancellors (thankfully) are not expected by the appellate courts to be mind readers — at least in the realm of pleadings.
-
This case involved a pro se litigant; you, as a lawyer, are held to a higher standard.
-
If you do overlook pleading for certain relief, try putting on proof on the point anyway, and, if you do put in the proof you need, ask the court for leave to amend the pleadings and conform the pleadings to the proof. If the other lawyer blocks your attempts, as for leave to amend per MRCP 15.
-
If you ask for nothing, you shall receive nothing — in abundance.
In the recent case of Knighten v. Hooper, decided September 6, 2011, the COA upheld the chancellor’s decision not to award the child dependency tax exemption on the basis that the issue was not raised in the pleadings. Both parties had, at the court’s behest, presented proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and Knighten had inserted the issue for the first time in his submission. There had been no proof on the point at trial. The COA held at ¶ 16:
“After reviewing the pleadings and trial transcript, we find that Knighten did not properly raise the issue through his pleadings or evidence presented at trial. See MRCP 8, 15. As a result, Hooper was not given notice and an opportunity to respond. The issue was not subjected to the adversarial process and, as such, was not properly before the chancellor for consideration. Therefore, the chancellor did not err when she refused to address the issue in her judgment.”
While we are on the subject, keep in mind that once a pre-trial order is entered, it controls and determines the issues and relief, no matter what was in the original pleadings. In Singley v. Singley, 846 So.2d 1004 (Miss. 2002), the trial judge allowed in proof supportng a claim for alimony over objection on the basis that, although alimony had been omitted from the pre-trial order, it had been pled for in the original pleadings. The COA reversed, and the MSSC, in upholding the COA, stated, at page 1013:
“”The pre-trial statement approved by order of the chancellor controls. It is clear and concise, easily understood and substantially complies with M.R.C.P. 16. We hold that the chancellor cannot modify the statement unless it is done by mutual agreement with the parties as was initially done, or the chancellor finds manifest injustice, neither of which occurred. The Court of Appeals is affirmed on this issue.”
As it is true that you may not receive something for which you have not pled, the converse is true: that you may receive something for which you pled, but did not exactly foresee.
Take, for instance, the case of Rose v. Upshaw, handed down by the COA on August 30, 2011. In that case, Rose registered a Louisiana judgment in Mississippi, and asked the chancery court to severly restrict Upshaw’s visitation under the Louisina judgment. Instead, the chancellor found that the visitation provisions of the Louisiana judgment were not working, and modified the visitation in Upshaw’s favor. Rose appealed, contending that it was improper for the chancellor to grant any modification relief other than the restricted visitation he had prayed for. The COA disagreed:
Rose essentially argues, since he was the one to plead modification, the chancellor could only modify the visitation order to meet Rose’s specific request that Upshaw’s visitation be restricted. But, procedurally, the chancellor was not limited to granting all-or-nothing relief — either enforcement of the unmodified Louisiana order or restriction of Upshaw’s visitation rights. “On visitation issues, as with other issues concerning children, the chancery court enjoys a large amount of discretion in making its determination of what is in the nest interest of the child.” Haddon v. Haddon, 806 So.2d 1017, 1020 (¶ 12) (Miss. 2000)(citing Harrell v. Harrell, 231 So.2d 793, 797 (Miss. 1970).
So there you have it. Two general principles of pleading that you need to bear in mind:
- If your pleading does not include a clear request for relief that a chancellor can comprehend, you can’t expect to receive that relief; and
- Be careful of the issues you introduce into the proceedings because that whipsaw effect can sting.
