“QUOTE UNQUOTE”
March 4, 2011 § Leave a comment
“Those who dance were thought to be quite insane by those who could not hear the music.” — Angela Monet
“Dancing madly backwards
Dancing on a sea
Racing on my memories
I’m glad I set my dreams
Tip toe, tip toe quickly
Forget about your cares
And remember underneath you
Is just a sea of air” — Captain Beyond
“Perhaps sound is only an insanity of silence, a mad gibber of empty space grown fearful of listening to itself and hearing nothing.” — Steven Millhauser
NEW PECKING ORDER AT THE COA
March 3, 2011 § Leave a comment
Chief Justice Waller has appointed Judge L. Joseph Lee as Chief Judge of the COA.
New Presiding Judges are Judge Tyree Irving and Judge Kenny Griffis.
LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR A BUSINESS RECORD
March 3, 2011 § 1 Comment
Business records play a role in many chancery court matters. Getting them into evidence can sometimes be crucial to your case.
MRE 803(6) allows introduction of business records, and states that they are “not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness.” Before you can get the records into evidence, however, you must lay a foundation that the records come within the rule. The four elements of foundation are:
- The record was made and kept in the course of regularly conducted business activity;
- The record is one that is routinely made and kept in the course of business, in the business’s usual practice;
- The record was made at or near the time of the event that it records; and
- The record was made by a person with knowledge, or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge, and who reported such knowledge in the regular course of business.
The witness who establishes the four elements will be either the record custodian or “other qualified witness,” who may be any person who can testify that the records satisfy the four elements. The witness need not have personal knowledge of the contents, nor is it required that the witness was custodian at the time the record was made. All that is required is that the witness have knowledge of the procedures under which the records were made and maintained. In H & E Equipment v. Floyd, 959 So.2d 578, 581 (Miss. App. 2007), the trial court properly excluded the invoices upon which the plaintiff sought to sue on open account because the custodian failed to explain how the invoices, many of which were reprints, were created, or that the invoices relied on were created at the time the charges were incurred.
Under the rule, the focus is on when the documents were created, their trustworthiness, and whether they were created in the course of regularly conducted business. Ferguson v. Snell, 905 So.2d 516, 519-520 (Miss. 2004). In Bower v. Bower, 758 So.2d 405, 414-415 (Miss. 2000), husband offered the monthly internet bills to prove wife’s internet usage, and the husband’s testimony was the only authenticating testimony offered. The supreme court held that the trial court properly excluded them as not being proven to be business records; if you click through the criteria above, you can see that husband’s testimony did not meet them.
The fact that the records are maintained on a computer or in a data file does not require any additional foundation requirements.
The person who generated the information in the record must have had personal knowledge, but the person who entered or recorded the information need not have personal knowledge. For example, an employee of the business observes a chemical process and records the temperatures, reactions and times involved in hand-written notes, which she then tenders to a stenographer who turns the notes into a typed record that is maintained by a custodian. The employee who observed must have had first-hand knowledge when the notes were made and if called as a witness, but neither the stenographer nor the custodian are under the same requirement simply to authenticate the documents as business records. In Dillon v. Greenbriar Digging Service, 919 So.2d 172, 174 (Miss. App. 2005), it was held that the trial court properly let in an inspection report, even though the inspector/custodian who testified was not the inspector who performed the documented inspection, because he adequately authenticated it as a business record.
If the record includes a statement by a person who is not a part of the business and is under no duty to make the report, and the statement is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, it will be treated as hearsay that is inadmissible, unless it can be shown to come within an exception to the hearsay rule. An example: The business’s employee reports the contents of a conversation he had with a customer. If the statement is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted by the customer, it is hearsay and will not be allowed in unless it comes within an exception, such as the customer’s own statement offered against him. In Bingham v. State, 723 So.2d 1189, 1190 (Miss. App. 1998), the court of appeals held that a police officer’s report may be admitted only to prove matters observed by the officer, but not to prove inadmissible matter such as the hearsay statements of persons interviewed by the officer. Copeland v. City of Jackson, 548 So.2d 970, 975 (Miss. 1989). But see, Watson v. State, 521 So.2d 1290, 1294 (Miss. 1990), where the supreme court upheld admission of letters of complaint from customers maintained by a bank on the basis that the documents were made a part of the ban business records.
It sometimes happens that records generated by third parties become part of a business’s records. An expert’s report and recommendations, for instance, may be included in the records of a project. The expert’s testimony would not be required for introduction of the report if: (1) the custodian can establish that the expert’s report was incorporated into records kept in the normal course of business; (2) that the business keeping the record relies on its accuracy in the conduct of its business; and (3) “other circumstances” indicate the trustworthiness of the document. Documents that are prepared for litigation or “litigation inspired” are generally found to lack trustworthiness. Jones v. Hatchett, 504 So.2d 198, 201 (Miss. 1987); See, e.g., Gilbert v. Ireland, 758 So.2d 1050, 1053-1054 (Miss. App. 2000)
When the source of the information is an outsider who is not a member of the business organization, the statement may be admissible if there is proof that there is a regular practice of verification by an employee so that the outsider’s statements are adopted by the business and become its own statements. An example of an admissible outsider record would be an invoice submitted by an outside company that is verified by an employee, matched to a purchase order of the business, and attached to records in the business’s files. An example of an inadmissible outsider statement would be a letter from someone not connected with the business that is merely placed in the files of the business.