“QUOTE UNQUOTE”
September 9, 2011 § Leave a comment
“I worked on levee camps, extra gangs, road camps and rock quarries and every place, and I hear guys singing uh-hmmmm this and mmmmm that, and I want to get the thing plainly that the blues is something that’s from the heart — I know that, and whensoever you hear fellows singing the blues — I always believed it was a really heart thing, from his heart, you know, and it was expressing his feeling about how he felt to the people.” — Big Bill Broonzy
“We’re blues people. And blues never lets tragedy have the last word.” — Wynton Marsalis
“I fancied I could smell the Mississippi, which for me is southern America in a liquid form, signifying fried catfish, roasting ears dipped in butter, and watermelon in the cool of the evening, washed down with corn liquor and accompanied by the blues.” — Alan Lomax
Q & A WITH JUDGE DAVIDSON
September 8, 2011 § Leave a comment
Chancellor Jim Davidson of Columbus sits in the 14th District (Chickasaw, Clay, Lowndes, Noxubee, Oktibbeha and Webster). Here’s a brief interview with the learned judge.
Q: Tell us some of your personal preferences that lawyers from outside your district need to know before they come before you.
We decide temporary issues by affidavits. Don’t file 500 of them however. This defeats the purpose of doing so by affidavits. We find that we hear the same proof on both. The purpose of the temp. is to maintain stability and status quo until the final hearing. 8:05 requires form, tax returns and pay stubs. It is not sufficient to have the client take it lightly. Please agree on as many issues as possible. Stipulations work better than trying to prove something that you may fail to do. Prepare summaries of the assets and prepare your client to testify about them. 500 exhibits requires a lot of time to assimilate and organize and we might , I say might, not have 3 days to wade through it. Don’t be baited into arguing for two hours about whether the other party said a curse word to your client. This is especially true if it is a custody case. Keep your eye on the ball!
Q: What are the three attributes that you would consider to set the good lawyers apart from the bad ones?
a. Organized and efficient b. Respect to the Court and the other parties and their attorney c. Brevity but with effect. Don’t belabor the small stuff.
Q: What is the main thing lawyers should know to avoid doing in your court room during a trial?
Never misrepresent the facts or the law, no matter how much it may hurt. This will come back in a big way to haunt you. Never argue with the Court even if you are right. This is why we have motions to reconsider and appeals. Don’t speak at the same time as the judge or the other lawyer. Most judges wish to keep their court reporters happy and they cannot take down two or three conversations at the same time. In spite of what many people think, the practice of law is a noble profession. That nobility can be destroyed by the actions of a few. Don’t lower yourself in any way, win or lose.
Q: What part of your job do you enjoy the most?
I enjoy most everything about my job. I especially enjoy adoptions because I am playing a big role in the change in that child’s life. I sometimes tear up and whenever possible we make a picture and give them a hug.
Q: What part of your job do you enjoy the least?
I struggle most with custody. Most of the time the reason we are there is that both parents want the child or children. someone is going to be disappointed. Adults can cope, but what if I make the wrong decision and that child’s life is change dramatically merely because of me. This is why they pay us the big bucks, I guess.
Q: Tell us a funny story about something that happened in your court room.
Law provides so many funny stories. It is truly the most colorful profession-this is illustrated by the huge number of lawyer jokes. Do you know one of the two CPA jokes-I didn’t think so! I was in a custody trial and one of the lawyers discovered that the mother may have been in the back of the house with her boyfriend while the children were in the front. He asked her, ” So while you were in the back doing Smoochy, smoochy, hoochy coochy (sp) the children were 20 feet away.” He had a straight face, but nobody else did.
Q: Who do you model yourself after as a judge?
I think Judge [John Clark] Love is probably the judge I would most emulate. He was thorough, fair and knowledgeable. Early in my career I was called out in the Courtroom by a judge for a very minor thing. He did this to most of the young lawyers. I vowed that if I was ever in that position, I would never embarass a lawyer in the courtroom. The courtroom is a place where people should expect not only justice but to be able to be there without fear or intimidation.