Objections that the records include ambiguous or inaccurate statements or that they are incomplete go to the probative weight and not to admissibility.
Proof of matters based on absence of entries in business records and admissibility of public records are subjects of other posts.
MRE 902 addresses self-authentication, which may apply to some business records.
OVERNIGHT GIRLFRIENDS: NOW WELCOME?
March 2, 2011 § 3 Comments
And boyfriends, too, for that matter.
It has long been a widespread practice in chancery court to enjoin the parties from having a girlfriend or boyfriend spend the night when the minor children are present. This language is lifted from a recent judgment in this district:
“The parties are each enjoined from having a person of the opposite sex, to whom the party is not related by blood or marriage, present at any time between the hours of 9:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m. when the minor children are present.”
The expected beneficial effect being that the children are not exposed to an inappropriate relationship and modelling of improper behavior. Seems like a worthwhile goal.
I have heard it questioned from time to time whether the court has authority to enter such an injunction in the face of some case law that discourages restrictions on visitation.
The matter may have been resolved in Howell v. Turnage, decided March 1, 2011. In that case, the chancellor had applied the familiar injunction, and the COA reversed his decision. Here’s what the COA said:
“At the close of the modification hearing, the chancellor voiced concern regarding Hannah’s visiting Mitchel’s home when his girlfriend was also spending the night. Consequently, the chancellor restricted Mitchel’s visitation with his teenaged daughter, Hannah. Specifically, the chancellor prohibited overnight visitation with Hannah “in any dwelling where a member of the opposite sex, to whom [Mitchel] is not related is also spending [the] night.”
¶16. The chancellor has broad discretion in determining visitation and imposing restrictions upon it. Dunn v. Dunn, 609 So. 2d 1277, 1286 (Miss. 1992). However, absent a finding of ‘actual danger or other substantial detriment to the children,’ a chancellor may not restrict a non-custodial parent’s visitation. Id. There was absolutely no evidence in the record that overnight visits in the presence of Mitchel’s girlfriend adversely affected Hannah. Therefore,the chancellor abused his discretion in placing a restriction on Mitchel’s visitation.”
Dunn, you may recall, is the case where the chancellor had entered a broad injunction against the husband ever having the minor children in the presence of the woman with whom he admitted having an adulterous affair. The injunction lumped together innocuous conduct such as attending church or a concert, dining out at MacDonald’s, or grocery shopping, with questionable and even outrageous conduct such as kissing, sleeping in the same bedroom, engaging in sex, and walking around the house in negligees. No rational person can question that there is a considerable distinction between the two kinds of conduct.
The Howell v. Turnage case was not remanded for the chancellor to hear whether there might be any such proof. It was rendered outright on the point. So the message we are to draw, apparently, is that the door is closed on such injunctions unless there is proof that the girl/boyfriend’s presence adversely affects the child.
Strictly my own opinion: This kind of living arrangement is probably standard operating procedure in the “sophisticated” big cities like Jackson, but I don’t think this will go over too well with the more respectable folks in New Hebron and Monticello, or in Quitman, Meridian, Zero or Shubuta, for that matter. Folks in these more “backwards” areas think that exposure of children, especially impressionable children in their early teenage years, to that kind of situation is per se harmful to them. And I guess I am old fashioned enough to see their point. I wonder why the COA could not have simply said that such a restriction, minor as it is, is reasonable.
Ironically, if the chancellor is weighing the best interest of the child under the Albright factors, she can consider behavior such as allowing an overnight guest of the opposite sex in the presence of the children as a negative under parenting skills or moral fitness, but when it comes to proscribing such conduct, now we are going to tie the chancellor’s hands? Maybe it’s just me, but that doesn’t make much sense. And it certainly doesn’t seem to put the best interest of the child first.
From a practice standpoint, if you’re pursuing that injunction, don’t just assume some harm to the children. Put on some proof about how it is harmful from a behavioral, moral and any other standpoint. At least that way there will be proof in the record to support a finding, and the appellate court will have to decide whether behavioral or moral harm to a child is something that the public policy of Mississippi wants to guard against or not.
There is nothing in the holding of this case that says that agreed injunctions can’t be enforced. Negotiating such a provision now, however, will likely be more difficult.
FINAL THOUGHTS ON THE JUDICIAL PAY RAISE (UNTIL NEXT YEAR)
March 1, 2011 § 1 Comment
Please pause a minute in your busy day and think back on the legislature’s slapdown of a judicial pay raise last week and its ramifications for your practice of law. Yes, whatever affects the court system directly affects how effectively you can represent your clients and what your future in the legal profession will be. You should be as vitally interested in the judicial system as a doctor is in the viability of the local hospitals and medical support system.
The courts are where you do your work, whether you are a court room lawyer or not. You need judges to get your job done. And you need good judges. Good judges are diligent, know the law and hold you to high standards. Bad judges leave you open to complaints and worse from your clients, neglect their work, and make your job considerably more difficult.
Our courts are the place where people bring their knotty problems — ones they can’t find a way to settle on their own. In chancery court, those problems include those that are at the very heart of the family, that involve inheritance and care for those who can’t take care of themselves, that deal with people’s real property rights, and even that involve dissolution of businesses, among many others. The judicial function is a critically important service provided by the state. It gives people a civilized way to resolve conflicts without bloodshed. Our courts are crucial to commerce.
But when it comes to funding this essential service, Mississippi treats the judicial branch like an afterthought. The judicial branch receives less than one-half of one percent of the entire state budget. That means that the legislative and executive branches feed off of 99.996% of your tax dollars. If it is true that government is a burden on taxpayers, as some maintain, the judicial branch in Mississippi is a featherweight.
When we underfund the judiciary, we aren’t simply starving the judges, we are depriving our citizens of the best value they can enjoy from an independent, competent, dedicated judiciary.
Down below you can read how Mississippi’s judicial pay ranks 51st in a nation of 50 states. How can we be proud of lagging behind places like Arkansas and Alabama, of all places? How can we set our sights so low when we have so much going for us? Is that really what we aspire to — to be the last or worst; to be like an Arkansas or Alabama — or worse?
I’m proud to live in Mississippi. I got my college and law school education here, raised and educated my three children here, go to church here, pay taxes here, and work as hard as I know how to be a good judge here. There is so much to treasure in Mississippi: wonderful people; our musical heritage; hunting, fishing and the outdoors; a small-town sense of community; world-class research facilities; a literary legacy no other state can match; beaches, the Delta, the hills, the Black Belt; and so much more. I could go on and on, but you get the point. How could any true Mississippian stand to be second to anyone else?
A lawyer I know suggested that the legislators voted against the pay raise (some legislators believe it or not voted against any appropriation for the courts) because they were afraid of voter reaction in November. If that’s the case, then why don’t they just pass a bill to tie judicial pay to a percentage of federal judge pay and be done with it? That way, they could absolve themselves of all blame as the pay would set itself in relation to federal pay. And if it is a fear reaction in an election year, what was their rationale in all those non-election years when they said “now is not the time.” I hate to think that there’s really simply a control issue here. I mean, don’t we make our decisions based on what’s best for the citizens we serve? Or are there some other dynamics at work? And should there be?
While you’re taking a few minutes to ponder all of this, I recommend that you check out Philip Thomas’s take on this issue at his Mississippi Litigation Review & Commentary blog.
Another chancellor sent the following thoughts. They’re worth mulling over.
“Facts about the vote of SB 2253 and judicial pay:
11 Republicans voted to pass the bill. 40 Republicans voted against the bill. 2 Republicans were either absent or not voting.
48 Democrats voted to pass the bill. 18 Democrats voted against the bill. 2 Democrats were either absent or not voting. 1 Democrat voted Present.
22 attorneys voted to pass the bill while 3 attorneys voted against the bill.
Under Rep. Blackmon’s amendment, salary increases would have been phased in over a 4 year period. The first increase was scheduled for July 1, 2012, with subsequent increases occurring on July 1, 2013, July 1, 2014, and July 1, 2015.
The salary increases were fully funded by user fees, yet the so-called conservative opposition says “We don’t have the money.”
The last salary increase for state judges, other than justice court judges, took effect January 1, 2004.
It has now been 8 years since the last salary increase, with no relief in sight.
The salary for trial and appellate court judges in Mississippi ranks 51st in a nation with 50 states. Salaries for judges in the District of Columbia exceed those for judges in Mississippi. In addition, judges in the American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands are paid more than Mississippi Judges. The only judges paid less than Mississippi judges are the judges of the pie eating contest at your local county fair, if you still have one.
‘These people are the salt of the earth who have dedicated their lives to serve the people of Mississippi,’ said Rep. Bo Eaton, D-Taylorsville. 58 members of the Mississippi House of Representatives were not at all impressed.”
I want to emphasize that no tax dollars were to be used to fund this raise, and even with the proposed raise in court costs, Mississippi’s would still be the lowest court costs of all the southern states. It would have been strictly a user’s fee.
I urge you as a member of the legal profession to give this issue some serious thought. Where do we want our court system to be? Do we really want to be last, or do our citizens deserve better? What can or should you as a lawyer do to help the situation? Do we want the best government we can afford or the cheapest we can get by with?