ESSENTIAL PROCEDURES IN A GUARDIANSHIP AND CONSERVATORSHIP
September 7, 2011 § 1 Comment
MCA 93-13-38 (1) states:
All the provisions of the law on the subject of executors and administrators, relating to settlement or disposition of property limitations, notice to creditors, probate and registration of claims, proceedings to insolvency and distribution of assets of insolvent estates, shall, as far as applicable and not otherwise provided, be observed and enforced in all guardianships.
MCA 93-13-255 provides that a conservator appointed by the court shall have “the same duties, powers and responsibilities as a guardian of a minor, and all laws relative to the guardianship of a minor shall be applicable to a conservator.”
That means that in your guardianship or conservatorship you will need to file your affidavit of creditors in the proper time, publish to creditors, file an inventory, and do all the other acts and things required of fiduciaries in estates.
And keep in mind that the MSSC has made it abundantly clear that there are dire consequences for both the fiduciary and the attorney for failing to do so.
AGREEING TO FOREGO CHILD SUPPORT
September 6, 2011 § 5 Comments
We’ve talked here before about forgiving child support arrearages. In a nutshell, the law is that the court can not order a reduction or forgiveness in child support arrearage except in the case where the father’s parentage of the child is subsequently disproved by DNA testing. In such a case, the statute permits the trial court to remit the arrearage to prevent an unjust enrichment.
What about the situation where the parents agree to forego child support altogether? Should the court approve it? Here’s a scenario:
R.C. and Esther obtain an irreconcilable differences divorce in which R.C. agrees to pay Esther $30 a week for child support. Later, however, R.C. and Esther into an extra-judicial agreement in which R.C. conveys his interest in a home to Esther and agrees to pay the mortgage debt; in consideration, Esther signs a “Covenant not to Sue” by which she agrees not to sue R.C. for the child support ordered. Esther ignored the agreement and sued R.C. for contempt when he paid the mortgage instead of the child support. The chancellor found the “Covenant not to Sue” unenforceable, and adjudged R.C. to be in contempt.
Confronted with these facts in the case of Calton v. Calton, 485 So.2d 309, 310 (Miss. 1986), the Mississippi Supreme Court stated:
… this jurisdiction has held that a child support judgment is awarded to the custodial parent for the benefit and protection of the minor child, the underlying principle being the legal duty owed to the child for the child’s maintenance and best interest. Wilson v. Wilson, 464 So.2d 496 (Miss. 1985), Hailey v. Holden, 457 So.2d 947 (Miss. 1984). There is a fiduciary duty owed to the child by the custodial parent. Wilson, supra, Trunzler v. Trunzler, 431 So.2d 1115, 1116 (Miss. 1983). The duty to support children is a continuing duty on both parents and is a vested right of the child. Wilson, supra, Simpson v. Rast, 258 so.2d 233 (Miss. 1972).
The court held that the parties’ agreement was unenforceable as against public policy.
As for the extra-judicial agreement, the court said at page 311 that “Further, the parents cannot by contract alter a court judgment entered for the benefit of a minor, for only the court granting such judgment can alter such a judgment.”
Aside from its obvious and express holding, Calton is a major component in my reluctance to approve agreements that provide that “Husband shall support the child when the child is with him, and Wife shall support the child when he is with her.” That kind of agreement, in my opinion, leaves open the question whether the parents are indeed fulfilling their fiduciary duty to the best interest of the child.
TRIAL BY GRIDIRON
September 2, 2011 § Leave a comment
Football season is here.
Lawyer 1: When did you learn that your husband had used the retirement funds to pay off his debt?
Lawyer 2: Objection. Irrelevant.
Judge: How is that relevant?
Lawyer 1: It’s probably not. I just threw a “Hail, Mary” hoping to hit something.
Judge: Well, the pass is incomplete. Call another play.
These referee signals might come in handy next time something like that comes up again in court …
Having a logic referee might help. But even with a referee, things usually look more like this …
A previous post with a link to a catalogue of logical fallacies is here.
Referee signals from Marginal Revolution.

